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2 Introduction  
 
Since the 1970ies silent but nonetheless important changes have taken place. They are 
altogether an expression of a "shedding of limitations". As one fundamental result of 
these developments, national politics alone, are decreasingly able to produce the desired 
results: "The steering capacity of governments has significantly decreased in issue areas 
where the scope of real economic and societal activities transcend the limits of national 
borders and rules" (Zürn 1996: 32, own translation). Additionally the number of 
problems that can no more be handled by a single state, due to this "shedding of 
limitations" has increased in the last decade (Jachtenfuchs 2003: 508). Hence nation 
states react at the international level with the creation of international institutions – 
regimes  and organizations – to gain back steering capacity, and to adjust the scope of 
political rules to the limits of social correlation of action (Zürn 1996: 33). The form and 
degree of formalization of these international cooperations varies widely. New forms of 
governance beyond the nation states emerge as a consequence of the increasing number 
of transnational social spaces.   
 
In many policy areas in Europe cooperation problems that emerge due to transnational 
exchange and the increase of international interdependences are handled within the 
framework of the European Union. The integration process and the creation of 
supranational institutions therefore, can be regarded as one answer, given to the 
declining steering capacity of the nation states alone. Nonetheless it is important to keep 
in mind that the integration process, especially the process of negative integration has in 
multiple ways contributed to this limitation of national steering capacity, too (Scharpf 
1999; Streeck 1995). Additionally the EU arena is only one part of this policy making 
beyond the nation state and one should therefore not fall into the trap of regarding other 
European transnational policy regimes, as weaker forms of cooperation or second-best 
solutions, per se (Wallace et al. 2005: 8).  
 
In the absence of a central super authority several forms of governance4 take place in 
the international system. The scope thereby ranges from hierarchical forms with a 
central authority existing, to forms of self-organization without governmental 
                                                 
4 In International Relations the term governance is used for just describing authority structures without a 
sovereign superior instance, whereas in other contexts and scientific schools this term is used in different 
ways, covering quite a range of different meanings (Mayntz 2004). 
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involvement. The main forms of governance beyond the nation state are international 
institutions. The latter are defined in this context as entities establishing permanent and 
stable behavior patterns of a specific number of actors in repeating situations. These 
behavior patterns rest on norms and rules, which define the repertoire of action. 
Additionally international institutions create spheres of authority (Zürn 1998: 169ff.). 
 
Institutional form or design is one important factor, amongst others like "type of 
problem", or "constellation of actors", on which the success of governance beyond the 
nation state is based (Jachtenfuchs 2003: 509). It is legitimate to assume, that both the 
type but also the form of a political institution influences the outcome, and that different 
institutions lead to different outcomes (Levy et al. 1995: 274). In short, institutions and 
their concrete form do matter or as March and Olsen put it: "institutions affect the flow 
of history" (March/Olsen 1989: 159). Hence the study of institutional form or design is 
one important array of research that should not be simply overlooked. 
 
In the context of EU research alternative modes of governance, often labeled new 
modes of governance, have received much attention recently (Caporaso/Wittenbrinck 
2006). They are characterized by their non-bindingness, subsidiarity and the use of soft 
law5. The mechanisms at work are diffusion, learning, persuasion, standardization and 
time management. A basic typology distinguishes two main types: a) Development of 
substantive targets b) Definition of procedural norms. The first type can be further 
divided into two subtypes, concerning the way the agreed upon targets shall be reached6 
(Caporaso/Wittenbrinck 2006; Héritier 2002). The increased interest in these forms of 
governance can be mainly traced back to the invention of the so called Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC), which was first specified for the European employment strategy, 
that is known as the Luxembourg process (Scharpf 2002: 653), and later formally 
introduced by the Lisbon Summit (Scharpf 2005: 13). Open coordination has received 
much academic attention so far (e.g. Radaelli 2003). Nonetheless the OMC should not 
be regarded as a wholly new governing mode as its fashionable label may imply. Taking 
into account international and historical comparisons, it becomes clear that it is just one 
                                                 
5 There exist different definitions and is has to be noted that soft law is a term that has been used to 
describe a range of processes (Trubek et al. 2005: 5). In the following this definition will be used: "Rules 
of conduct that are laid down in instruments which have not been attributed legally binding force as such, 
but nevertheless may have certain (indirect) legal effects, and that are aimed at and may produce practical 
effects" (Senden 2004: 112).  
6 See also Figure 10 in the appendix 
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special form of multilateral surveillance, that has been used in other organizations for 
years (Schäfer 2005: 16). Therefore the notion of a new, innovative or even 
"experimental" (Szyszczak 2006) mode of governance can be misleading7. The latter 
point makes clear that despite its high grade of delegated and pooled sovereignty8, and 
the necessity of distinguishing the EU from other International Organizations, policy 
making in the EU takes several different forms of which the traditional community 
method is just one among other forms. Policy-making in the European Union includes 
different policy modes: the traditional community method, the EU regulatory mode, the 
EU distributional mode, policy coordination, intensive transgovernmentalism (Wallace 
2005a: 77ff.).  
 
Whereas the Community Method was extremely effective in promoting integration, it 
has ceased to do so in recent years (Schäfer 2006b: 2004). "Rather than moving towards 
a functionally integrated and territorially consolidated state, or state-like entity, the 
European Union is developing into a collection of overlapping functionally specific 
arrangements for mutual coordination among varying sets of participating countries" 
(Streeck 1996: 70). This variation in the geometry of integration "uniquely fits the 
principles of intergovernmental cooperation among sovereign nation-states" (Streeck 
1996: 70). Streeck’s notion makes it clear that cooperation does not necessarily have to 
take place inside the EU. European states, being embedded in a plurality of international 
institutions, face a broad range of alternatives between cooperation and anarchy 
regarding institutional form. In the past the form chosen often was integration but 
voluntaristic forms of cooperation are on the increase (Schäfer 2005: 228). The "classic" 
Community method still remains important for a number of policy fields but: "It has 
not, however, become the dominant pattern, as early theorists suggested and 
Commission enthusiasts hoped" (Wallace 2005b: 486f.). 
 
Democracy is an additional important issue that should not be left out when discussing 
governance beyond national borders. Although the creation of international institutions 
is mainly due to solve common problems on the appropriate level, this proceeding does 
                                                 
7 Additionally it is more accurate to talk of multiple types of OMCs (Hatzopoulos 2007) and not of the 
one OMC. 
8 By pooling of sovereignty "voting by other procedures than unanimity" (Schmimmelfennig 2004) – in 
the context of the European Union mainly qualified major voting – is meant. Delegation implies a transfer 
of sovereign powers to semi-autonomous central institutions (Moravcsik 1993). 
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however often entail negative consequences for the democratic legitimacy of 
governance, inside the state as well as at the international level. Hence not only the 
positive sides of international cooperation should be stressed but also this so-called 
"dark side of intergovernmental cooperation" (Wolf 1999: 334).  
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3 Research topic 
 
In 1998 four European ministers responsible for matters of higher education signed a 
declaration that emphasized their will to harmonize their systems of higher education 
and to invent a study structure based on two main cycles. Ten years later 46 countries, 
ranging from Austria to Azerbaijan voluntarily cooperate under participation of a bunch 
of organizations including the European Commission as well as the European Student’s 
Union, and aim at the establishment of a common European Higher Education Area by 
the year 2010. Under the label "Bologna Process" the most far-reaching European 
reform of higher education systems that has ever taken place, even entails the sweeping 
away of longtime preserved heritages of national higher education traditions virtually 
over night. Bachelor-, Master- and PhD-programs sprout like mushrooms and 
increasingly the traditional landscape of Continental Europe’s higher education 
structures changes. The whole amount of consequences and implications this initiative 
has on European higher education in general, on all the institutions of higher education 
and not at least on all the citizens concerned, be it students or teachers cannot yet fully 
be appreciated.  
 
The field of higher education9 in Europe is of particular interest due to the changes that 
have taken place in the last decade. One site of interest in particular, is the relation 
between the European Union and its member states, which is characterized by tensions 
between national sovereignty in the field of higher education and the drive towards 
more integration promoted by the European Commission. As in other policy fields, the 
Commission’s expansion of competences, but also the rulings of the European Court of 
Justice10 were criticized by the member states. Within the Treaty of Maastricht, the 
authority and the competence of the European Union concerning the content of teaching 
and the structures of the national education systems was restricted:  
 
                                                 
9 The terms "higher education" and "tertiary education" are used in this research project the same way. 
Due to reasons of comparison the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED 1997), 
which is used by Eurydice, the OECD and UNESCO’s Institute for Statistics is employed here too. 
According to ISCED, higher or tertiary education encompasses level 5 and 6 (UNESCO 2006b), which 
mainly describes education that takes place at universities tertiary colleges (ISCED 5a/b) and studies that 
lead to advanced research qualification, like a Ph.D. (ISCED 6). It has to be mentioned that the category 
ISCED 5a encompasses Bachelor as well as Master degrees (Kelo et al. 2006). 
10 On this point see for example: (Blitz 2003; Beukel 2001; Walkenhorst 2005). 
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"The Community shall contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging 
cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their 
action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching 
and the organization of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity" (art. 149/1 
TEC).  
 
The sovereignty of the Member States and the subsidiarity principle clearly set the 
limitations for community actions. With the signing of the "Joint Declaration on 
harmonization of the architecture of the European higher education system" ("Sorbonne 
Declaration") that took place in the course of the Sorbonne University’s eight hundredth 
anniversary celebration (Hackl 2001b: 1) it became clear that some European states 
actively sought to coordinate their higher education policy in another institutional 
framework than the EU. This initiative to harmonize parts of the higher education 
systems surprised most of the EU member states and led to intensive discussions that 
were followed by further attempts to deepen and widen this cooperation. The signing of 
the Bologna Declaration ("Joint Declaration on the European Higher Education Area") 
in 1999 finally marked a visible shift of the dominating paradigm. While system 
diversities and strong rejection of any attempts to harmonization dominated for decades, 
with Bologna a need and will to adapt (the term “harmonization” was still rejected and 
therefore replaced through compatibility and comparability) the national structures of 
higher education was formulated. Regarding the legal meaning of the Bologna Process 
it is evident that this process stands formally outside the European Union’s treaty 
system (Linsenmann 2002: 527). The Bologna Declaration doesn’t possess formal 
relevance according to international law (Pechar 2003: 30; Seifert 2004: 38), and the 
signing states are not legally bound to comply (Huisman/Van der Wende 2004: 352). 
Therefore the realization of the Bologna objectives requires the voluntary action of the 
participating states.   
 
As Figure 11 shows, a bundle of institutions and International Organizations deal with 
matters of higher education policy in Europe and influence national systems of higher 
education. Whereas the EU action programs take place in the framework of the 
European Community, the Lisbon Strategy11, which is also relevant to the field of 
higher education, as well as the Bologna Process represent two soft-law based 
                                                 
11 See: Presidency conclusions, Lisbon European council. 23 and 24 march 2000. 
(http://europa.eu/european_council/conclusions/index_en.htm) 
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processes. These two processes can be distinguished in three dimensions. First Lisbon 
encompasses more than just one policy field, whereas the Bologna Process is solely 
situated in the area of higher education. Second, the Bologna Process and the Lisbon 
strategy represent different forms of soft coordination. Bologna focuses much more on 
specific goals and concrete content, whereas Lisbon exactly defines the methods how to 
achieve broadly formulated goals. Third these two processes differ strongly concerning 
their effectiveness, as far as it can be measured by now. Actual surveys show that the 
main Bologna Process goal, the invention of the two cycle study structure, is quite 
advanced (Eurydice 2005b), although the concrete implementation surely differs from 
country to country according to already existing analyses.12 On the contrary the efforts 
of the Lisbon strategy in reaching its goals are being rated quite poor.13 The underlying 
difficulty of distinguishing outcomes due to the effectiveness of OMC processes from 
other externalities still remains (Szyszczak 2006: 497). Additionally the Lisbon Strategy 
has already been subject to analyses dealing with the question of soft cooperation 
(Schäfer 2005), which is not the case with the Bologna Process. 
                                                 
12 For national implementation studies regarding the Bologna Process see for example: (Dittrich et al. 
2004; Furlong 2004; Malan 2004; Pechar/Pellert 2004; Welsh 2004). For more comparative syntheses 
see: (Tauch 2004; Kehm/Teichler 2006).  
13 For surveys concerning the effectiveness of the Lisbon strategy in achieving its goals see for example: 
(European Commission 2006; Kaiser/Prange 2005; Archibugi/Coco 2005; Campbell 2006). 
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4 Research interest and main research questions 
 
Summing up the main issues mentioned above, the Bologna Process represents a very 
interesting case to analyze. Not only because it is an actual example of soft coordination 
at the European level (an aspect which has not been analyzed till now) but also due to 
the fact that it helps us to understand the actual dynamics of cooperation in distinct 
policy fields at the European level. As stated above the classic Community method is no 
more the dominant pattern. Instead, other less binding forms of cooperation emerge. 
Nonetheless this does not mean that the European Union in general does not play a role, 
or that the European Commission in particular is not able to influence these new 
institutions at all. Not at least, the critical scientist also has to try to identify the 
implications of these soft forms of coordination, which may include further democratic 
deficits and problems. Hence following Wolf (1999), the question about consequences 
for  the democratic legitimacy of governance can therefore not be simply left out and 
will be discussed in this dissertation. 
 
The main research questions can be stated as follows: 
1. What explains the genesis of the Bologna-Regime? 
2. How can the institutional design of the Bologna-Regime be explained? 
2a. Why does this cooperation take place outside the EU? 
2b. Why does this cooperation solely base on soft coordination? 
3. What are the implications and consequences of the Bologna-Regime for the 
democratic legitimacy of governance? 
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5 Structure of thesis 
 
This thesis proceeds as follows: In the next chapter the theoretical framework, in which 
the research questions are embedded, will be worked out. This encompasses a state of 
the art discussion of theoretical approaches suitable to adapt to the research question 
and a debate why alternative approaches have not been considered useful in this context. 
Additionally the main terms and concepts used in this dissertation will be defined. After 
a profound discussion of the chosen theoretical approaches, always in reference to the 
respective research questions, hypotheses will be derived. Chapter 7 discusses the 
methodological aspects of this dissertation project. Starting with an explanation of the 
research design, the concrete methods of data collection and analysis will be discussed. 
The following chapters (8 and 9) provide the necessary information concerning main 
trends and recent developments, in the area of European higher education policy, as 
well as existing cooperation in this policy field. Chapter 10 constitutes the Bologna 
Process as an international regime, following the theoretical approaches. In chapter 11 
the first research question, concerning the emergence of this regime is answered. 
Chapter 12 engages with explaining the form of this distinct regime, why it does take 
place outside the European Union framework and why this initiative does only base on 
soft coordination. In the following chapter (13) that is the last empirical part of this 
dissertation, after a short overview about problems and deficits of democracy beyond 
the nation state, a framework for analyzing the democratic legitimacy and quality of this 
specific regime is developed and finally applied. The conclusion finally takes up the 
main findings, connects them with the research questions formulated in advance and 
discusses them under reference to the theoretical framework. Some remarks concerning 
possible theoretical future developments will be made as well as a short outlook 
concerning avenues for further research in this policy field. 
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6 Theoretical framework 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
It is evident that a theoretical framework encompassing the research questions stated 
above can hardly consist of one single all-explaining theory. Instead it is necessary to 
use and combine several approaches and concepts to gain as much explanatory power as 
possible. The research questions will be mainly embedded into an institutionalist, 
namely a regime-theoretical perspective, as the first question already implies. Regime 
theory has many advantages over other approaches. The most important one is its 
general applicableness. Therefore it cannot be only applied in the EUropean context, as 
is the case with some other theoretical approaches. Furthermore the questions that are of 
interest in this research project are exactly the questions regime theory deals with: How 
and why does cooperation at the international level take place and which shape do the 
emerging institutions take? 
 
Before turning to other theories that could contribute to an explanation on important 
issue still has to be mentioned: When it comes to explaining the form or design an 
institution takes, a lot of explanations found in the literature engaged with soft law are 
merely based on functional arguments that can be traced back to one general theme, 
which states that soft law is the appropriate way to deal with a given coordination 
problem. These arguments stress the flexibility, the simplicity or the low contracting 
costs in addition to the adequateness concerning the diversity of participating actors 
(Trubek et al. 2005; Schäfer 2006b). The theme that "institutions emerge as good things, 
and it is their goodness that ultimately explains them […] They exist and take he forms 
they do because they make people better off" (Moe 2005: 216), is a common one. But 
pure functional explanations are not enough. Neither societal functionalism, nor actor-
centered functionalism can account for explaining institutional choice, development and 
form alone, due to a bundle of limitations (see: Pierson 2004: 109-121, 2000b). In 
addition the notion that a particular institution is designed to achieve one particular 
goal, understates the problems of balancing competing interests of actors involved. 
Therefore "one cannot equate the initiators’ goals with the final outcome of these 
compromises" (Schickler 2001: 13). Furthermore it is important to stress the point that, 
for social research that is oriented towards explanation, functional arguments alone do 
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not suffice. Given the function is held constant, they would let us expect similar 
solutions, which is falsified by the immense variation of institutional solutions  
(Mayntz/Scharpf 1995b: 15).  
 
Other research projects work with the Europeanization approach to explain the recent 
developments in the field of higher education14 , stressing the bottom-up dimension of 
this concept. This also points to a big problem of the Europeanization concept: 
Europeanization means (too) many things15. Originally it was used for the study of 
effects stemming from the European level on the national level (Radaelli 2000), but in 
the meantime also other interpretations and applications exist (Olsen 2002; Risse et al. 
2001). Due to this reasons I prefer not to join this strand of theory.  
 
The same applies to integration theories. Although some scholars proposed to use 
integration theories to explain why the Bologna Process takes place outside the 
framework European Union (eg. Barkholt 2005), maybe following Schmitter (2004b: 
47), who claimed that "any comprehensive theory of integration should potentially be a 
theory of disintegration. It should not only explain why countries decide to coordinate 
their efforts across a wider range of tasks and delegate more authority to common 
institutions, but also why they do not do so16", the explaining of non-integration 
equipped with theories that are created to explain integration seems a difficult task. 
Hence integration theories cannot contribute too much in this case, although it is clear 
that possible explanations may be found in different integration theoretical approaches. 
Clearly the third stage of Moravcsik’s Liberal Intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1998, 
1993), one of the most, if not the most influential approach in the explanation of 
European Integration and in the development of European integration theory, could be 
used for deriving hypotheses. Nonetheless this would require a more or less complete 
disregarding of other main assumptions this approach states, in other words a 
misapplication of Liberal Intergovernmentalism. The same holds for the other main 
strand of integration theory, Neo-functionalism (eg. Stone Sweet/Sandholtz 1997; 
Sandholtz/Stone Sweet 1998). Especially the mostly intergovernmental character of soft 
                                                 
14 See for example (Bache 2006; Pechar 2003; Trondal 2002). 
15 The same applies to most of the studies dealing with "internationalization", or "globalization" of higher 
education, although here the variation is even bigger. See for example (Enders 2002; Luijten-Lub et al. 
2005; Teichler 1998, 2004; Van der Wende 2003; Vijlder 2001). 
16 The normative – or even deterministic – notion of this statement should be considered. 
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coordination can hardly be integrated into an explanation stemming from the neo-
functional perspective, stressing the importance of supranational actors. Additionally it 
should not be ignored that there exist legal restrictions against a harmonization of higher 
education structures in the framework of the EU, namely a lack of treaty base 
(Walkenhorst 2005). On a more general base it has to be noted that, the role of the 
European Union is sometimes exaggerated in the scientific debate and that it’s often the 
real question, under which extraordinary circumstances states choose hard forms of 
coordination (Schäfer 2005: 17). As a consequence a framework designed to explain the 
emergence and form of a soft-coordinated arrangement at the international level, has to 
shift its perspective from the narrow angle of theories clustering around the explanation 
of European Union matters. 
 
After having underlined the usefulness of regime theory compared to other approaches 
for this dissertation project the chapter proceeds as follows: First the necessary 
definitions of the main terms and concepts will be given, to clarify the starting point. As 
a next step the theoretical approach used in this project will be developed. After an 
explanation of the regime theoretical model, a refinement and enrichment with other 
concept will be necessary. This especially concerns concepts engaged with discussing 
the distinct form institutions take. Finally hypotheses will be developed, deriving from 
the theoretical approaches. 
 
6.2 What are institutions? The quest for definition 
 
Multiple definitions of the term institution exist and overall agreement about what an 
institution is cannot be observed. Therefore this issue deserves some discussion here. 
Existing definitions range from a comprehension of institutions as solely being the rules 
of the game (North 1993), to understandings that do not only encompass formal rules 
but also social norms and that view institutions as shared scripts. Generally, it can be 
stated that the answer to the question what an institution is, depends heavily on the 
theoretical approach one employs (Peters 1999). The same goes true for questions of 
how these institutions emerge and through which processes they change. Scholars 
working in a rational choice tradition would surely attribute other characteristics to 
institutions than sociological institutionalists, whereas anthropologist would presumably 
employ a much more encompassing approach, even including customs or rites. This 
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research project aiming at something very different has to employ a definition of 
institution that is much more formal. Therefore only formal political institutions are 
taken into consideration. Following Streeck and Thelen (2005) institutions are 
recognized as "systems of social interaction under formalized normative control". This 
definition encompasses pacts and conventions that’s stability depends not exclusively 
on the self-interested behavior of the actors directly involved (Streeck/Thelen 2005), but 
on at least some kind ex post control.  
 
How do institutions emerge? Here the main insights provided in the recent literature 
(Streeck/Thelen 2005; Thelen 2003; Pierson 2004) are taken into consideration. 
Informal institutions may evolve, but formal political institutions that are in the focus of 
research here, are at least to some extent subject of an intended development. It is 
acknowledged that institutional design and form are not simply a question of choice but 
also of development over time and specific processes of institutional change17. 
Nonetheless there is one certain point in time – there can be even a few – when the 
basics of an institutions are decided on, or when the institution is heavily changed. It 
should be possible to identify such points. Scholars working with the concept of path 
dependence would call them presumably "critical junctures" (Pierson 2004; Mahoney 
2000).   
 
Institutional form or design encompasses several features. Regimes as one type of 
institution include not only the principles and norms, but also rules and procedures. So 
the grade of legal formalization and the instruments which a certain institution employs 
are also part of institutional form or design.  
 
6.3 Cooperation and Coordination 
 
Even important books dealing with issues of cooperation theory go without a definition 
of cooperation itself (e.g. Axelrod 1984). Nonetheless clarity of definition is highly 
advisable here. Yet the use of the term cooperation differs concerning the (theoretical) 
context in which it is employed. Cooperation cannot always be simply regarded as the 
absence of conflict, the opposite of confrontation or one early stage of an integration 
                                                 
17 Streeck and Thelen identify five different types (Displacement, Layering, Drift, Conversion, and 
Exhaustion) of institutional change. They emphasize especially gradual transformations over time 
(Streeck/Thelen 2005). 
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process. A useful definition of this concept that goes beyond these – admittedly helpful 
– views and statements therefore has to involve actors and their interests. One widely 
accepted definition of the phenomenon international cooperation goes as follows:  
"Cooperation requires that the actions of separate individuals or organizations – 
which are not in pre-existent harmony – be brought into conformity with one 
another through a process of negotiation, which is often referred to as "policy 
coordination" [...] Cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behavior to the 
actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy 
coordination" (Keohane 1984: 51f.). 
 
In a more general sense coordination means the process to order and adjust different 
goals, actions and interests. Leaving out very specific conceptualizations, that divide 
between positive and negative coordination (Scharpf 1993), coordination can be 
regarded as a process that seeks to adjust policies of separate actors with the aim of 
reducing the negative consequences among each other (Milner 1992: 467). Following 
the classic definition of Lindblom (1965: 227) a "set of decisions is coordinated if 
adjustments have been made in them, such that the adverse consequences of any one 
decision for other decisions are to a degree and in some frequency avoided, reduced, or 
counterbalanced or overweighed". Hence coordination is seen as the process through 
which actors are trying to achieve specific goals. 
 
6.4 Regime theoretical approaches 
 
The questions of institutional development and form can be set into a regime-theoretical 
perspective, which is the view preferred her in this thesis. First of all it is important to 
stress the point, that there does not exists the one homogenous and coherent regime 
theory but a bunch of different approaches and perspectives that emphasize different 
explanatory variables, build on different meta-theoretical assumptions and state 
different hypotheses concerning the questions of regime formation and design. 
Problems concerning a clear-cut definition of "regime" witness this evidence 
exemplarily.  
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Even the existence of a so-called consensus definition, proposed by Krasner18 (1983) 
should not be misinterpreted as an endpoint in this discussion, quite the contrary. The 
main lines of criticism focus on the vagueness and on the problems of distinguishing 
between the four components of  this definition of regimes (Levy et al. 1995: 270). The 
solution to subsume all these components under the single concept of rules as performed 
by Keohane (1989), has besides its pragmatic gains also costs that have to be taken into 
consideration (Hasenclever et al. 1997b: 12). In this research project the definition by 
Levy and collaborators, a modification of the consensus definition will be employed. 
Following Levy et al. (1995: 274) regimes are defined as "social institutions consisting 
of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, procedures and programs that govern the 
interactions of actors in specific issue areas". Principles contain the definition of goals 
that should be attained and causal beliefs at the level of policy fields. Norms contain the 
behavioral guidelines according to the principles. They describe the general rights and 
obligations. Although situated mainly on the level of issue area they are still very 
general. Rules concretize these norms, and may contain explicit targets and timetables. 
Procedures can be regarded as the regime’s information- and decision-  processes (Levy 
et al. 1995).   
 
Taken altogether regimes consist of a substantive and a procedural component. The 
substantive component encompassing the principles, norms and rules the procedural 
encompassing the decision-making procedures (Hasenclever et al. 1997a). As stated 
above the study of international regimes can be divided into several schools or 
perspectives that emphasize specific variables. Many studies just focus on the role of 
one single factor to explain the success or the failure of efforts to create international 
regimes (Young 1994: 36). One possible classification is to distinguish between power-
based (realist), interest-based (neoliberal) and knowledge-based (cognitivist) 
approaches. Whereas realists stress the importance of power including possible 
asymmetrical power positions that influence the content and form of a regime, 
neoliberals emphasize self-interest and the possibilities of common gains as one 
motivation for cooperation among states. Cognitivists finally employ with the actor’s 
                                                 
18 Regimes are "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around 
which actor’s expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of 
fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. 
Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing 
practices for making and implementing collective choice" (Krasner 1983) 
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causal and social knowledge (Hasenclever et al. 1997b). Since all three "power, interests 
and knowledge interact in the production of international regimes" (Hasenclever et al. 
1997b: 211) it does not seem useful to treat the different regime-theoretical approaches 
as merely alternative ones. They may as well complement and enrich each other. This 
does not mean that there do not exist relevant differences between these perspectives. 
But since the aim of this thesis is to contribute to the explanation of a specific case, and 
not to help sharpen the borders of one school of thought by neglecting important aspects 
of another one, this chapter tries to combine these approaches.  
 
Hereby especially approaches stemming from the realist and neoliberal school of 
thought seem to be helpful and open to combination, also due to the fact that both of 
them share the commitment to rationalism as a meta-theoretical foundation. The main 
actors are therefore states that act self-interested and goal-seeking with the aim of 
maximizing their individual utility (Hasenclever et al. 1997b: 23). According to this 
model the preferences and identities of the actors are exogenously given contrarily to 
knowledge-based theories of regimes that also focus on the origins of interests adding a 
theory of preference formation (Hasenclever et al. 1997b)19. 
 
The starting point for regime theoretical approaches is interdependence as the 
dominating characteristic of international politics. This interdependence leads to a 
demand for international cooperation (Kohler-Koch 1989: 22) in certain issue areas. 
Hence international regimes are created to overcome collective dilemmas or to integrate 
competing actors. Cooperation – at least in the interest-based approach – promises to 
make all better off (Hasenclever et al. 1997a). It has to be pointed out that regime 
structures are not simply logical deviations of problem field-relevant norms, rules and 
procedures from a consensual main principle. Regimes reflect the distribution of power, 
normative-institutional and situation-structural factors that play a role in the bargaining 
process. Even the definition of a common goal does not implicitly guarantee that a 
regime is coherent in itself. Goals may often be equivocal and power as well as interests 
do play a role here (Kohler-Koch 1989: 35ff.).  
 
                                                 
19 The insights of this strand of theory focusing especially on the "preference formation mechanisms" that 
are "lacking in most rational choice accounts" (Knight 2001), like the literature on epistemic communities 
(Haas 1992) are regarded as important complementary accounts. Due to restrictions in time the preference 
formation stage cannot be analyzed in the framework of this research project too. 
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Regime formation or regime building can be regarded as a mostly intergovernmental 
bargaining process in which nonetheless, different actors are involved. This is an 
important point, and one should not fall into the trap of functional false conclusion. An 
understanding of how international regimes function does not necessarily explain their 
occurrence (Kohler-Koch 1989: 29; Keohane 1984) as already mentioned. Although 
states are the main actors, non-state actors are not excluded or seen as being irrelevant. 
International Organizations20 for example are regarded as taking in an important role in 
the stage of regime building. They constitute communication fora that may be relevant 
at the stage of regime formation. Furthermore decision procedures of international 
regimes are often delegated to specialized organizations (Zürn 1998: 175; Kohler-Koch 
1989: 32f.). Hence an analysis should also involve the identification of the relevant non-
state actors. It is important to stress the point that states should ideally not be treated as 
unitary actors, but complex collective entities. For practical reasons this claim is 
nonetheless not always feasible. Therefore it is necessary to recall the decreasing 
abstraction principle, according to which it is not necessary to explain things at the level 
of individual actors, when institution-based information is sufficient to derive 
satisfactory explanations (Mayntz/Scharpf 1995a: 66; Scharpf 1997: 42). When this is 
not the case additional perspectives opening up the unitary actor black-box have to be 
considered. The most influential approach that helps to overcome a shortened 
perspective has become the two-level game approach (Putnam 1988): At the level of the 
actors it has to be taken into account that the national governments operate in a 
privileged position in the international system. Situated at the gateway between the 
national and the European/international level they enjoy privileged access to 
information and are able to use this extended room for maneuver for pursuing their own 
interests. This fact is taken up by the concept of two-level games (Putnam 1988). 
 
 The process of regime formation can be, at least analytically divided into three distinct 
types: self-generation, negotiation and imposition. Normally however the process of 
regime formation encompasses elements of all three processes. Whereas negotiated 
regimes develop out of a process of conscious bargaining, self-generating (spontaneous) 
                                                 
20 It is important to note that international organizations and international regimes are not the same thing, 
although they are both types of international institutions (Hasenclever et al. 1997b: 10f.). Organizations 
can be regarded as being material entities "possessing offices, personnel, equipment, budgets, and legal 
personality" (Young 1994). One additional important difference is that regimes are "issue-specific 
institutions" (Hasenclever et al. 1997b), whereas International Organizations do not necessarily have to 
cover only one specific issue. 
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regimes do not need these conscious efforts but simply emerge through processes of 
converging expectations. A small coalition of powerful actors or just one single 
powerful actor can also succeed in imposing their institutional preferences on others. 
These actors can also be interpreted as the important prime movers (Levy et al. 1995: 
281-282). In this theoretical framework mainly the importance of negotiation but also 
aspects of power are considered.  
 
 It is helpful to distinguish the process of regime formation into different stages, which 
are at least analytically sequenced: agenda formation => institutional choice => 
operationalization. Or according to Young (1994): prenegotiation => negotiation => 
postnegotiation. Even though the driving social forces of actors engaged in regime 
formation are identified as power, knowledge and interest some cross-cutting factors 
have to be taken into consideration: individual leadership21 and context (Levy et al. 
1995). The latter point has to be underlined. Regime building is taking place in the 
environment of mainly institutionalized international relations and not in an anarchic 
environment (Kohler-Koch 1989).  
 
In the following, three approaches that contribute to an explanation concerning the 
questions of regime formation and design or form will be explicated. This begins with 
Zürn’s (1992) situation-structural approach that has is virtues especially at the demand-
side of international regimes focusing on the probability that regimes emerge in distinct 
situations. Since critics remark that the approach is less explicit concerning the supply-
side, how this demand is finally met (Hasenclever et al. 1997b: 56) additional 
theoretical support is needed. Young’s (1994) model of institutional bargaining does not 
only focus on situations in which negotiations aimed at the creation of international 
regimes do regularly take place, he also identifies factors that are regarded as being 
necessary for a success of these negotiations. Following scholars working in a realist 
tradition focusing on issues of power it is also important to look at the distribution of 
power among the actors’ involved, and its consequences. This task is performed in the 
third part of the discussion of regime theoretical approaches. 
 
                                                 
21 "In virtually every case of successful regime formation, one or more key individuals have provided 
leadership at crucial turning points" (Levy et al. 1995: 285). For a differentiation into three types of 
leadership in the process of regime formation see: (Young 1999, 1991). 
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6.4.1 Situation-structural approach 
 
The situation-structural approach (Zürn 1992) an interest-based regime-theoretical 
approach (Hasenclever et al. 1997b) addresses the main questions posed in this research 
project. Thereby the different forms of institutions in the international politics are 
treated as the dependent variable. This form can vary along a continuum, regarding it’s 
grade of legal formalization (Zürn 1992: 150).  
 
Figure 1: Continuum - Grade of legal formalization 
Non-binding                        Binding 
|_________________________________________________________________| 
Soft Law                Hard Law 
 
Conflict, defined as a situation in which two or more actors strive for different 
contradicting goals or a situation in which two or more actors strive for a common goal 
but want to choose different means to (Zürn 1992: 139), is the starting point. The actors 
involved act goal-oriented but on the basis of a bounded rationality (Elster 1983; Simon 
1985). Here the assumption of hyper-rationality has to be avoided22. Actors do not 
follow simply neither a logic of consequentiality nor a pure logic of appropriateness 
(March/Olsen 1989, 1998: 952). A combination of both of these logics seems necessary 
for useful empirical research. Situation-structuralists assume that regimes help to 
facilitate international cooperation and are therefore created by rational actors to avoid 
Pareto-inefficient23 outcomes. The probability of emergence of institutions and the 
question of degree of formalization of institutions is traced back in the situation-
structural approach to the structure of the situation in which they were created, and 
formed to hypotheses that use game-theoretic language and reasoning. In the following 
the approach’s two main hypotheses that are of interest concerning the research 
questions will be stated: 
 
 
                                                 
22 In many respects this resembles insights from Scharpf’s (1997: 19ff.) actor-centered institutionalism. 
23 The term Pareto-efficiency or optimality is widely-used in game theory, and labels the condition of a 
game in which no player can improve its condition without making another one worse off  (Zürn 1992). 
Pareto-inefficient outcomes are therefore outcomes where possibilities of improvement (for at least one 
player) exist, without making any other player worse off. 
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a) The probability for the emergence of normative international institutions is 
dependent on the structure of the situation: 1 it is highest in situations that’s 
structure resemble coordination games without distributional conflict, 2 second 
highest in coordination games with distributional conflict, 3 second lowest in 
dilemma-games, 4 lowest in Rambo-games. 
b) The nature of normative institutions depends on the structure of the situation in 
which they were created: The degree of formalization increases from 1 to 3.  It is 
lowest in Coordination games without distributional conflict, and highest in 
dilemma-games. Rambo-games lie between (Zürn 1992: 164f.). 
 
It follows that the creation of a regime is more likely the less demanding the problem 
that should be coordinated is24 (Hasenclever et al. 1997b: 53). Zürn does also add a set 
of secondary variables25 to refine his regime formation hypotheses that are based on the 
four types of problematic social situations (Zürn 1992: 164).  
 
Following this approach the situation in which the Bologna Process started does play a 
crucial role. If this situation can be modeled as a coordination game with very low or 
even without distributional conflict, the situation-structural approach would assume that 
the probability that an institution emerges is high. As a consequence the degree of 
formalization would be assumed to be low (as it actually is). 
6.4.2 Institutional bargaining 
 
Oran Young’s (1994; 1991) model of regime formation focuses on the bargaining 
process among self-interested actors "seeking to reap joint gains by devising 
institutional arrangements to avoid or overcome collective-action problems" (Young 
1994: 98f.). The group of actors involved in the bargaining process, that is operating on 
the basis of a consensus rule mainly consists of states. Nonetheless  other actors like 
transnational alliances among influential interest groups may also play a role (Young 
                                                 
24 This "amounts to arguing that regimes are the more likely the less they are needed. This relationship, if 
normatively undesirable, may have considerable analytical plausibility. The point is, though that demand 
can only be part of the story of regime formation" (Hasenclever et al. 1997b). 
25 These variables make reference to arguments stemming from various strands of regime theory 
(Hasenclever et al. 1997b) . Zürn himself calls his choice of variables (frequency of interaction, density of 
transactions, type of foreign policy, distribution of issue-specific resources, presence/absence of salient 
solutions, number of actors in the issue-area, overall relationship of the actors(Hasenclever et al. 1997b))  
in some respects arbitrary (Zürn 1992). 
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1994: 103-105). It is important to stress the point that even before the bargaining takes 
place important decisions concerning the involvement and exclusion of parties are 
taken. Contrary to a majoritarian rule the consensus rule makes it necessary that those 
parties are excluded that are assumed to be against any reasonable institutional 
arrangement or that threaten to ignore opposition of one or more other actors and to go 
on with their own arrangement. Once membership in this bargaining club is fixed, the 
search for solutions all actors involved can accept begins (Young 1994: 99-100). What 
contributes to the success of the bargaining process is the fact that regime formation 
normally involves integrative in contrast to distributive bargaining under a veil of 
uncertainty (Young 1991: 283). This veil of uncertainty26 illustrates the fact that 
institutional arrangements "typically apply across a wide range of contexts and over a 
more or less expended period of time" (Young 1994: 101), which creates uncertainty 
among the negotiators. This uncertainty makes it "difficult for individuals to predict 
how specific institutional arrangements will affect their interests over time" (Young 
1991: 283) and therefore "actually facilitates efforts to reach agreement on the 
substantive provisions of institutional arrangements" (Young 1994: 102). Hence actors 
do seldom try to perfect their information about all possible outcomes and the 
dimensions of contract zones prior to the serious bargaining, but focus instead on the 
key problems and try to work out broadly acceptable approaches. Differences among 
these approaches are sought to be brought into accordance in the course of the 
negotiations. Nonetheless this does not mean that the actors involved can always 
reconcile divergent approaches (Young 1994: 102-103). 
 
Obstacles to successful regime formation can be identified in the unanimity rule itself 
that may be exploited by ambitious actors, diverging preferences among the negotiators 
concerning the composition of the group of participants and the contents. The fact that 
at the international level all parties involved in the bargaining process are collective or 
corporate entities (e.g. states of international organizations) may give rise to problems 
depicted in the logic of two level games (see chapter 6.4). To overcome the obstacles 
mentioned above the process of institutional bargaining needs an additional element, 
namely leadership (Young 1991: 284-285). In the following the main hypotheses of the 
institutional bargaining approach that deal with the success and failure of institutional 
                                                 
26 Not to be confused with John Rawl’s (Rawls 1993) "veil of ignorance" where the actors do not know 
their roles in society.  
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bargaining are stated and discussed. As Hasenclever and collaborators put it (1997b: 
74): "The model of institutional bargaining has both a descriptive and an analytical 
aspect. Descriptively, it seeks to outline the essential circumstances under which 
collective efforts to form regimes regularly take place. Analytically, it points to a 
number of factors that are critical for the success of such efforts". Therefore the six 
main hypotheses can be divided according to these two aspects: 
 
a) "Institutional bargaining can succeed only when the issues at 
stake lend themselves to treatment in a contractarian 
mode"(Young 1994: 107).  
b) "Exogenous shocks or crises increase the probability of success 
in efforts to negotiate the terms of governance systems" (Young 
1994: 112).  
 
These two hypotheses refer to conditions that are external or prior to the negotiations. 
The first hypothesis mainly restates the main ideas of the model and incorporates them. 
The contractual environment has to take a form in which the zone of agreement is 
blurred and the future distribution of benefits is veiled (Hasenclever et al. 1997b: 74f.; 
Young 1994: 107f.). The second hypothesis emphasizes the role of factors such as 
shocks or crises exogenous to the bargaining process, in breaking logjams27, and 
helping the parties involved in the bargaining to refocus on the common interest 
(Hasenclever et al. 1997a: 75). 
 
c) "The availability of arrangements that all participants can 
accept as equitable is necessary for institutional bargaining to 
succeed"(Young 1994: 109). 
d) "The identification of salient solutions (or focal points) 
describable in simple terms increases the probability of success 
in institutional bargaining"(Young 1994: 110). 
                                                 
27 It should not come as a big surprise that, Oran Young as a specialist in international governance and 
environmental institutions actively engaged in various organizations, and committees dedicated to the 
protection of the environment has especially shocks and crisis in this policy field in mind. As examples 
for such shocks he mentions the discovery of the ozone hole over Antarctica in 1995, or the Chernobyl 
accident in 1986 (Young 1994). Nonetheless relevant shocks in other policy fields could be also imagined 
(e.g. the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center). 
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e) "The probability of success in institutional bargaining rises 
when clear-cut and reliable compliance mechanisms are 
available"(Young 1994: 111). 
f) "Institutional bargaining cannot succeed in the absence of 
effective entrepreneurial leadership on the part of the 
individuals" (Young 1994: 114). 
 
These four hypotheses take the factors that are necessary for integrative bargaining to 
take place for granted, and focus instead on factors that are identified to be crucial for 
the successful completion of the bargaining. Whilst it is evident that the unanimity rule 
makes it necessary to find arrangements that all parties involved can accept, it is not so 
clear what constitutes a "equitable" solution or a "salient" solution, that’s existence may 
increase the probability for success but is nonetheless not a necessary condition. The 
third hypothesis – that stresses the importance of clear-cut and reliable compliance 
mechanisms as factors increasing the probability of successful bargaining – points to a 
well known issue in the study of collective-action problems. The less the actors 
involved fear that other actors cheat on them, the more likely they agree on the common 
institutional arrangement (Hasenclever et al. 1997b: 76).  
 
Whereas the hypotheses mentioned above either encompass factors just being 
supportive for successful bargaining or as discussed not fully clear, the last hypothesis 
states a very clear necessary condition for successful regime building: "It is no 
exaggeration to say that efforts to negotiate the terms of international regimes are apt to 
succeed when one or more individuals emerge as effective leaders and that in the 
absence of such leadership, they will fail" (Young 1994: 114). Without the aim of 
"diminishing the role of collective entities, such as states, international organizations, 
nongovernmental organizations, and multinational corporations" the "individual" 
(Young 1991: 282) is brought back in the discussion. Leadership therefore means 
actions taken by individuals with the aim to contribute to successful institutional 
bargaining. It is important to keep in mind that one has to be very careful in determining 
who did provide leadership in the process of regime formation, already knowing the 
outcome of the institutional bargaining. Since the action of one or the other actor 
involved in this process or the fact that he/she did play a role is not necessarily a prove 
of leadership. So, a conception of leadership with a focus on specific forms of behavior 
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that can also be identified without making reference to the outcomes of the whole 
process is necessary (Young 1991: 286). It is possible to – analytically – distinguish 
between different types of leadership, namely structural leadership, entrepreneurial 
leadership and intellectual leadership28. Interestingly this model does only incorporate 
the entrepreneurial leader, leaving aside the two other types of leadership. 
Entrepreneurial leaders are neither representatives of major states or hegemons nor are 
they just ethically motivated actors. Instead entrepreneurial leaders are actors that have 
the skill to invent new institutional arrangements and to broker the overlapping interests 
of the parties involved in this issue area. Entrepreneurial leaders play their "catalytic 
role" (Hasenclever et al. 1997b: 76), especially when the danger of logjam has to be 
avoided. It is their negotiation skill and ingenuity not their power that makes 
entrepreneurial leaders that important. Entrepreneurial leaders also function as agenda 
setters that shape the form in which issues are presented at the international level. They 
actively try to draw the attention to the importance of the distinct issues. It is also 
important to recall that entrepreneurial leaders are not independent mediators but agents 
of actors with specific interests in the issues at hand (Young 1991: 293f.). They are 
gain-seeking (material rewards, enhanced reputation) themselves, too (Young 1994).  
 
Following the insights stemming from the institutional bargaining approach it is 
especially important to search and identify the entrepreneurial leader(s) in the formation 
of the Bologna-Regime. Concerning the question of the specific form an institutional 
arrangement takes this approach does not contribute too much. 
6.4.3 Power-distributionalist perspectives 
 
The neoliberal view that political institutions are means of cooperative action due to 
collective action problems is not fully shared by theorists of other theoretical schools. 
Political institutions can not only regarded as being just structures of cooperation but 
also as structures of power (Gruber 2000; Moe 2005). Especially scholars working in a 
                                                 
28 "The structural leader translates power resources into bargaining leverage in an effort to bring pressure 
to bear on others to assent to the terms of proposed constitutional contracts. The entrepreneurial leader 
makes use of negotiation skill to frame the issues at stake, devise mutually acceptable formulas, and 
broker the interests of key players in building support for these formulas. the intellectual leader, by 
contrast, relies on the power of ideas to shape the thinking of the principals in processes of institutional 
bargaining"  (Young 1991). 
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realist tradition29 focusing on the distribution of power disagree with some assumptions 
of the neoliberal model. Notwithstanding they do not completely dismiss the neoliberal 
model to present their own fully worked-out model but focus on some distinct points of 
criticism: While realists agree to the main claim of neoliberals that cheating is one 
important obstacle to cooperation among rational acting states, they do not regard 
cheating as the only barrier to international cooperation. Scholars working in the realist 
tradition do also not deny that states try to maximize their absolute gains but they stress 
the point that states also worry about relative achievements of gains (Grieco 1988a: 
487). This can be traced back to different understandings between these theories 
concerning the anarchic international environment30. Therefore from a realist viewpoint 
the concern of states is not so much the maximizing of power but the maintaining of 
their position31 in the system (Waltz 1979). The "major goal of states in any relationship 
is not to attain the highest possible individual gain or payoff. Instead, the fundamental 
goal of states in any relationship is to prevent others from achieving advances in their 
relative capabilities" (Grieco 1988a: 498). The relative-gains problem for cooperation 
may lead to situations in which a state refuses to cooperate even if it is sure that the 
other actors involved will keep their commitments to the joint arrangement. States 
might even leave out opportunities to increase their absolute capabilities if this strongly 
contributes to stabilize the distribution of power (Grieco 1988b: 602).  
 
The utility function for a state therefore changes from U = V to U = V – k (W – V) [k > 
0]. U is the state’s utility, V is the state’s absolute gains, W is it’s partner’s absolute 
gains and k is the coefficient capturing the state’s sensitivity to differences in pay-offs 
(Grieco 1988a; Hasenclever et al. 1997b). As one can easily observe one crucial 
variable in this formula is the value k takes. The smaller k is, the smaller are the 
                                                 
29 It is noteworthy that realists that are engaged in the discussion about international institutions and 
regimes are not disciples of "orthodox realist interpretations of international politics as a state of war 
which militates against any significant role for international institutions" (Hasenclever et al. 1997b). In 
this thesis the view that "institutions are basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the world 
[…] They are based on the self-interested calculations of the great powers, and they have no independent 
effect on state behavior" (Mearsheimer 1994/95: 7) is not shared. Institutions are not only created and 
shaped by the most powerful states in the system to "maintain their share of world power, or even 
increase it" as some neorealists assume (Mearsheimer 1994/95: 13). 
30 For realists international anarchy means that "no agency exists in the international polity to which states 
can appeal for protection or the enforcement of promises" (Grieco 1988b). So matters of security do also 
play a role and not only the fear of being cheated. 
31 Interestingly realists observe this "deep-rooted tendency in states to assess their level of achievement by 
comparison of their own individual performance to the performance of other states" not only in domains 
of activity like "military power" but also "educational excellence" (Grieco 1988b: 602). 
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differences between this realist formula and the neoliberal U=V formula. There exist 
several contextual variables that determine the value of k. The nature of the issue (e.g. 
security, economic), past and present relationship between the states (allies or foes), the 
existence of a common opponent32 and the size of the power difference (Hasenclever et 
al. 1997b: 119)  
 
Uncertainty plays an important role in this view, too. Since states are uncertain about 
the future intentions of other states, they look very carefully at the possible 
consequences cooperation might entail in the future concerning relative capabilities. "If 
two states are worried or uncertain about relative achievements of gains, then each will 
prefer a less durable cooperative arrangement, for each would want to be more readily 
able to exit from the arrangement if gaps in gains did come to favor the other" (Grieco 
1988a: 506) 
  
As can be seen power is regarded not as a facilitator or catalyst of cooperation but 
primarily as a means to influence the distribution of benefits. Therefore the analysis has 
to focus on actor’s interests and relative capabilities too. Because it is not only the 
monitoring capacity but also power and interests that determine outcomes (Krasner 
1991: 362-365). According to Krasner (1991) it is clear that in some cases international 
regimes are beneficial for all parties involved and without the existence of these regimes 
all actors would have been worse off, but nonetheless there exist many points along the 
Pareto frontier33. Which one is chosen (which institutional arrangement), can be 
explained by focusing on the distribution of national power capabilities. Here state 
power is exercised (at least) in three different ways (Krasner 1991: 340): 
 
1. "Power may be used to determine who can play the game in the first place. In 
international relations less powerful actors are often never invited to the table". 
2. "Power may also be used to dictated rules of the game, for instance who gets to 
move first. In [Battle of the Sexes34] the player who moves first can dictate the 
                                                 
32 Concerning the number of participants of a cooperative attempt, it is debated if relative-gain seeking 
does still pose an obstacle to cooperation if large numbers of actors are involved (Grieco 1993; Snidal 
1991).  
33 The game theoretical concept pareto frontier means the set of possible outcomes that are pareto 
optimal. 
34 "Archetypical" mixed-motive game in which "the preferences of the players are partly harmonious and 
partly in conflict" (Scharpf 1997). Zürn (Zürn 1992) classifies Battle of the Sexes as a coordination game 
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outcome, provided that the other player is convinced that the first player’s 
strategy is irrevocable". 
3. "Power may be used to change the payoff matrix. For instance, a more powerful 
row player might use tactical linkage to change, or credibly threaten to change 
the payoff matrix"35. 
 
Following these assumptions, in contrast to neoliberal argumentation already the 
constellation of actors is a crucial starting point, that has to be taken into consideration, 
since not every actor may be allowed to participate. Contrary to Young’s approach (see: 
chapter 6.4.2) this does not only apply to actor’s that are unwilling to support any 
reasonable solution. In Krasner’s view power is primarily used to determine the 
distribution of gains from cooperation. Powerful actors have more influence concerning 
which point on the Pareto frontier is chosen. Nonetheless there are no losers, all 
cooperating members are made better off in this process (Moe 2005: 225).  
 
This view is challenged by Lloyd Gruber (Gruber 2000) who argues that under the 
cover of voluntary cooperation the exercise of power is often hidden. Here power is not 
only employed to decide which point on the Pareto frontier is taken36. It seems strange 
but states do sometimes even join international institutions when they expect to be 
worse off in the following (Moe 2005). Institutions are not just means to overcome 
coordination problems that cannot be handled alone, providing joint gains. In this view 
not every actor is better off in the end, there are no mutual benefits for all parties 
involved. The starting point for this notion is, that some states are that important in a 
distinct area, that they can decide to "go it alone", in creating an institution. This "go it 
alone power" (Gruber 2000) allows one or a few states to limit the range of options for 
weaker states. These other states then may decide to join this institution, even if they 
never wanted it in the first place and even if they expect to be worse off compared to the 
original status quo (Moe 2005). It is easily observable that this is the crucial point of the 
                                                                                                                                               
with distributional conflict. In "Battle" a couple wants to spend the evening together. She wants to go to a 
soccer game, he prefers going to the opera. As can be easily noted there exist two Pareto-optimal 
outcomes, for which one of them has to give in. 
35 This means that actors with more abundant resources could tactically link issues to manipulate the 
other’s preference ordering the way, that the game is changed into one where there is only one Pareto-
efficient equilibrium solution left: Which is the one that is preferred by the more powerful actor 
(Hasenclever et al. 1997b). 
36 The graphic visualizations that can be found in (Gruber 2000), page 35-39 very well illustrate this 
argument. 
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approach. The prime movers, when cooperating and forming an institution alter the 
status quo. 
 
 Weaker states cannot go back the way things were. They may decide to join, or not. 
Interestingly they will sometimes even plead to be admitted into the cooperative 
institution, whose members may not even want them to join (Gruber 2001: 708, 2000: 
7). Agenda control is the kind of power Gruber is talking about. "The outsiders cannot 
go back to the way things were. They must now choose from the power-constrained 
choice set and from that alone. They may (and probably will) choose to "cooperate." 
But they may also be worse off than before the institutions were imposed" (Moe 2005: 
227). Centrally in this approach are the prime movers, the so-called "enactors" (Gruber 
2000), who engage first in the building of the new regime.  Their ex ante power 
positions are regarded as being the strongest. This is either due to their ability to 
unilateral action (in Gruber’s words their "go it alone power"), or due to the fact that the 
non-cooperative status quo is not as bad for them as for the other actors. When the 
emergence and the concrete form of international institutions should be explained, it is 
according to Gruber the first step to inquire "the strategic calculations and incentives of 
these more powerful participants, the ones who wield the greatest bargaining and/or go-
it-alone power at the outset" (Gruber 2005: 127). Hence in this view international 
regimes are designed by a small subset – the most powerful – of the founding members. 
 
It is important to note that there is nonetheless not necessarily a contradiction between 
the exercise of power and mutual gain (Moe 2005: 228). Although the "enactors" are the 
crucial actors in the process of forming and designing an international institution, it is 
not necessarily the case that the following actors that join the cooperative arrangement 
later have to be worse off then before. It might be the case, but it does not always have 
to be.  
 
As can be observed scholars focusing on issues of power and the distribution of power 
do on the one hand not represent a coherent group, on the other hand they do not fully 
neglect the neoliberal view on international institutions. Instead they enrich the 
discussion by pointing to aspects too easily overseen by neoliberals. Concerning the 
question of development and form of the Bologna-Regime it is according to both 
Krasner (1991) and Gruber (2000) important to focus on the prime actors, their interests 
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and power. Following their approaches power means especially agenda control. The 
analysis of the Bologna-Regime should therefore also try to identify such prime movers, 
their preferences and power. In the next chapters questions of institutional form are 
discussed from distinct perspectives, widening the debate and adding theoretical 
substance.  
 
6.5 Explaining institutional form or design 
 
In international relations there exist multiple ways to solve a common cooperation 
problem. Only one solution among others is the creation of new institution like 
international regimes. The form these institutions take also varies in multiple ways. The 
second research question of this dissertation points in this direction: How can the form 
or design of this institution be explained? Additionally the question concerning reasons 
for this institutions softness is raised.  
 
Since it is assumed that institutions are responses to certain cooperation problems given 
by boundly rational actors it is important to consider the ex ante institutional strategies 
available to these actors. At this point it is very useful to keep in mind that the 
"anarchic" characteristic of the international system should not be overemphasized. 
Cooperation takes place in the environment of mainly institutionalized international 
relations and not in a purely anarchic environment (Kohler-Koch 1989). "Few 
cooperation problems arise within an institutional "vacuum"" (Jupille/Snidal 2006: 10). 
Following a recent paper of Jupille and Snidal (2006) that incorporates the institutional 
status quo37 in the analysis, the creation of new institutions is in principle not as likely 
as one may assume. Following the process of institutional choice as depicted in Figure 
2, the use of focal institutions38, the selection among alternative institutions and the 
changing of already existing institutions are available on the menu of international 
actors too39. Due to increasing decision costs and increasing risk and uncertainty when 
moving down the decision tree as depicted in Figure 2, a general status quo bias 
favoring existing institutional arrangements can be noticed (Jupille/Snidal 2006: 24). 
                                                 
37 Defined as: " the set of pre-existing institutions potentially relevant to an emergent cooperation 
problem" (Jupille/Snidal 2006). 
38 Focal institutions are defined as being institutions that are widely accepted as the "natural" fora for 
dealing with a particular cooperation problem (Jupille/Snidal 2006) 
39 Here in this context, institutional choice is defined as the "collective choice over institutions – not 
individual actor strategies over institutions but their aggregate outcome" (Jupille/Snidal 2006). 
 36
Only when "substantial gaps in the international status quo" (Jupille/Snidal 2006: 33) 
exist, new institutions are likely to be created. These gaps encompass absence of 
institutions in the given issue area, either concerning the set of actors or the issue. 
Hence membership and scope are centrally important in this concept40. Interestingly 
also the nature of the cooperation problem, consisting of a range of factors, is included 
in this model.  
 
Although this concept does not help to answer the question how the form or design of a 
new institution can be explained, it nonetheless contributes in two aspects. On the one 
hand the attention is directed towards the fact that the creation of new institutions 
follows a long process of decision and exclusion. It stands at the endpoint of this 
decision chain, not at the beginning. On the other hand the research question 2a – why 
this cooperation does take place outside the European Union, can be modeled as a case 
of an unsatisfactory focal institution. The conjecture or hypothesis following this model 
can therefore be stated as follows:  
 
Lack of congruence concerning membership between the EU and the group of actors 
engaged in the cooperative initiative aiming to coordinate the higher education systems, 
leads to the dismissal of the EU as the appropriate institutional solution. 
 
Also considerations of power are built into this approach. When powerful actors, 
especially those with go-it-alone power (Gruber 2000), have alternative institutional 
preferences the (focal) institution will not be selected (Jupille/Snidal 2006: 27). This 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
When powerful actors have alternative institutional preferences the EU will not be 
selected as the appropriate institutional solution. 
                                                 
40 Are all actors members of the institution in question to be used? Does the mandate of the institution in 
question encompass the issue being addressed? 
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Figure 2: Institutional choice process 
 
Source: (Jupille/Snidal 2006: 4, 14) 
 
Coming back to the main question concerning the form or design institutions take, it is 
important to consider that institutions may vary among multiple dimensions. For their 
rational design project Koremenos and collaborators (Koremenos et al. 2001b, a), 
developed five key dimensions (membership rules, scope of issues covered, 
centralization of tasks, rules for controlling the institution, flexibility of arrangements). 
Without missing their point concerning the  problems of just using a single measure for 
describing institutions (Koremenos et al. 2001a: 769) it does not seem useful to apply 
their approach encompassing five dimensions and the corresponding conjectures to the 
case this dissertation is employed with. The dimension of interest is already specified in 
the research question. Primarily the choice of soft coordinated institutions stands in the 
center of the analysis. Since "softness" does not depict a clear cut dimension and since 
the whole concept of soft law is not uncontested, as already noted elsewhere (see: 
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chapter 2) some additional clarifications still have to be made. Contrary to approaches 
focusing just on the aspect of legality and therefore assuming just a binary nature of 
legal obligations41 (Raustiala 2005: 586), I prefer to assume a continuum instead of a 
dichotomy (see: Figure 1). Following Abbot and Snidal (2000: 422) "the realm of "soft 
law" begins once legal arrangements that are weakened along one or more of the 
dimensions of obligation, precision, and delegation". Abbot and Snidal apply a 
functional approach, treating the specific form of soft law as actor’s attempt to solve a 
particular problem (Abbott/Snidal 2000: 423), nonetheless they also involve strategic 
considerations of rational actors in their discussion of why soft forms are chosen. In the 
following their main claims and hypotheses will be stated in short.  
 
Soft legalization has many advantages, like lower contracting and sovereignty costs. 
Concerning the differing sovereignty costs in different policy fields it is likely that 
states choose different forms of legalization in different issue areas (Abbott/Snidal 
2000: 440)42. Additionally it is possible to regard soft law as a prior step to hard 
legalization. States may learn about the consequences of an agreement and in the 
following choose to commit themselves in a more binding way43. Notwithstanding not 
every soft law agreement leads inevitable to harder forms of legalization. Another virtue 
of soft law is its ability to deal with uncertainty. Abbot and Snidal (2000: 444) therefore 
hypothesize that when uncertainty and sovereignty costs44 are high states prefer softer 
forms of legalization. Soft law may also be employed to overcome bargaining problems 
by forming agreements that have general goals that are less precise and have limited 
                                                 
41 In fact for Raustiala "there is no such thing as "soft law." The concept of soft law purports to identify 
something between binding law and no law. Yet as an analytic or practical matter no meaningful 
intermediate category exists" (Raustiala 2005). In his conception there exists only a dichotomy between a 
contract and a pledge. 
42 It should nonetheless be mentioned that the distinction between policy fields where stakes concerning 
national sovereignty are high and those where they are not is – maybe with the exception of national 
security - not a clear cut one. Following  Hoffman’s (1995) division into high and low politics, whereas 
high politics represent areas that touch national sovereignty and national identity this can be exemplarily 
noted with regards to the education policy field. Some scholars treat education policy as a matter of high 
politics (Cini 2003: 98), whereas others regard it as belonging to low politics (Borchard 2003: 196). 
43 In his "ratchet fusion" model of integration Wolfgang Wessels for example also treats softer non-
binding forms of interaction like the OMC as a preliminary step of a evolutionary integration process 
(Wessels 1997; Wessels/Linsenmann 2002). 
44 "Souvereignty costs" are used in this context as a "covering term" for all "categories of costs to 
emphasize the high stakes states often face in accepting international agreements" (Abbott/Snidal 2000). 
Abbot and Snidal here follow the categorization of Krasner (Krasner 1999) encompassing "domestic 
sovereignty (the organization of authority and control within the state), interdependence sovereignty (the 
ability to control flows across borders), international legal sovereignty (establishing the status of a 
political entity in the international system), and Westphalian sovereignty (preventing external actors from 
influencing or determining domestic authority structures) (Abbott/Snidal 2000). 
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delegation. This creates flexibility in implementation that helps states to deal with 
domestic consequences of an agreement, political and economic ones (Abbott/Snidal 
2000: 445). The point that soft law may be useful to overcome bargaining problems has 
also been taken up by a recent approach. Nonetheless this approach does no more focus 
on common coordination problems. The next chapter gives an overview of this 
approach. 
 
6.6 Soft Coordination: Substituting content with procedure 
 
The most recent attempt  to explain the development of soft coordination (in the field of 
economic policy) treats soft law as a means to overcome impossibilities of substantive 
agreements and to avoid deadlock (Schäfer 2005). In this view soft coordination is not 
employed as one possible answer to the question of how to reach common goals but as a 
means to overcome divergent and even conflicting views concerning the substance 
(Schäfer 2006b: 200). Soft coordination also has to be regarded as a means which is 
used when some goals should be brought onto the European agenda without concrete 
content. Content is substituted with voluntaristic procedures (Schäfer 2005: 223f.). 
Nonetheless one should not fall into the trap of assuming that thereby cooperation is 
regarded as a means in itself. The possibility of deciding even with no substantial 
agreement regarding the content, and the possibility to prevent failures of negotiations is 
one means to increase the room of maneuver for governments (Schäfer 2005: 48), to 
play two-level games, for example45.  
 
In my dissertation project questions of the consequences and effectiveness of soft 
coordination will not be analyzed46. Nonetheless it should be mentioned that non-
bindingness and softness of instructions do not automatically imply that they have no 
consequences or are ineffective at all (Streeck 1996: 82). Hereby it is important to note 
that there is a big difference between the use of soft law inside a nation state and its use 
in the international system. Inside the nation state these soft modes are applied in the 
                                                 
45 One could also add more than just two-levels, since this two-level game picture is not always enough – 
other levels like subnational entities, agencies can also be included (Wallace et al. 2005: 7). 
46 On the one hand due to the fact that the Bologna Process is not an ideal case for already examining the 
consequences yet, since the establishment of the European area of higher education is pronounced for the 
year 2010. On the other hand a solid analysis of the implementation of the Bologna objectives that does 
not base it’s conclusions only on the data stemming from the official stocktaking – that is not 
unproblematic in this context (see: chapter 10.4) – would be enormously time-consuming and costly. 
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shadow of hierarchy and all the actors involved know this fact, which may enhance the 
effectiveness. In the international system the possibility of sanctions is far fewer, 
nonetheless some exist. Amazingly, when it comes to the implementation of political 
programs and decisions, the difference is not as big as may be assumed (Jachtenfuchs 
2003: 506f.). Furthermore there is some evidence that, measures stemming from the 
international level, as soft as these may be, can help to stimulate reform at the national 
level and to overcome domestic resistance (Héritier 2002: 9f.). Other scholars do not 
share this optimistic few but regard the expectations about the effectiveness of soft 
forms of cooperation stemming from EU research as unrealistic (Schäfer 2005: 17). A 
more fundamental critique focuses on the difficulties to detect causal relations between 
governance processes and outcomes. (Trubek et al. 2005: 23). One remark has to be 
made in this discussion. It is quite obvious that soft coordination can entail 
consequences at the domestic level and does not necessarily exhibit solely a "fair 
weather instrument" (Schäfer 2005: 223), but its voluntaristic character and the widened 
opportunity space for national governments nonetheless remains.  
 
One important point has to be stated concerning this approach. Schäfer (2005) 
developed his hypothesis that content is substituted with procedure in the context of the 
EU’s economic policy and the Open Method of Coordination. Therefore it is highly 
interesting if this hypothesis is also applicable in other policy fields. If this is not the 
case in another policy field this is no final prove that the hypothesis is wrong but that its 
application to another case has failed.  
 
6.7 Timing, path dependences and unintended consequences 
 
When analyzing institutions it is important to also incorporate the temporal dimension. 
Since it is not the case that regimes are designed47 one certain point in time to resist in 
this specific form forever, but instead they change or disappear. Especially scholars 
working in the historical institutionalist tradition direct their attention towards this view. 
In this thesis the starting point is the claim that every institution in a certain policy field 
can be situated at a specific point on a continuum that captures the grade of legal 
                                                 
47 Be it to best fulfill the task of increasing cooperative gains, or just reflecting the preferences of 
powerful founding members. 
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formalization (see Figure 1), and the fact that institutions develop over time and are 
neither static nor plastic and fully under control of the founding members.  
 
So, bringing time back in allows us to overcome a static snapshot view as criticized by 
Pierson (2004). Whereas move from the left to the right on this continuum over time is 
likely to occur, a move from the right to the left is not likely to occur due to path 
dependences and stickiness of institutions48 (Pierson 2004). The actors deciding and 
bargaining about which institutional form to choose know about long-term effects and 
about possible unintended consequences. They are able to learn, and to recall past 
experiences. Regarding the continuum picture, actors when deciding upon the form of 
an institutions know that move from the right to the left is more difficult to achieve than 
move from the left to the right. So, this means that once institutions are installed in a 
more binding form, a switch-back to softer, less binding forms are very difficult to 
reach. The two figures below visualize the possibility of movement. In Figure 3 
movement, regarding the form of legal formalization of an institution from point T1 to 
point T2, is possible (but not necessarily likely) to occur. In contrast Figure 4 shows that 
this is not the case, when the movement takes place in the other direction.  
 
Figure 3: Likely movement over time  
Non-binding       T1              T2                        Binding 
|____________x =======================>  x_____________________| 
Soft Law                 Hard Law 
 
Figure 4: Unlikely movement over time 
Non-binding        T2              T1                        Binding 
|____________x <= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =  x_____________________| 
Soft Law                Hard Law 
 
In the following the two theoretical concepts mentioned above, path dependences and 
unintended consequences will be explained a little further. 
 
                                                 
48 Pierson is not the first scholar occupied with this issue. See for example (Krasner 1988). Nonetheless 
his book from 2004 constitutes a very thick and focused analysis occupied with matters of temporality. 
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Path dependences: 
The concept of path dependence is not an entirely new one. Nonetheless it is 
often depicted in the literature in a shortened or even misleading way. The basic 
idea that time does play a role and that institutions are not created overnight to 
stay static, but develop and get more institutionalized is well known for some 
time (Huntington 1969: 14ff.). Nonetheless a useful application of the concept of 
path dependence demands more than just vague notions that history matters and 
that past choices influence future processes. Additionally it is important to be 
aware of the fact, that path dependence does not necessarily mean the same in 
politics as in economics.  Especially increasing returns arguments cannot be 
transferred wholly unchanged from one sphere to the other (Pierson 2004, 
2000a). In its core a path dependent process can be described as a dynamic 
process that enfolds over time, and in turn leads to irreversibilities. It is 
important to keep in mind that, this does not mean that institutions get 
unchangeable. But change may become difficult. In the following three 
important features of path dependent sequences will be stated. 
 
- Timing plays an important role in path dependent processes. It is of big 
importance to consider at which point in time an event takes place. Normally 
earlier events are regarded as being more important than the later parts. 
Hence the order of events is an important factor that should not be 
overlooked. 
- The final outcome of a path dependent sequence cannot be explained with 
initial conditions or prior events. In the beginning a choice between different 
paths is possible.49 
- Once a process is set into motion and begins to follow a certain track and 
produces a certain outcome, a path dependent process will stay in motion and 
continue to follow this track and continue to produce the certain outcome 
(Mahoney 2000). 
 
When looking at potentially path-dependent processes it makes sense to 
distinguish between two types of sequences: Self-reinforcing sequences and 
                                                 
49 The Polya urn experiment is a good example to visualize this point (Pierson 2004).  
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reactive sequences. Self-reinforcing sequences are processes in which a given 
institutional pattern is formed and reproduced in the long-term. Once adopted 
this pattern becomes more and more difficult to transform, or to select an 
alternative option. Reactive sequences are chains of causally connected events 
that are temporally ordered. Every single event in this chain is partially a 
reaction to prior events. So every step in this chain depends on prior steps 
(Mahoney 2000). To be clear, when arguing with path-dependence it is 
important not only to give a description but to identify the mechanisms at work 
that reinforce a particular path. A mere description of stability is not regarded as 
being enough (Pierson 2004: 49). 
 
Unintended consequences 
Not only can the structure of the bargaining situation be employed for an 
explanation of why soft coordination is employed. Under the assumption of 
rational actors that are able to learn, the effects of previous decisions influence 
future decision. In this case whether to choose the same institutional form or not. 
Actors learn to avoid unintended consequences (Schäfer 2005: 34). There exists 
a bunch of literature dealing with this not entirely new concept. In its core it can 
be summed up that "Things don’t always turn out as we expect them to. Many 
events occur unintentionally" (Elster 1989: 91). Due to incomplete information, 
actors cannot always predict the effects of their actions. Agency losses, unequal 
distributional benefits but also changes of preferences may occur (Elster 1989; 
Menon 2003; Pierson 1996) Therefore actors learning from past experiences 
may decide trying to avoid these unintended consequences. In the case of 
institutional building, governments may not be willing to pool or delegate 
sovereignty to supranational institutions due to past experiences (Schäfer 2004, 
2005: 34). To avoid these unintended consequences other forms of coordination 
– e.g. soft forms – may be chosen. Nonetheless it has to be noted that these soft 
policy instruments also entail their specific unintended consequences. Actors 
choose soft policy instruments to be able to determine the level of policy 
adjustment they want to undertake. European guidelines may help to justify 
unpopular actions but they can also be ignored. In the EU context  the "OECD-
technique" (Wallace 2005a) can be regarded as a means of protection against the 
agenda-stretching Commission and the jurisdiction of the European Court of 
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Justice. The increasing choice of soft law in the EU in the last years can be 
understood as a reaction to former experiences with the classic Community 
method. Governments try to prevent unintended consequences (Schäfer 2005: 
228). In this view it is not the expected benefits that are primarily considered, 
but the possible losses, which are regarded as being minor when using soft 
coordination instruments. 
 
Following the insights stated above it becomes clear that intentional design of 
institutions, undertaken by intentional designers is partly a myth. Institutions sometimes 
develop accidentally, or develop following a logic not intended by their founding 
fathers.  Nonetheless, "even where direct design is impossible, however, indirect design 
is often nonetheless feasible. Accidents happen but, the frequency and direction of 
accidents can be significantly shaped by intentional interventions" (Goodin 1996: 29). 
This is also the direction in which the main argument of this chapter is aiming at. 
 
One point still remains to be clarified a little further: Why should states (or 
governments) in effect try to avoid more formalized, harder forms of coordination? As 
can be seen in Figure 5, the room for maneuver for the individual states differs 
according to the degree of formalization of an international institution. The more 
formalized an institution is, and the more binding its coordination instruments get, the 
smaller the room for maneuver becomes. This room for maneuver encompasses issues 
of autonomy as well as questions of sovereignty. Distance d characterizes the size of the 
room for maneuver. Distance d0, which is the smallest possible value for d, indicates 
that there is always some room left for maneuver. This can be traced back for example 
to issues of implementation. 
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Figure 5: Differing room for maneuver 
 
 
One could therefore assume that states, supposed the concrete coordination problem can 
be solved in a (soft) way50, will prefer softer or non-binding forms over hard law and 
more binding forms due to the aim to keep their room for maneuver as big as possible51. 
It should however not be forgotten that the room for maneuver may differ for different 
actors involved in an international coordination attempt. This evidence points to issues 
of power-distribution. Less powerful actors’ room for maneuver can be smaller than for 
more powerful actors.  
 
As already stated above, actually the real question is under which extraordinary 
circumstances states choose hard forms of coordination (Schäfer 2005: 17). The insights 
presented above are nothing new for scholars employed with regime theory and 
questions of institutional form. Uncertainty about possible consequences in the future, 
that makes states reluctant to more durable cooperative arrangements, has already been 
mentioned above (see chapter 6.4.3).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 Which is not always the case: Some issues can only be dealt in a binding form based on hard law.  
51 This does apply too, when governments delegate competences to institutions situated at a higher level. 
To maintain as much influence as possible these governments will insist on unanimity or qualified 
majority voting, even if the policy outcomes "are likely to be inefficient from a problem–solving 
perspective" (Scharpf 2006).  
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6.8 Summary 
 
As can be easily regarded the range of theoretical approaches discussed in this chapter 
mainly cover the first and second research questions. These two questions deal with two 
different dependent variables, namely the development and the structure of this regime, 
that are both subject to regime analysis. This distinction between the two variables is 
important, because indifference at this point has already contributed to enough 
confusion in the political science debate about international regimes (Wolf 1989: 151). 
Table 1 visualizes and summarizes the different independent variables that are regarded 
to have an impact on the dependent variables.  
 
Table 1: Dependent variables, variation, independent variables 
Dependent 
Variable (DV) 
Variation of DV Independent Variables (IV) 
Regime Formation no regime – regime 
no coordination - coordination 
individual leadership  
power – inclusion/exclusion of 
actors  
power – agenda control 
Regime 
Form/Design 
non binding – binding 
soft law – hard law 
content of agreement  
reflecting enactors’ preferences  
actor’s strategic action  
uncertainty, sovereignty costs 
 
The broad hypotheses that are presented in the following chapter stem from the insights 
of the theoretical considerations presented above. They are not regarded as being strictly 
derived from a specific theory and ready to be tested. Instead they should provide 
guiding direction for the answering of the research questions posed in this project. 
Nonetheless it will be examined if they are supported by the empirical evidence or not. 
 
6.9 Hypotheses 
 
Pure functionalist arguments are not viewed as being irrelevant here. Nonetheless the 
notion that soft coordinated institutions are chosen at the international level due to their 
flexibility, simplicity, the low contracting costs52 and  the possibility to overcome 
diversity among the participants, do not represent tough hypotheses. Although it is clear 
                                                 
52 Contracting costs increase due to large number of actors, difficult national ratification procedures, or 
distributional effects of the negotiations (Abbott/Snidal 2000). 
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that these arguments constitute an important background for the analysis and are 
therefore surely taken into consideration, the focus will be set on the other theoretical 
approaches mentioned above. Since almost "all institutions are "functional" in that they 
respond to some problem that lies outside the institutions themselves" (Caporaso 2007: 
401), this "problem" has to be included in the analysis. This task will be accomplished 
in chapter 8 of this dissertation. 
 
The set of hypotheses developed in this dissertation are divided into three sections, each 
corresponding to one specific research question. Hence the first two hypotheses engage 
with explaining the genesis of the Bologna-Regime. The second series of hypotheses 
deal with explanations why this cooperation process does take place outside the 
European Union. Finally the last hypotheses engage with explaining the soft form of 
this coordination process. 
 
Hypothesis 1a stresses Young’s (1991; Young 1994) emphasize on the importance of 
individual leadership in the process of regime formation. Hypothesis 1b takes up the 
power distributionalist argumentation line and the focus on the powerful enactors 
(Gruber 2000). Building on Jupille and Snidal’s (2006) approach the question why this 
cooperation takes place outside the institutional framework of the European Union will 
be modeled as a dismissal of the focal institution. This leads to hypothesis 2a. 
Hypothesis 2b repeats the power-distributional perspective with its focus on powerful 
actors influence. With hypothesis 3a Schäfer’s main claim (2005) stemming from 
economic policy will be analyzed in the context of another policy field. This seems an 
interesting and necessary next step in advancing knowledge about the connection 
between soft coordination instruments and the goals or in other words the content -
dimension or -layer Hypothesis 3b is added as alternative explanation, combining 
insights from the situation-structural regime-theoretical approach and theoretical 
concepts dealing with the importance of time. Contrary to the first hypothesis this one 
does not state that the content of an international agreement is substituted with 
procedure. Instead it is assumed that even in cases where compromise about the 
concrete goals exists, governments still may prefer to coordinate these issues in a soft 
non-binding way. Abbott and Snidal’s (2000) focus on uncertainty and sovereignty is 
embedded in hypothesis 3c. Hypothesis 3d finally represents the answer from a power-
distributionalist perspective, stressing the role of prime-moving actors. 
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Hypothesis 1a: For successful regime formation the presence of effective 
entrepreneurial leadership on the part of the individuals is required. 
Hypothesis 1b: An international regime is created mainly by a small group of actors 
whose ex ante power position can be regarded strongest. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Lack of congruence concerning membership between the EU and the 
group of actors engaged in the cooperative initiative aiming to coordinate the higher 
education systems, leads to the dismissal of the EU as the appropriate institutional 
solution. 
Hypothesis 2b: When powerful actors have alternative institutional preferences the EU, 
will not be selected as the appropriate institutional solution. 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Governments choose soft coordination when no compromise about the 
concrete goals exists. 
Hypothesis 3b: Governments choose soft coordination to widen their room of maneuver 
and to minimize unintended consequences, as far as possible.  
Hypothesis 3c: When uncertainty and sovereignty costs are high governments prefer 
softer forms of legalization. 
Hypothesis 3d: Enactors decide about which form an institution takes. 
 
Each of these hypotheses tries to account for the genesis or form (in this project: soft 
coordinated institutions) of international regimes from a certain perspective, and each 
hypothesis entails certain implications. It is evident that the explanatory outcomes of 
this analysis will be a combination of these different but nonetheless not mutually 
exclusive hypotheses. As can be seen these hypotheses mainly cover the strategic 
reasons of why soft coordination instruments are employed. Nonetheless, even if not 
formulated into preliminary hypotheses the explanations that go back to policy reasons 
are part of the analysis too. Especially because these policy-centered reasons represent 
the prevalent view on soft law, the proposition of alternative explanations focusing 
more on the strategic reasons seems an important task. It is important to note that the 
critical examination as formulated in the third research question will hopefully lead to 
the development of new theses and hypotheses. 
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7 Methodology 
 
The aim of this chapter is to clarify and discuss, how the research questions of this 
thesis that already have been set into a theoretical framework have been worked on from 
a methodological point of view. Since these methodological considerations guide and 
for a certain degree also determine the whole research process, the outcomes and the 
quality of theses outcomes the occupation with questions of methodology is by no 
means a compulsory exercise but one essential part of the whole research project at all. 
The notion that concept formation and questions of research design and not the concrete 
methods are the relevant starting points at this for the "conscious thinker" (Sartori 1970) 
is still true. Every research process can be divided into different phases53. Here the 
starting point is the overall research design or the research strategy, which is followed 
by concrete methods or techniques of data collection and preparation. The last steps in 
this chain are the analysis, interpretation and presentation of the collected data54. This 
chapter therefore proceeds as follows: First the overall research design will be 
explicated, followed by a description of the concrete methods of data collection and 
preparation. Finally questions concerning the analysis and interpretation of the collected 
data will be discussed.  
 
7.1 Research Design 
 
As the research questions of this thesis already imply the main focus of interest lies 
rather on the explanation of this case then on testing hypothesis derived from specific 
theories. This does not mean that the results will not be discussed in a wider context and 
that no contribution concerning the further development of theory is intended, as 
already discussed elsewhere (see chapter 4). Nonetheless the clear focus on the Bologna 
initiative has some methodological implications, because here the tracing of this 
process55 stands in the heart of this analysis, not the comparison of specific institutions, 
                                                 
53 Following Denzin and Lincoln (Denzin/Lincoln 2000: 20): Research Strategies => Methods of 
Collection and Analysis => Art, Practices and Politics of Interpretation and Presentation; or Mayring 
(Mayring 1993): Design => Techniques: Data Collection => Data preparation => Interpretation / Analysis 
54 In principle these phases apply to quantitative as well as to qualitative research. It is noteworthy at this 
point that I generally do not want to overemphasize the differences between these two research traditions 
since "most research does not fit clearly into one category or the other [...] Both quantitative and 
qualitative research can be systematic and scientific [and] neither quantitative nor qualitative research is 
superior to the other" (King et al. 1994).   
55 Not to confuse with the research technique/method/strategy named process tracing as described by 
George, Bennet or Checkel (George/Bennet 2005; Checkel 2005), that does in my point of view besides 
its catchy label not depict a very clear and well-defined approach. 
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which would in the following be the logical next step. Hence this research project bases 
on a single case study, a research approach or strategy56 that is quite well established in 
the social sciences (see for example: Eckstein 1975; Lijphart 1971; Stake 2000). 
Especially in the qualitative paradigm single case studies are situated at the heart of the 
research strategy canon (Mayring 1993: 28). Nonetheless also research that is more 
oriented towards quantification regularly uses case studies, not only in the explanatory 
phase as will be explicated below. Hence it can be concluded that there exists more than 
just one type of case study. The same applies to the question what makes up a case 
itself57. The notion that "a case may be simple or complex […] It may be a child, or a 
classroom of children, or an incident such as a mobilization of professionals to study a 
childhood condition" (Stake 2000: 436) for example does in my view not substantially 
advance our knowledge about cases. Instead I follow George and Bennet (2005: 17f.), 
who define a case  
 
"as an instance of a class of events. The term "class of events" refers here to a 
phenomenon of scientific interest, such as revolutions, types of governmental regimes 
[...] that the investigator chooses to study with the aim of developing theory (or "generic 
knowledge") regarding the causes of similarities or differences among instances (cases) 
of that class of events. A case study is thus a well-defined aspect of a historical episode 
that the investigator selects for analysis, rather than a historical event itself."  
 
Following the insights presented above it becomes clear that it is not the Bologna 
Process itself that makes up the case but the regime building that has taken place in the 
course of this initiative to coordinate higher education policies at the European level. 
Typologies of case studies mainly differ concerning the function the case study has to 
fulfill58. In reality however these types often become blurred. Although the aim of this 
case study surely is to generate, justify and if necessary reject hypotheses, there exists 
interest in the case itself (like with intrinsic case studies), too.  
 
                                                 
56 The choice to conduct a case study does not depict a choice of a concrete method: "Case study is not a 
methodological choice but a choice of what is to be studied. By whatever methods we choose to study the 
case" (Stake 2000: 435). 
57 It has to be noted in this context that many articles and books about these issues stem from disciplines 
other than political science and therefore the focus concerning the object of research as well as the level 
of analysis differs. Therefore case study manuals have to be treated with caution.  
58 For example: Explorative case study, hypotheses generating case study, case study to justify and 
illustrate quantitative findings (Lamnek 1995). Another typology identifies intrinsic, instrumental and 
collective case studies (Stake 2000). 
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What is special and a great advantage about a singe case study is "that by focusing on a 
single case, that case can be intensively examined even when the research resources at 
the investigator’s disposal are relatively limited" (Lijphart 1971: 691).  Notwithstanding 
these gains in depth have their costs too. Therefore it is inevitable to discuss some of the 
problems the chosen proceeding implies. It is evident that a research project like this 
one can due to restrictions in time and financial resources only cover a limited range of 
cases. The so called small-n problem is well known and documented in social sciences 
especially when qualitative methods are employed (Scharpf 1997; Eckstein 1975; 
Przeworski/Teune 1970), and does not only apply to single case studies. 
 
Regarding the question if a study that is based on a singe case can contribute to our 
theoretical insight, Rueschemeyer (2003: 332) states that "even analytically oriented 
analysis of single historical cases [...] can yield significant theoretical gains. These gains 
go far beyond the rejection of determinist propositions from which the case deviates and 
the increased credibility a proposition receives from a confirmation under least likely 
conditions. They include the generation of new hypotheses, as well as their testing and 
retesting against the multiple data points a thoroughly analyzed historical case offers". 
Flyvbjerg (2006) points in the same direction when arguing that one can even make 
generalizations on the basis of a single case: "One can often generalize on the basis of a 
single case, and the case study may be central to scientific development via 
generalization as supplement or alternative to other methods. But formal generalization 
is overvalued as a source of scientific development, whereas "the force of example" is 
underestimated" (Flyvbjerg 2006: 228). 
 
It is important to note that a single case study demands enhanced attention to be lain on 
the concrete methods. Hence to answer the research questions a multi-method strategy, 
a method –mix or triangulation59 (Denzin 1970) will be employed. This proceeding is 
especially necessary with single case studies, to avoid errors and to capture all relevant 
aspects and dimensions of the research field (Lamnek 1995: 4f.). Here I follow the 
notion that triangulation not primarily serves to increase the validity of the findings but 
mainly to come to complementary findings. Therefore this combination of methods 
ensures an encompassing analysis of the object of research, and widens the scientist’s 
                                                 
59 Triangulation is "the use of multiple methods in the study of the same object" (Denzin 1970). 
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focus. In the following section of this chapter the concrete methods that will be 
employed in this research project are discussed. 
 
7.2 Data Collection and preparation 
 
 The logical first step of every research project is to collect and analyze the existing 
literature concerned with the respective research topic. Hence first and foremost the 
existing secondary literature on the Bologna Process, which lacks in large parts 
considerably theoretical perspective and stringency has been collected and set into the 
perspective of the research questions and the theoretical approach to cover the 
descriptive dimension in a stringent way. This applies especially to the first research 
question that asks for the reasons why this initiative did start in the first place. 
Nonetheless an all-embracing answering of this research questions did require other 
data sources too. This is also true for the other research questions, for which no 
secondary literature exists. Additionally to this analysis of the secondary literature an 
explorative newspaper analysis has been conducted, to get a quick overview of what has 
happened in this process and to identify the relevant actors involved. Therefore six 
European newspapers60 as well as the European daily bulletins have been systematically 
scanned, covering the time-frame 1998-2005.  
 
Clearly one important part of this research project has been the collection and analysis 
of the relevant primary data, that is composed of official documents61, (progress) reports 
and statements of participating actors. Since these documents and reports do only 
partially provide the necessary information to answer the research questions this thesis 
does not only rest on the analysis of existing primary data but also on data gained from 
expert interviews and an e-mail survey.  
 
Interview methods and especially expert interviews have become common in Political 
Science (Leech 2002), not only in the explorative phase of a research project but at the 
heart of the data collection. Still expert interviews are often used in the Social Sciences 
as a means of exploring the field of research. Explorative expert interviews therefore 
help to structure this field and to generate first working hypotheses. Nonetheless expert 
                                                 
60 To get some variation two Austrian (Der Standard and Die Presse), two German (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
Die Welt) and two British (The Guardian, Times Higher Education Supplement) were used.  
61 For a list of primary data used in this thesis see Table 8 in the appendix (chapter 15.1). 
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interviews may also be used to gain systematic and complete information from experts 
that possess specialized knowledge that is otherwise not directly accessible. Therefore 
this type of expert interview is called systematizing (Bogner/Menz 2002). The third type 
of expert interview, as invented by Meuser and  Nagel (1991) aims at the generation of 
theory. Concerning the question who actually is an expert, two lines of argumentation 
prevail. The first a very broad notion (see for example: Gläser/Laudel 2004), regards 
eventually everybody as an expert (of his/her everyday life (Bogner/Menz 2002: 40)), 
whereas a more narrow conception does only conceive persons as experts because of 
their function in an organizational or institutional context. Being an expert is dependent 
on the research question and therefore a relational status. The researcher defines his/her 
experts according to the respective research questions (Meuser/Nagel 1991). For most 
questions in Political Science the latter conception of expert is more useful than the 
voluntaristic "everybody is an expert" notion that – in my opinion – partially even 
undermines the whole method as a useful tool for the collection of data. In this research 
project the selection of interview partners was informed by the fact that it was due to 
reasons of time and language ability, not possible to interview one expert from every 
participating country. Additionally it did seem better not to choose only experts from 
some countries, which would have biased the interview data. So members of the 
European Commission that have observed the whole Bologna initiative since the 
beginning have been interviewed. This is due to two reasons: First of all they possess 
the necessary information and second they are expected to rather give the "big picture" 
instead of praising the individual national achievements62. Additionally interviews with 
experts highly involved in the preparatory phase of the Bologna ministerial meeting 
were conducted63. Based on a structured open questionnaire, these expert interviews 
took place between April 2006 and January 2007 (see Table 9 in the Appendix). In 
preparation for these interviews and the questionnaire the tension between openness and 
the need to get usable data as well as problems concerning the perception of the 
researcher by the expert have been taken into consideration (Bogner/Menz 2002; 
Gläser/Laudel 2004). Also purely practical instructions and hints for the interviews have 
                                                 
62 In fact the Commission officials did of course especially overemphasize the role the Commission 
played in the beginning of the Bologna initiative, which did not come as a big surprise and was 
manageable. 
63 The former Austrian minister participating at an informal Education Council in Baden 23-24 October 
1998 during the Austrian presidency, the chairman of the Sorbonne follow-up group preparing the 
Bologna Declaration and the unofficial "author" of the Bologna Declaration itself were among these 
experts that have been interviewed. 
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been incorporated (Froschauer/Lueger 2003: 51-79; Helfferich 2004).  These expert 
interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed64, finally.  
 
Additionally to these expert interviews an e-mail survey among experts from every 
country participating since the Bologna ministerial conference in 1999 has been 
conducted. An e-mail survey is the easiest reactive method of internet-based data 
collection (Batinic/Bosnjak 2000: 288). Analogical to postal surveys a questionnaire is 
sent out, which the recipient is expected to complete and return (Bandilla/Hauptmanns 
1998). In principal two possibilities exist how to send out the questionnaire: a) the 
questionnaire is embedded directly in the text of the e-mail or b) the questionnaire is an 
own file in the attachment65. The main advantages of internet-based methods of data 
collection compared to traditional methods are the minimal costs (Sheehan 2001; 
Yun/Trumbo 2000), the fast responses (Dillman 2000; Tuten 1997), and the 
geographical independence. Additionally it is not necessary to put in the data by 
oneself. Nonetheless there exist several restrictions and sources of error too, when using 
these methods. In fact internet-based methods of data collection can only be applied to a 
very limited range of cases mainly due to problems concerning the definition of a target 
population and "perhaps the most critical problem with Internet-based research": "the 
practical impossibility of probability sampling" (Smith 1997). Problems concerning the 
response rates or the quality of the data then again do not seem to very much differ from 
traditional methods of data collection (Sheehan 2001; Yun/Trumbo 2000). What does 
matter nonetheless, are questions about the technical implementation that have to be 
thought about very carefully66. Summing up the main points it has to be noted, that e-
mail surveys can only be applied to a limited range of cases. Especially useable 
quantitative data is much harder to gain as one may expect in advance. This is mainly 
due to issues of probability sampling, which is a necessary precondition for most 
statistical operations. Nonetheless surveys in closed networks or elite- and expert-
                                                 
64 For the transcription the free available software "f4" (http://www.audiotranskription.de/f4.htm) was 
used. Since anonymity was assured to all interview partners, the interviews were randomly numbered and 
citations just refer to this interview number (e.g.: Interview X: 22). The citation does not refer to pages 
but to line numbers. The spoken interviews were transcribed mainly as they were spoken (therefore 
grammatically not perfect), not including special labels for breaks, pitches of the voice or nonverbal 
elements. Due to improve the interviews readability the word order was sometimes corrected without 
changing the meaning of the sentences. Since these interviews were conducted with the aim to gain 
shared knowledge (Meuser/Nagel 1991) from the experts  it has not been necessary to create commented 
or word-for-word transcriptions (Mayring 1993). 
65 The second possibility is widely rejected (Batinic/Bosnjak 2000; Hewson et al. 2003). 
66 Concerning this point see especially: (Dillman 2000). 
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interviews, collecting qualitative data seem to be a useful application of internet-based 
methods67.  
 
Since this case study cannot rest only on the data gained in the expert interviews, that 
have been conducted mainly among European Commission officials, an e-mail survey 
has been conducted among experts from every country that has participated since the 
conference in Bologna68. To improve response rates and the quality of the data, the 
questionnaire has been constructed in compliance with the instructions stemming from 
the relevant literature69. Four weeks after the first e-mail a reminder e-mail has been 
sent out that improved the response rates considerably. Altogether 15 out of 3070 experts 
did response the e-mail and the length and quality of some of the answers are quite 
surprising71. Figure 6 provides a temporal overview of the process of data collection. 
 
Figure 6: Phases of data collection 
Apr.05 Jun.05 Sep.05 Nov.05 Feb.06 Apr.06 Jul.06 Okt.06 Dez.06 Mär.07 Mai.07 Aug.07
Literature analysis
Newspaper analysis
Primary data analysis
Expert Interviews
E-Mail Survey
 
 
 
                                                 
67 For more information about e-mail surveys and internet-based methods of data collection in general see 
the literature mentioned in this chapter as well as the following internet resource: 
http://www.geog.le.ac.uk/orm/ . 
68 Due to practical reasons and also due to reasons of comparability the members of the Bologna Follow 
Up Group have been selected as good experts. Stemming mainly from the national ministries, most of 
them have widespread knowledge about their higher education system, reforms planned and their 
countries motivation to join the Bologna initiative. It also has to be added that – at least partly useful – 
participant lists including e-mail addresses from the BFUG exist. At this point it is noteworthy that 
nonetheless a third of these e-mail address did not work, which did entail some more research exercise. 
69 Hence the questionnaire is composed of nine questions sent directly inside the e-mail, not in the 
attachment. None of the respondents seemed to have technical problems or problems concerning the 
language (the questionnaire was only sent out in English).  
70 The Flemish and French community of Belgium are counted as two and Austria is not included. 
71 In accordance with the data stemming from the expert interviews, the texts stemming from this e-mail 
survey are reformatted and numbered, too. 
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7.3 Interpretation and analysis of Data 
 
There does not exist just one possibility of how to analyze material that has been 
collected with qualitative interviews (Lamnek 1995: 108), but there exists a bunch of 
methods and specific techniques that nonetheless have to be adapted to each individual 
case72. It is at this point helpful to recall that many of these qualitative methods and 
techniques have been developed in disciplines other than Political Science like 
Sociology or Pschology. Since the epistemological interest often differs very strongly 
between these disciplines, this also implys that not every concrete qualitative method or 
technique is well suited to be applied to Political Science questions. It is additionally 
necessary to keep in mind, that qualitative analysis of text has to be performed in a 
systematic way, following previously defined rules. Therefore one has to define the 
sequence of the analysis in advance.  
 
The analysis of the data gained in the expert interviews of this research project has been 
informed by the concept of qualitative content analysis (Mayring 2003), which 
represents a structured, systematic and theory-based way of analyzing interview data. 
Big amounts of text can be processed (Mayring 1993: 98). Since content analysis is not 
a standard instrument it has to be adapted to the respective object of research and to the 
specific research questions (Mayring 2003: 42). The main aim of content analysis is the 
analysis of material stemming from some source of communication (Mayring 2003: 11). 
Important basic ideas of this method are the proceeding according to rules, the centrality 
of categories and the care for criteria of reliability and validity73 (Mayring 2000). In this 
dissertation project a certain form of structuring qualitative content analysis has been 
employed. The main aim of this type of content analysis is to extract and summarize 
certain topics, contents and aspects out of the material.  
 
The choice of these contents depends on categories that have been developed according 
to the theories employed (Mayring 2003: 89). It can be seen that the definition of 
categories lies at the core of structuring qualitative content analysis. If it is necessary 
even sub-categories can be developed.  In a so called coding agenda, the definition of 
categories, examples and coding rules for the categories are collected. After this 
                                                 
72 For an overview about methods for analyzing qualitative data see for example: (Ryan/Bernard 2000). 
73 For a general sequence model of content analysis see: (Mayring 2003). 
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important step - the development of the coding agenda - the material is worked through. 
Since this method is embedded in the qualitative paradigm openness is demanded. 
Therefore categories and coding agenda may be revised after the first working through 
the texts. After this revision and refinement procedure and the following final working 
through the texts, the results have to be interpreted (Mayring 2000, 2003). This 
interpretation has to take place with regard to the research questions, and should go 
beyond a mere description of the individual cases (Lamnek 1995: 215). 
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8 Changing background for higher education – main trends and developments 
 
The context for higher education and in the following national higher education policies 
have changed starkly in the last decades. Most of these developments mirror the 
increasing shedding of limitations and growing interconnection but also changes of 
policy approaches and rationales74 can be observed. The major trends and developments 
that have important impact on national higher education systems and policies will be 
illustrated in the following by some different but nonetheless in some ways connected 
developments: The increase in student numbers and international mobility, the increase 
of trade in higher education or the emergence of a so-called higher education market, 
and the developments and changes in the funding of higher education systems. In this 
context it is very important to exactly express what it is that one is talking about. 
Therefore vague notions of some kind of globalization influencing higher education 
systems and policies in one and the other way are not regarded as being useful and 
therefore avoided. 
 
8.1 Student numbers 
 
There is widespread consensus that a turn from elite to mass higher education has taken 
place in the last century. This expansion in student numbers that began in the 1960ies 
and intensified in the 1980ies, totally changed the academic landscape (Zgaga 2005). In 
2004, 132 million students were enrolled in tertiary education globally compared to a 68 
million in 1991. The main growth took place thereby in East Asia and the Pacific, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, the Arab States, Central and Eastern Europe and Sub-
Saharan Africa (UNESCO 2006a: 21). Nonetheless even in North America and Western 
Europe, starting from a far higher level of tertiary participation, a growth rate of about 
2% per year since 1991 was observable  (UNESCO 2006a). In EU -15 on average the 
number of students has doubled in the period 1975/76-1996/97 (Eurydice 2000a: 104). 
Although in some countries in this region since 1998 periods of minor decrease in 
student numbers can be observed, taken altogether the number of EU-25 students has 
still grown by 16 % from 1998 to 2002 (Eurydice 2005c). Recent numbers available for 
                                                 
74 These approaches and rationales are closely connected to the particular understanding of education that 
is dominating the contemporary discourse (Faschingeder 2005). This point cannot be further elaborated in 
the framework of this research project. Nonetheless it should be at least mentioned that on the levels of 
discourses and policy approaches changes have taken place. These changes have at least in the long run 
effects on concrete policies.  
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the EU-27 students show that the number of students is still growing, by over 10% in 
2004 compared to 2001 (Eurydice 2007b: 39). The number of students matter in this 
context because some scholars regard the increase of student numbers and 
overcrowding as driving factors that make shorter durations of studies for many 
countries very attractive (Field 2003: 184). The move towards mass higher education 
with all its implications can surely be identified as one critical driving force of the 
"fundaments of contemporary higher education policies" (Zgaga 2005: 9). 
 
8.2 Student mobility 
 
Regarding the sheer number of mobile students at the beginning of the 21st century it 
becomes clear very quickly that we are no more talking about some hundred medieval 
scholars on their contemplative peregrinatio academici75. In 2004 at least 2,5 million 
students, studied outside of their home countries76. Compared to the 1,75 million 
students in 1999, this represents a 41% increase in five years. When looking at the 
period for which comparable data are available one can observe three remarkable surges 
in growth. From 1975 to 1980 the number of mobile students grew from 800.000 to 
over 1 million, which represents a growth by 30%. A second rise of 34% took place 
between 1989 and 1994. The biggest expansion is the one already mentioned above in 
the time period from 1999 to 2004 (UNESCO 2006a). When comparing this enormous 
increase of student mobility with the general increase in student numbers, it becomes 
clear that students are not increasingly more mobile, but they are increasingly pursuing 
their education. Nonetheless this steadily increase is not equally distributed, and 
therefore has important impact on the countries receiving mobile students, called host 
countries. The mobile student population grew about three times as fast as the domestic 
student enrolment in the six major host countries77 that receive 67% of the world’s 
mobile students - this clearly shows where the majority of mobile students goes to. In 
2003 about 2,12 million students where studying in another country than their country 
of origin. 1,98 million (93%) studied in the OECD area (OECD 2006). When looking at 
                                                 
75 Pilgrimage of the Scholar: It is estimated that in the seventeenth century 10% of all students in Europe 
were mobile and studying abroad  (Neave 2003), which means regardless of total numbers that in the 17th 
century the percentage of mobile students in Europe was higher than now (Amaral/Magalhaes 2004). 
76 The problematic aspects of using nationality data for measuring mobility as pointed out elsewhere  
(Kelo et al. 2006) is recognized. Since it is above all the overall trend (the increase in numbers of students 
studying abroad) that matters here this should not pose a big problem in this project. 
77 United States (23%), United Kingdom (12%), Germany (11%), France (10%), Australia (7%), Japan 
(5%). 
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the number of foreign students hosted by a country in this area over the last twenty 
years one can recognize that some countries had quite impressive growth rates, whilst 
others tended to keep their rates stable. Besides Australia and New Zealand it's 
especially EU countries that experienced the biggest increase from 1980 to 2001. In this 
area Europe is the largest receiving region, but many of the mobile students are moving 
from one European country to another. 52% of foreign students in Europe are European 
(OECD 2004; UNESCO 2006a). 
 
8.3 Funding of higher education systems 
 
Due to the fact that the increase in student numbers and the resultant financial burden is 
often mentioned to explain the attempts to change higher education structures78 (Pechar 
et al. 1998: 1-3), the funding of higher education structures will also be discussed in 
short79. It is noteworthy to recall that it is the aim of this chapter to just give an 
overview, and to depict the main developments, not to discuss issues of tertiary 
education funding in detail.  
 
Generally educational expenditure is funded from two different sources, public and 
private ones. "Public expenditure includes all direct purchase of educational services by 
the public sector (irrespective of the administrative level concerned) whereas private 
expenditure includes the payment of tuition fees (and all other payments) mainly by 
households, the business sector and non-profit organisations" (Eurydice 2005c). 
Although higher education in Europe is mainly funded publicly, a development that is 
shifting the burden of financing from the state to the students and their families, with all 
its consequences like the increase of educational inequity, cannot only be observed in 
the United States but also in Europe (Salerno 2006: 88). This development started in the 
United States twenty years ago and the perception of higher education in Europe is also 
changing in the meantime. Education and thereby especially higher education is more 
and more regarded as a private benefit in contrast to the view that regards education as a 
                                                 
78 The increased invention of tertiary colleges (e.g. Fachhochschulen in Austria) can be regarded as one 
answer to the expansion of tertiary education. Although they surely serve other purposes too, the 
invention of tertiary colleges is a way of expanding tertiary education at lower cost than expanding 
universities (Grubb 2003). 
79 For more general information on the relationship between state and higher education institutions 
regarding financial matters see for example: (Williams 1999). More detailed analysis about financing and 
autonomy or the assessment of costs per student can be found in: (Barnes 1999; Jongbloed et al. 1994).  
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public good (Heller/Rogers 2006; Teixeira 2006: 14). Nonetheless even the World Bank 
assumes that government funding is very likely to remain the primary source of 
financing for higher education in most countries (World Bank 2002: 91). 
 
In principle one can distinguish between two main forms of governmental tertiary 
education subsidization. Whilst the first form is based on a transfer of money to higher 
education institutions the second form transfers money directly to students. Regarding 
the implications these different forms entail it is evident, that direct funding of higher 
education institutions reflects the idea of higher education as a public service (Williams 
1999: 158). Nonetheless it should not be overlooked that state funding of educational 
institutions can take various forms, with different consequences and implications. The 
national context or steering framework within which recourse decisions are taken 
becomes an important part of this discussion. Here a shift has taken place throughout 
Western Europe that altered the relationship between government and public sector-
dependent organizations. Regulation by control and central planning are more and more 
replaced by the establishment of boundary conditions within which higher education 
institutions must operate (Salerno 2006: 89). This deregulation and liberalization 
development is sometimes referred to as shift from a state control model towards state 
supervising model80. 
 
Although being the prevailing mode of higher education provision since the nineteenth 
century, state funding of publicly administered universities is not everywhere regarded 
as necessary. In many Asian countries for example, privately funded universities 
dominate the higher education landscape. Similar conditions can be observed with 
limitations in the former British system. Britain longtime differed from most other 
countries in Europe, and before the 1950ies there were hardly any public provisions of 
higher education (Williams 1999: 142f.; Pechar 2006: 59f.). It has to be noted here, that 
public funding of higher education institutions varies from country to country regarding 
the level from which it originates – from the national level, state or provincial level or 
                                                 
80 Following the approach of  Vught (Maassen/Van Vught 1994) two basic steering models can be 
distinguished in higher education policy. The state control model and the state supervising model, that are 
based on more general models of governmental steering, namely the model of rational planning and 
control and the model of self-regulation (Maassen/Van Vught 1994: 38-40). Whereas the state control 
model can be traditionally found in the higher education systems of the European continent the state 
supervising model has its origins in the higher education systems of the United States and the traditional 
British system. This shift is depicted elsewhere as a move from the old interventionary towards a new 
facilitatory state (Neave/Van Vught 1991). 
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even from the municipal level (Grubb 2003). A discussion that cannot be further 
continued in this context deals with the public financial support for private higher 
education institutions. Nonetheless it should be mentioned, that in many countries also 
private higher education institutions do receive public financial support. This will be of 
increasing salience in the future due to the steadily expansion of the private higher 
education sector. It is also important to watch these developments in the European 
context, given that in Eastern Europe an enormous expansion of the private higher 
education sector has taken place since the beginning of the 1990ies81 (Salerno 2004).  
 
As mentioned above, in Europe (data covers the EU-25 here) education is mainly 
funded from public sources. In all these countries at least 80% of the total educational 
expenditure stem from public sources (Eurydice 2005c). This picture diversifies when 
only tertiary education is concerned and the circle of countries is widened. In OECD 
countries for which data is available, the proportion of private expenditures on tertiary 
institutions ranges from less than 5% (e.g. Denmark, Finland, Greece) to more than 50% 
(e.g. United States, Australia, Japan) and over 85% in Korea (OECD 2005). It is 
noteworthy that 80% of private expenditures are covered in tertiary education by private 
households. In the time period 1995 to 2002 the share of private expenditure on tertiary 
educational institutions increased in most OECD countries. This rise in private 
educational expenditure has - with the exception of Australia - generally not been 
followed by cuts in public expenditure (OECD 2005). Expenditures on tertiary 
education as a percentage of GDP, both public and private remained quite stable 
between 2000 and 2003 (UNESCO 2006a). Data on expenditure on tertiary education 
per student between 1995 and 2002 show that only in 5 out of 23 OECD countries for 
which data is available, expenditure declined. This can be traced back to rapid increases 
in student numbers in these countries during the same period (OECD 2005). 
 
8.4 Trade in higher education services82 
 
It is well known that education in general and higher education in particular have 
become big businesses. Educational services were included in the negotiations under the 
                                                 
81 In Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania enrolment in the private sector increased from 
12.000 students in 1990 to 320.000 in 1997 (World Bank 2002). 
82 Data on trade in educational services are  rare and often different methods and indicators are used for 
the surveys. The data used in this paper are mainly taken from OECD and Eurydice publications, as well 
as the recently published UNESCO education digest (UNESCO 2006a). 
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General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). This agreement regards education as a service, and aims at the removal of all 
trade barriers. Nonetheless the European Commission that has the negotiation mandate 
in the WTO rounds for all EU countries, does not want to go beyond the 1994 
agreement regarding liberalization in the field of higher education. The agreement of 
1994 limits liberalization in higher education to privately-funded education services. 
Public services are not directly affected (Hartmann 2004; Reinalda/Kulesza 2005)83. 
 
The discussion about dangers of further liberalization, marketization and the increasing 
predominance of economic thinking in systems of higher education or in discourses 
about higher education are acknowledged as being important contributions in this 
research field. Normative debates about the question if education should be regarded as 
a tradable service subordinated to the forces of a free market or not, are to some extent 
necessary and interesting, indeed. Analyses of these discussions and debates help 
besides their normative input to improve the understanding of policy rationales and 
approaches that guide and justify political action in this policy field (see for example: 
Lassnigg 2003; Hartmann 2004; Bache 2006). Nonetheless it has to be stressed that 
tertiary education has already become a global market84 and many countries and their 
higher education institutions have an essential interest in getting their slice of this still 
growing cake. According to this it is incontestable that increasing cross-border 
exchange and an increase in education services that are traded have an impact, or at 
least make up a necessary background for changes in higher education systems. In the 
following the main trends and issues will be discussed in short. In doing so the 
emphasis lies especially on the developments over time.  
 
The overall size of the global education market is estimated at more than US$ 2 trillion. 
This encompasses public as well as private household spending on education. Teaching 
staff employed in public as well as private education makes up for between 2% and 5% 
of the total labor force (Patrinos 2000). The segment of the market related to 
international student mobility has amounted to an estimated minimum of US$ 30 billion 
                                                 
83 Due to limitations in time and space the connection between GATS and higher education 
systems/institutions cannot be further examined here. See for example: (Scherrer 2004; Knight 2002; 
Barblan 2002).  
84 As a matter of fact it’s a combination of a multitude of markets. One could distinguish between a 
market for students, a market for research staff, a market for grants and scholarships, and so on 
(Jongbloed 2003). 
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for the OECD countries alone (Patrinos 2000; OECD 2004). This makes up about three 
per cent of their total services trade. Students traveling and studying abroad still 
constitute the largest component of international trade in educational services (Larsen et 
al. 2002). At this point it has to be mentioned that cross-border education and trade in 
education does not limit itself to students going abroad. It is useful to distinguish 
between three85 main forms of cross-border higher education, that correspond to the 
different modes of services trade according to the WTO classification (see: Knight 
2002: 212) of supplying goods and services across borders.  Nonetheless it should be 
mentioned that the data available mainly cover the first mode - consumption abroad - 
which is often used as an indicator for estimating the overall level of trade in 
educational services (Larsen et al. 2002). 
 
a) Student mobility (consumption abroad) 
This is the most common form of cross-border higher education. International flows 
of students make up at present the largest part of the global market for education 
services. Besides the costs for living foreign students are often obliged to pay cost-
covering tuition-fees, which makes these "full fee paying students" (Pechar 2003) 
very attractive for universities. Especially universities in Anglo-Saxon countries 
(United States, Australia, and United Kingdom) are successfully engaged in the 
recruitment of foreign students. The English language may constitute an advantage 
of location thereby, too86.  
 
b) Program mobility (cross-border supply) 
This second most common form of cross-border higher education corresponds to the 
traditional form of trade in goods. Only the service itself crosses the border. 
Distance learning and e-learning complemented by traditional teaching sourced out 
to partner institutions as well as franchise arrangements, allowing local providers to 
offer a foreign educational program are covered by this form. It is easily imaginable 
                                                 
85 The presence of natural persons traveling to another country to provide an educational service on a 
temporary basis (guest professor, researcher) is not being counted as a mode in its own. 
86 Generally it has to be noted that language is one of the key factors determining student choice in 
destination. This does not only hold true for the English language. Belgium and France for example rare 
the most popular destinations for francophone students stemming from sub-Saharan Africa (UNESCO 
2006a). Nonetheless not only language can be regarded as a crucial factor. Even Austria has its 
advantages of location: "" You’ll never have university education [in the UK] up to the standard of 
Austria", said a student reading Dickens in Vienna’s Cafe Benno, among companions playing chess and 
cribbage " You haven’t enough cafes"" (THES, 16.4.1999).  
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that these forms of cross-border higher education services will grow further in the 
near future due to steadily innovation and in, and extensive spreading of information 
and communication technologies87. 
 
c) Institution mobility (commercial presence) 
Mobility of institutions, which refers to the establishment of facilities abroad by 
education providers, is still limited in scale but is becoming more and more an 
important feature of cross-border higher education.  
(Larsen et al. 2002: 850f; OECD 2004: 3) 
 
For some countries traded educational services have become an important business, and 
concerning their higher education policy rationales, it can be stated that they now tend 
to follow a "revenue-generating approach" (OECD 2004), pushing an active higher 
education export policy. Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom are examples 
of countries that adapted this strategy for successfully promoting education as an export 
industry. Especially Australia experienced an impressive growth in the trade of 
educational services since the 1970ies. There education has become the eight largest 
export industry in 1999, which amounts to 12 per cent of Australia’s total exports of 
services. (Vlk 2006: 33f; Larsen et al. 2002). Expressed in numbers earnings from 
foreign students represented about US$ 6 million in 1970. They increased up to about 
US$ 2 billion in 1999. The United States representing the biggest exporter of 
educational services earned US$ 11,5 billion in 2001, followed by the UK with US$ 
11,1 billion (Vlk 2006; Larsen et al. 2002). When talking about the whole higher 
education services market one has to consider that these numbers only cover revenues 
due to student mobility. Comprehensive data on program- and institution-mobility is not 
available yet. 
 
8.5 Summary and further discussion 
 
Following the discussions mentioned above, one can clearly observe important 
developments and major changes concerning the overall background for higher 
education. These developments and changes have to be regarded as important stimuli 
                                                 
87 For more discussion on the effects of new information and communication technologies see for 
example: (Trow 2000). 
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for the change in higher education policies and for increased cooperation at the 
European level. Nonetheless they do not necessarily explain why cooperation took 
place, or determine the form of this cooperation. 
 
Summing up the main findings it is not very amazing, that the enormous increase in the 
number of students is also mirrored in the number of mobile students, studying abroad.  
Concerning the effects on the funding of higher education it is noteworthy that the 
dreaded cuts in public expenditures due to increasing student numbers have not arrived 
yet. In European countries expenditures for higher education are relatively stable if 
regarded as a percentage of the GDP. Nonetheless even in Europe private expenditures 
are rising, for example in the form of tuition fees. An already visible consequence of the 
increase in student number and student mobility is the advent of a competition for 
students in the so-called international higher education market among developed 
countries88, especially among the United States and Europe. Interestingly it is not only 
short-term economic considerations that play a role in the decision to host mobile 
students. Even if mobile foreign students in the actual moment constitute a burden on 
national education systems, in the longer run theses students might bring high returns to 
the host country – although not necessarily in the education sector. The need of aging 
societies to attract high skilled people may also be part of the consideration (UNESCO 
2006a: 46). Opportunities that emerged on the global market and the proactive approach 
of some countries (especially Anglo-Saxon countries) towards the export of higher 
education have also been noticed in continental Europe. It was recognized that in the 
1980ies the number of students coming from Europe that were studying in the United 
States for the first time exceeded the number of American students in Europe. Although 
Europe still hosted more foreign students than the United States (over 800.000 
compared to 547.000 in the year 2000), the greatest amount of international students 
studying in Europe came from Europe itself. This competition disadvantage and the 
lagging behind has also been noticed by the member states of the EU, which responded 
to theses challenges for example within the framework of the Bologna Process (Vlk 
2006). It could be followed that the EU countries looked across the Atlantic for 
inspiring models, when trying to establish their own pan-European framework. 
Regarded this way one key component of the Bologna Process has to be interpreted as 
                                                 
88 This analysis does not involve questions of how the unequal competition on this global higher 
education market effects education systems of developing countries (Langthaler 2005). 
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the creation of a European version of American degree standards and matriculation 
(Douglass 2006). It will be interesting to observe in the future if American higher 
education degrees still "remain the gold standard throughout the world" (Langan 2004: 
453). 
 
 Clearly structural convergence of the national higher education systems as fostered 
with the Bologna Declaration has mainly two purposes: To increase the attractiveness of 
European higher education to students from elsewhere89 and to foster and facilitate 
student mobility within Europe (Teichler 2006: 457). In this sense the Bologna 
Declaration can also be interpreted as a European response to the US dominance in 
higher education (Langan 2004: 449). 
 
From the outside view – the American view – Europe is increasingly catching up, 
concerning its position on the higher education market. Only from inside Europe the 
process seems slow-going. The speed of change in Europe has to be pointed out. For 
example financing changes that occurred over 20 years in the US are implemented in a 
much shorter timeframe (Heller/Rogers 2006: 92), which also points to a further 
important factor: Higher education is a very important policy issue in Europe, and 
especially EU countries are engaged in national and international debates about the 
future of tertiary education. This stands in contrast to the US where education is in the 
moment a second-tier political issue (Douglass 2006). 
                                                 
89 Since from the beginning of the Bologna initiative also national interests did play an important role 
(see: chapter 11.1), I do not follow Teichler who assumes that this focus on competitiveness and the 
fostering of increasing European Universities attractiveness to students from outside Europe has shifted in 
the meantime, so that the invention of a tiered system is being regarded in the meantime, as having intra-
European value, too (Teichler 2005: 93). 
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9 Cooperation in Higher Education Policy in Europe 
 
The cooperation attempts in higher education in form of the early EU/EC education and 
training programmes like Erasmus, as well as other Community action like the 
invention of the ECTS system90 are often mentioned as important explanatory factors 
for the starting of the Bologna Process (Wächter 2004: 268). Therefore this chapter 
gives a first comprehensive insight into the development of cooperation concerning 
higher education in the EU/EC91. It should nonetheless not be forgotten that cooperation 
also took place outside the EU involving other International Organizations. Hence the 
most important developments that took place under assistance of other important actors 
in the field of higher education policy are included in this discussion, too. 
 
9.1 Cooperation in the framework of the EU/EC  
 
To be clear, education was not part of the original EEC (European Economic 
Community) program and has not been mentioned in the treaties as an independent 
subject for common policies until the Maastricht Treaty. The earliest decisions 
connected to matters of education concerned vocational training and recognition of 
qualifications. These areas also formed the label under which EC educational activities 
were promoted (Keeling 2006: 204). Altogether EU policies in the field of education are 
mainly intended to be additional to national policies (Beukel 2001: 124), as finally 
stated in the Maastricht Treaty, too (art. 149/1 TEC). Hence European activities 
longtime lacked a legal basis for action. But exactly this lack of legal basis in parts 
widened the room of maneuver for the European Commission, which actively used this 
freedom for action, that would have been more difficult or even impossible within a 
clear-cut legal structure (Brakel et al. 2004). Regarding the administrative capacity it is 
noteworthy that since its major reorganization in the course of the 1973 enlargement the 
European Commission was able to increase its staff and up to now about 550 officials 
and temporary agents in the respective Directorate-Generale (Gornitzka 2007: 10). 
 
                                                 
90 ECTS, the European Credit Transfer System was first introduced in 1989 within the framework of 
ERASMUS. 
91 This exercise is necessary because for example "those who know the long history of education 
initiatives taken within the EC but not by it [...] will not have been surprised that the Commission was 
invited to the intergovernmental Bologna Process" (Corbett 2006). For a focused analysis of the European 
Union’s higher education policy from it’s beginning on see : (Corbett 2005). 
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One should thereby not forget to include the influential jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ), which starkly contributed to the establishment of education as a 
policy field and to the expansion of Commission’s competences92. The two most 
prominent cases – among others - concerning matters of education are Casagrande 
(1974)93 and Gravier (1985)94. Since the Casagrande ruling 1974 education was seen as 
being of Community concern, when the creation of a common market was affected 
(Blitz 2003: 202). The Gravier ruling had two main results. The first was the 
establishment of EC students’ right to equal access to higher education and the duty of 
the member states to respect this right. The second result was that higher education was 
qualified as being part of vocational education and therefore a Community 
responsibility (Hackl 2001b: 9f.).  
 
Until the beginning of the 1970ies cooperation in the field of education took place 
incidentally (Brakel et al. 2004), which changed at the beginning of the 1970ies. 
Nonetheless, as Corbett (2003; 2005) demonstrates, this does not imply that the period 
before 1970 had no impact on higher education policies at all. In fact many relevant 
ideas stem from this period. Although twice postponed, the first meeting of ministers in 
charge of education from the then six member states of the European Community took 
finally place in July 1971 under participation of Alterio Spinelli from the European 
Commission. Increasing cooperation, concerning education was decided, and the 
ministers also agreed on the establishment of a European University Institute in 
Florence. There was also consensus among the ministers that cooperation in education 
should not stop at the frontiers of the EEC (Beukel 2001: 127; Corbett 2005: 62f.). 
Since this first meeting in 1971 ministers of education started to meet on a regular basis 
(Leitner 1993: 204)95. It may be of interest in this context that intergovernmental 
cooperation of EC member states is nothing new, as the creation of the European 
University Institute (a which had already been discussed in 1955 (Corbett 2005: 25-34)) 
in Florence in 1972 witnesses. The decision was taken by the governments of the then 
                                                 
92 It is neither the aim of this dissertation to discuss the gradual expansion of Community competences in 
the field of education, nor the important role the ECJ played in this process. For a discussion concerning 
this issues see for example: (Hackl 2001a). For more information on the active role the ECJ held in 
furthering the integration process in detail see: (Stone Sweet 2004).  
93 Donato Casagrande v. Landeshauptstadt München (Case 9/74) 
94 Françoise Gravier v. City of Liège (Case 293/83) 
95 Until the Treaty of Maastricht these meetings ran under the label "Council and the ministers of 
education meeting within the Council", due to the lack of a legal base (De Wit 2003). 
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EC member states, but the agreement was taken under international law (De Witte 1993: 
193). 
 
In the consequence of the second meeting of the ministers of education in 1974 an 
Education Committee, composed of member states representatives and Commission 
representatives was set up, which got established as a permanent body with the adoption 
of the Community Education Action Programme in 1976. Among the main goals of the 
action program like the establishment of closer relations between the educational 
systems in Europe, the fostering of documentation and statistics on education, teaching 
of foreign languages there was also the goal of closer cooperation in the field of higher 
education (Beukel 2001: 128f.). The establishment of this program lay down the basis 
for future action. To foster closer cooperation among the member states and to get 
comparable data, already in 1976 the European Council argued for the establishment of 
a network for exchange of information concerning the organization of higher education 
(Official Journal C38 of 19.2.1976). This task was fulfilled with the establishment of 
the EURYDICE network96 in 1980. 
 
Between the years 1986-89 three important educational programmes97 were adopted: 
COMMETT in 1986 (Community Programme for Education and Training in 
Technology), ERASMUS in 1987 (European Community Action Scheme for the 
Mobility of University Students) and LINGUA in 1989 (Language and Training 
Programme). Besides the objective to increase student mobility ERASMUS also had the 
goal of promoting cooperation between the institutions of higher education. With the 
invention of ERASMUS the European Commission also sought to influence 
cooperation concerning the national curricula (Langan 2004: 447).  
 
                                                 
96 Established in 1980, expanded in 1990 by a resolution of the Council (Official Journal C 329 of 
31.12.1990) EURYDICE is since 1995 part of SOCRATES the Communities action programme in 
education. The importance of information exchange was underlined in the Treaty on European Union (art. 
149 TEC). The EURYDICE network consists of national units and a European unit set up by the 
ministries of education. EURYDICE network member countries are the member states of the EU, the 
three EFTA countries that are members of the European Economic Area and the EU candidate countries 
involved in SOCRATES. The main task of EURYDICE is to prepare and publish comparable 
monographs on the organization of education systems, studies on specific relevant topics and indicators 
(Eurydice 2000b). 
97 There were also other programmes established in this time period e.g. DELTA (learning technologies) 
or EURTECNET (professional education and information technology), but in this context they are of 
minor interest and therefore left out.   
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Regarding the scope of these programmes, it is noteworthy that COMMETT and 
ERASMUS already transcended the borders of the Community. EFTA countries 
participated since the early 1990ies. Cooperation agreements with the Mediterranean 
countries, the ACP98- countries, Canada and the USA were concluded (De Wit 2003: 
163). With the program TEMPUS (Trans-European Mobility Programme for University 
Students) educational cooperation was already extended to the new democracies in 
central and eastern Europe (Beukel 2001). This program was set up in 1990 for 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (Brakel et al. 
2004). What can be regarded in general for the 1990ies is the fact that the budgets for 
educational programmes in the EU increased. Nonetheless the overall characteristic that 
the main level of problem-solving and competence was the national level, still remained 
the same (Beukel 2001: 134). Additionally to the invention of action programmes two 
directives on the recognition on diplomas were passed: one in 198899 and a 
supplementary one in 1992100. They were intended to foster mobility and to a removal 
of barriers. It is true that enhanced student mobility requires if not harmonized systems, 
at least some level of mutual recognition of diplomas, which may in turn lead to 
increased mobility. The invention of a so called European Credit Transfer System 
(ECTS) was surely one important step towards this direction. Nonetheless one cannot 
observe the emergence of a quasi "”autodynamic” convergence of European higher 
education systems with regard to the duration and organization of courses of study, 
admission standards, curricula and substantive content - which in turn is preparing the 
ground for future directives on the mutual recognition of educational certificates" 
(Scharpf 1994: 236), following an intended strategy of the European Commission.   
 
Within the Maastricht treaty education finally got a legal base. Education and vocational 
training were thereby formally separated (art. 149 TEC/art. 150 TEC). Nonetheless the 
supplementary characteristic of education remained, which can be seen on the explicit 
reference to the need of respecting the responsibilities of the member states. This 
argumentation stands also in line with the subsidiarity clause (art. 5 TEC). With this 
                                                 
98 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries: the term grounds in the Lomé convention from 1975, that 
was signed by the members of the European Community and  46 representatives of  so-called ACP 
countries (Betz 2003). 
99 Council Directive 89/48/EEC of 21 December 1988 on a general system for the recognition of higher-
education diplomas awarded on completion of professional education and training of at least three years' 
duration 
100 Council Directive 92/51/EEC of 18 June 1992 on a second general system for the recognition of 
professional education and training to supplement Directive 89/48/EEC 
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treaty earlier Community activities like the action programmes were quasi legalized ex 
post (Wächter 2004: 271) The integrationist dynamic that could be observed until 
Maastricht ended with the establishment of a clear-cut legal structure, and was followed 
by a phase of relative political stagnation (Walkenhorst 2005: 7). It has already been 
mentioned that the cooperation attempt concerning higher education structures – the 
Bologna Process – takes place outside the EU, concerning the participants as well as the 
mode of decision-making. Nonetheless it is important to notice that this did not imply 
the end for higher education policy in the framework of the EU. Besides the 
developments following the European Council of Lisbon in 2000, other actions in 
related policy fields can be observed. For example the Bruges-Copenhagen process, that 
has the goal of enhanced cooperation in vocational training and education, taking over 
patterns from the Bologna Process (Balzer/Rusconi 2006).  Summing up the main 
developments in the field of education it may be true that "what has been achieved in 
the past thirty years is a recognition of the value of cooperative efforts rather than an 
evolved policy" (Blitz 2003: 212). Although some functions are partially aggregated at 
the EU level, namely the fostering of mobility, the central functions still remain at the 
national level (De Wit 2003: 166). 
 
9.2 Cooperation outside the EU/EC 
 
It has not only been the EU that actively engaged in the field of higher education in 
Europe. Besides some regional initiatives of groups of individual states101 especially 
international organizations were active in this policy field. In the following the main 
organizations that are actively involved in fostering cooperation among European nation 
states concerning their higher education policy, are discussed. Since it is not the main 
focus of this project, this will be done briefly.  Nonetheless it is important to show that 
cooperation in higher education policy is not only part of EU business and has always 
been a field where several international actors were involved102. To be true, the Council 
of Europe had been the first international forum that was given competences to develop 
measures aiming at the facilitation of cooperation in higher education. Ministers 
                                                 
101 Some regional initiatives were launched to enhance mobility of students and teachers. E.g. Nordplus, 
Pushing Back the Borders, Ceepus (Zgaga 2005).  
102 Interestingly in the very early days of educational cooperation at the European level even the Western 
European Union (WEU) was involved, by fostering contacts between the national rectors’ bodies. A task, 
that was regarded as being part of the own cultural propaganda mission (Corbett 2005). 
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responsible for matters of education of Council of Europe signatories started to meet  
regularly since 1959, to pass several resolutions (Corbett 2005: 52f.). 
 
Concerning academic recognition the Council of Europe and the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) adopted seven 
conventions since the 1950ies. The joint convention of 1997, the so-called Lisbon-
convention103 which entered into force in 1999 has been the last one. It has to be 
pointed out that not only European states signed it, but also certain non-European states 
like Israel, Canada, the United States or Australia. Not all signatory states have ratified 
the convention yet. The aim of these conventions is the setting of common standards, 
dealing with equivalence of diplomas, periods of study and recognition of qualifications 
(Reinalda/Kulesza 2005: 53f.). Being the only UN agency with an explicit mandate 
regarding education, UNESCO’s financial and personnel capacities concerning higher 
education are relatively limited (De Prado Yepes 2006: 122).  
 
Regarding educational statistics, the establishment of common indicators and 
benchmarking the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
has longtime experience. Regarding common education indicators the OECD has 
replaced most other organizations in the meantime (Martens/Wolf 2006: 163). Although 
originally only interested in the field of education as long as matters of economic 
development were touched, the OECD is actively engaged in this area since the early 
1960ies (Reinalda/Kulesza 2005: 60f.). With the invention of the Center for Educational 
Research and Innovation (CERI) in 1968 and the  establishment of the education 
committee two years later, education policy became institutionalized as a field of 
activity (Martens/Wolf 2006: 163). The establishment of the International Indicators of 
Educational Systems (INES) and the further development of the International Standard 
Classification of Education (ISCED) originally invented by UNESCO, consolidated its 
role as the most important and influential organization concerning education statistics 
(Weymann/Martens 2005). Though solely based on peer pressure, the impact of OECD 
education policy reviews on national policies should not be underestimated104 
                                                 
103 Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher Education in the European Region 
(CETS No.: 165). For the list of current signatory states see: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=165&CM=8&DF=8/8/2006&CL=ENG  
104 For a critical comment on benchmarking and ranking and its effects on the educational sphere see 
(Lissmann 2006: 74-87). 
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(Huisman/Van der Wende 2004: 351). The most prominent example of OECD influence 
through benchmarking and production of statistical data stems from a lower level of 
education: PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment). With its 
production of statistical material as a factor of harmonization the OECD should not be 
disregarded, even if it does not directly intervene (Lawn/Lingard 2002: 300), and nearly 
totally lacks financial and legal instruments (Weymann/Martens 2005: 81). OECD 
education policy reviews are regarded as being extremely influential, in making national 
governments aware of the differences and similarities of their national higher education 
systems towards a certain European ideal type model (Huisman/Van der Wende 2004: 
351). Especially the annually published "Education at a Glance" analysis receives much 
attention. 
 
Interestingly the OECD is also longtime active in fostering discussions on education 
and science policy. The first meeting of OECD ministers of science took place in 1963 
in Paris (Benum 2005). Following the discussion above it can be concluded, that the 
OECD fosters interstate cooperation with its benchmarking practices, recommendations, 
and declarations. Although the organizations mentioned above clearly are the most 
important ones regarding active involvement in the field of European higher education, 
one should not overlook that a bunch of other organizations and actors are more or less 
involved too105. 
                                                 
105 e.g. The World Bank, that is known for her activity in stimulating public policy reforms in former 
communist countries (Halász 2003), including the educational sector. 
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10 Institutionalizing soft-law: The Bologna-Regime 
 
The term Bologna Process describes an intergovernmental106 agreement between nearly 
all European countries, both EU-members and non-EU members. Additionally a bunch 
of other organizations participate and more or less try to influence and steer the process. 
Although the process is formally situated outside the framework of the EU one should 
not fall into the trap of underestimating the increasing influence of the European 
Commission. This growing influence can be mainly traced back to financial and 
organizational support but also to the Commissions agenda setting power and its 
influence on the level of discourse (Keeling 2006). Although the Commission did only 
get a full member of the process at the ministerial meeting in Prague it supported it from 
the beginning, funding research projects and seminars. Some scholars even argue that 
there would have been no preparation for the meeting in Bologna and therefore no 
successor to the Sorbonne Declaration without this financial support from the 
Commission (Balzer/Martens 2005). Although being weak regarding the legal basis, the 
Commission in fact can build upon her resources she can offer and her unique position 
as "a permanent nexus in this policy sector" (Gornitzka 2007: 27), that would be very 
difficult to substitute for other actors, be it national or international ones. 
  
In the following this chapter aims to discuss the Bologna Process in line with regime 
theory, as outlined in the chapter dealing with the overall theoretical framework. The 
individual parts forming the Bologna-regime are therefore analytically divided and 
discussed. The temporal ordering ((Sorbonne) – Bologna – Prague – Berlin – etc.), is 
not continued here. 
 
10.1 Principles and main goals 
 
The most prominent and well known aim is surely the aim to establish a European area 
of higher education. According to ministers of higher education this European Higher 
Education Area (EHEA) should be established by 2010. Clearly this aim, repeated like a 
mantra in official statements is more a header or trademark than a real goal. Because no 
                                                 
106 Strictly speaking the Bologna Process has begun as a mainly inter-ministerial forum that had been 
upgraded towards a real inter-governmental forum (Zgaga 2005: 9). This is mainly due to issues that 
cannot be dealt by the ministers of education alone (e.g. VISA policies).This point has already been taken 
up by the actors involved, in the course of discussions about the external dimension of the Bologna 
Process (Zgaga 2006), following the official Bologna seminar that took place in Oslo, 28-29 September 
2006. 
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one would deny that a European area of higher education did also exist before Bologna. 
It depends on which characteristics one applies to this "area of higher education" and 
which definition of "Europe" is employed107. Actually the original declaration did 
contain three main goals: international competitiveness, mobility and employability  
(Lourtie 2001: I). Some additional, regarding their content mainly complimentary goals 
were added since then at the following ministerial meetings. 
  
Mobility among students and higher education institutions’ staff should be increased as 
well as the employability of graduates finishing their higher education in Europe. 
Greater compatibility and comparability between higher education systems should be 
reached as a further goal. Finally the attractiveness and competitiveness of European 
higher education should be increased. For reasons of balance this competitiveness-goal 
should not be reached at the expense of social characteristics of the EHEA. So a 
reduction of social and gender inequalities at the national and European level can be 
regarded as an additional goal (Bergen Communiqué 2005; Berlin Communiqué 2003; 
Bologna Declaration 1999; Prague Communiqué 2001). 
 
10.2 Norms and rules – action lines 
 
Regarding the norms and rules that govern the interaction in the framework of the 
Bologna Process, which are referred to as main action lines in the literature 
(Reinalda/Kulesza 2005), one can mostly observe a continuousness with former EU 
action programmes and Commission objectives. Only the coordination concerning 
degree structures is a real invention in this context. Not at least due to its newness, this 
aim to change degree structures dominated the discussions and perceptions form the 
beginning (Wächter 2004: 268). With the implementation of the Diploma Supplement a 
system of easily readable and comparable degrees should be adopted. A system of 
studies based on two main cycles, undergraduate and graduate should be adopted too. 
This two-cycle structure has been broadened at the Berlin ministerial meeting, with the 
inclusion of a third cycle encompassing the doctoral level. The action lines stated briefly 
in the following, underpin the similarities to former action programmes. Mobility 
should be promoted and obstacles be removed. Here the necessity of developing a kind 
                                                 
107 Interestingly this "European area of higher education" does in the meantime also encompass Russia, 
Moldova and the Ukraine. For a very telling visualization see Figure 12. 
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of currency allowing mobile students the transfer of finished courses from one country 
to another points at the need to establish a system of credits (like the European Credit 
Transfer System ECTS). Also European cooperation in quality assurance (with the 
development of mutually shared criteria and methodologies on quality assurance), the 
European dimensions in higher education and the attractiveness of the EHEA should be 
promoted. Additionally lifelong learning the involvement of higher education 
institutions and students in the Bologna Process and the promotion of links between the 
EHEA and the European Research Area108 – as the two pillars of the knowledge based 
society, are included (Bergen Communiqué 2005; Berlin Communiqué 2003; Bologna 
Declaration 1999; Prague Communiqué 2001). 
 
As can be seen, similar to the main goals also principles and norms are established at a 
quite high level of abstraction, hardly ever stimulating concrete actions themselves. In 
the next sub-chapter the organizational structure, and the decision making at the 
European level is discussed shortly. Nonetheless it surely has become clear to the reader 
up to now that a lot of concrete and important action takes place at other levels, namely 
at the national and the subnational - the level of individual higher education institutions. 
 
10.3 Organizational structure – decision making 
 
The process of setting up the organizational structure mainly lasted from the meeting in 
Bologna in 1999, until the ministerial conference held in Berlin 2003. Only minor 
changes happened afterwards. A few consultative members were additionally invited at 
the conference in Bergen in 2005. The first attempt to structure the organization of this 
coordination process took place at the informal meeting of EU ministers on 23-25 
September, in Tampere109. There the establishment of two groups (a consultative group 
and a steering group) preparing the ministerial meeting in Prague in 2001 was decided 
(Reinalda/Kulesza 2005: 21). Nonetheless the organizational structure that is outlined 
here, represents the status quo established with the conferences in Berlin and Bergen, 
                                                 
108 The creation of this European Research Area (ERA) was proposed by the European Commission in 
2000 ((COM 2000) 6). This ERA shall also be fully developed in 2010 and is mainly funded by the 
Union’s research framework programs (European Commission 2002). 
109 see: http://presidency.finland.fi/netcomm/News/showarticle774.html The fact that it was the EU 
ministers that took the decision clearly shows that especially EU members are in position to steer the 
process. This evidence can also be noticed when looking at the role the Presidency of the EU plays in the 
organization of the follow-up structure. 
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and therefore does not involve a discussion of the consultative group, the steering 
committee or the Bologna Preparatory Group which had to plan the ministerial 
conference at Berlin. 
 
The main decision body is the Ministerial conference.  These meetings of ministers in 
charge of higher education take place every 2 years. Following the conference in 
Bologna in 1999, meetings were held in Prague 2001, Berlin 2003, Bergen 2005 and 
London 2007. The next ministerial conferences will take place in Leuven and Louvain-
la-Neuve (Belgium) in 2009 and in 2010 finally in Austria and Hungary. Decision 
making in the ministerial conference is based on consent of the participants. One of the 
main tasks of the ministerial conference is to adopt communiqués110 and programmatic 
declarations that are prepared by the Bologna Follow-up Group. These communiqués 
include besides the preamble, a summary of the progress achieved since the last 
meeting, further action lines, changes of the follow-up structure, and formal delegations 
of tasks to the follow-up group. These communiqués are declarations of intention but 
not legally binding. Summing up it is the main goal of these ministerial conferences to 
take stock of the progress reached so far and to decide on further action.  
 
Especially between the ministerial conferences the Bologna Follow-up Group (BFUG) 
and the Bologna Follow-up Group Board are important actors. The Bologna Follow-up 
Group (BFUG) is chaired by the EU Presidency at the time. The Vice-chair is held by 
host country of the next ministerial conference. Members of the BFUG are 
representatives of all signatory countries, new participants and the European 
Commission. As additional consultative members the Council of Europe, the European 
University Association (EUA), European Association of Institutions in Higher 
Education (EURASHE), the National Unions of Students in Europe (ESIB), UNESCO-
CEPES, Education International (EI) Pan-European Structure, the European Association 
for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA), and the Union of Industrial and 
Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE) participate. The member countries are 
mainly represented by officials from the ministries. The BFUG is responsible for the 
monitoring and development of the process (stocktaking), the drafting of the next 
                                                 
110 All communiqués and the Bologna Declaration itself (Berlin Communiqué 2003; Bergen Communiqué 
2005; Bologna Declaration 1999; Prague Communiqué 2001) can be found at the web page of Bologna 
secretariat (http://www.dfes.gov.uk/bologna/). 
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communiqué, the organization of a series of official Bologna seminars, and since Berlin 
also the preparation of next ministerial meeting. Additionally the BFUG is obligated to 
promote the process. The BFUG may convene ad hoc working groups. The BFUG 
meets at least twice a year (Reinalda/Kulesza 2005: 29). See therefore also Table 10 in 
the appendix. In practice one should not overestimate the differences between full and 
consultative members because voting does not take place too often. Effectively only the 
place where the next conference will take place and new board members are subject to 
voting (Interview 4: 165-170). 
 
The Bologna Follow-up Group Board  which was invented to "oversee the work 
between the meetings of the Follow-up Group" (Berlin Communiqué 2003), has the 
same chair and vice-chair as the BFUG. Members are representatives of the preceding 
and following EU Presidencies, representatives of three participating countries that are 
elected by the BFUG for one year and the European Commission. As consultative 
member the Council of Europe, EUA, EURASHE and ESIB participate. The board is 
obliged to support the Follow-up Group, organize events and working groups on special 
issues with members of the Follow-up Group, give assistance to the new members, 
coordinate the stocktaking preparation and coordinate and monitor the implementation 
of the work program (Reinalda/Kulesza 2005). The meetings of the board take place 
more often than the meetings of the BFUG (See Table 10). 
 
Since December 2003 the official secretariat composed of three persons, exists. It is 
located at the host country of the next conference. It has administrative and operational 
responsibility for the next ministerial conference, secretarial tasks, execution of special 
tasks if asked by the Follow-up Group or Board. The official secretariat is mainly  
invented to support the overall follow-up work (Reinalda/Kulesza 2005) and to provide 
information via the secretariat’s webpage about the process in general (including a 
library of the main documents) as well as about current Bologna-relevant events 
(seminars, conferences). One can easily recognize the limited institutional capacity of 
this process, given that not even a permanent secretariat exists (Corbett 2006: 23). 
 
Of importance are also the official Bologna seminars that are organized by national 
educational ministries and other stakeholders. These semi-formal seminars are 
important fora for international policy formulation. Here experts and practitioners 
 80
participate and contribute to the process by discussing and work on distinct relevant 
topics. For a list of seminars that took place between 2002 and 2007 see Table 11. 
 
 As can be observed a lot of actors, both governmental and non-governmental are 
integrated in the opinion-forming process. This does not apply to the national 
parliaments that are not involved (Seib 2005), and come only into play afterwards, when 
the decisions taken at the European level have to be translated into domestic legislation 
(Senden 2004). This point should not be overlooked when asking why governments 
prefer this way of coordinating higher education policy at the European level. 
 
10.4 Stocktaking 
 
Clearly the responsibility for the implementation of the goals and action lines agreed 
upon in the different communiqués rests within the individual member states. Actually 
there is no mechanism available to enforce the common agreements, even if signatories 
fail to comply. The only very soft instrument available to stimulate national adaptation 
is peer-pressure, based on the different stocktaking reports available. Although the 
stocktaking exercise should - according to Andrejs Rauhvargers the chairman of the  
stocktaking working group preparing the report for the London conference in 2007 – 
just have the purpose to inform "where we stand" and not stimulate any "races between 
countries" (Rauhvargers 2007), it is not absurd to assume at least some impact 
stemming from the comparison of progress. Bearing in mind the effects of OECD’s 
comparison and benchmarking it is not too surprising that peer-pressure effects, best-
practices and learning are also present in the framework of the Bologna Process111. 
Measuring progress in the following of the Bologna conference in 1999 took place at 
least till the Berlin ministerial conference in 2003 in a very broad and general way. This 
at least applies to the official Bologna follow-up stocktaking.  
 
To contribute to the ministerial meetings in Prague (2001) and Berlin (2003) 
background reports were commissioned by the Follow-up group of the Bologna 
Process, namely the so called Lourtie- and Zgaga- reports (Lourtie 2001; Zgaga 2003). 
                                                 
111 One expert (Interview 3: 120-130)  asserted a general climate change  - a kind of "Benchmarking turn" 
- since 2000 in Europe, concerning the effects of comparison be it Pisa or Bologna-Stocktaking. "There is 
a climate in which comparisons and honesty is accepted and appreciated" (Interview 3: 130f.). 
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These reports were occupied more with summing up the main events and outcomes and 
desired future perspectives of the process itself, than with detailed analysis of what was 
going on in the signatory states’ higher education systems. Already the first report was 
aware of the need to collect comparable data as a basis for future decision (Lourtie 
2001). Lacking own comparable data, these reports and the ministerial meetings itself 
very much relied on the TRENDS reports from the EUA112. In effect, the first TRENDS 
report (Haug/Kirstein 1999) constituted an important contribution to the ministerial 
conference in Bologna (see: chapter 11.2.1). Especially till the ministerial conference in 
Berlin in 2003 TRENDS II and III (Haug/Tauch 2001; Reichert/Tauch 2003) were – 
besides certain EURYDICE reports113  – the prime studies that measured the progress of 
the Bologna member states. The Berlin communiqué officially takes notice of the 
EUA’s contribution. 
 
With the prospects of reaching half-time in the creation of the European Higher 
Education Area in 2005, ministers agreed at the conference in Berlin in September 2003 
to the conduct of an own stocktaking exercise (Bologna Follow-up Group 2005: 35) 
because "a mid-term stocktaking exercise would provide reliable information on how 
the Process is actually advancing and would offer the possibility to take corrective 
measures, if appropriate" (Berlin Communiqué 2003). The Follow-up group was 
requested to organize this stocktaking process, and to deliver detailed reports before the 
Bergen conference in 2005, especially on the progress of implementation of quality 
assurance, the two-cycle system and the recognition of degrees and periods of studies. 
This request was renewed and the scope of the stocktaking was widened at the next 
conferences in Bergen and London. With the establishment of a working group charged 
with the task to carry out the stocktaking exercise in March 2004 the BFUG complied 
with the minister’s request (Bologna Process Stocktaking 2005: 5). 
 
To measure and visualize the concrete progress of individual member states concerning 
the relevant action lines, the so-called Bologna Scorecard was developed. Building on 
                                                 
112 At this point still the Confederation of European Union Rector’s Conferences and the Association of 
European Universities. 
113 Already mentioned the Bologna initiative in it’s 1999 comparative study "Organization of Higher 
Education structures in Europe" (Eurydice 1999) EURYDICE did contribute to the stocktaking with the 
collection of relevant data and the production of several comparative studies that focused on the "national 
trends in the Bologna Process" . Published before each ministerial conference since 2003 (Eurydice 
2003), these studies were well-suited to provide important additional data on the implementation of the 
Bologna action lines.  
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similar models like the Lisbon Scorecard114 or the balanced scorecard, the Bologna 
Scorecard has criteria and five benchmarks for each action line. These benchmarks are 
color-coded ranging from "Green", which stands for "Excellent performance" to "Red" 
which means that "Little progress has been made yet". The developed benchmarks were 
finally applied by the working group to each participating country. Country 
representatives were issued the initial scores and they had the chance to comment and 
review the material (Bologna Process Stocktaking 2005).  
 
The prime data sources on which the whole stocktaking exercise and also the Bologna 
Scorecard are based are the national reports submitted by the participating countries. 
Additional data, also due to reasons of validation stemming from EURYDICE, EUA 
and ESIB is employed too. Nonetheless, the main data sources are the national 
reports115. It is noteworthy in this context that the ESIB "Bologna with student eyes" 
study is mainly based on  a web-questionnaire accomplished by national unions of 
students (in the 2007 edition of 36 countries) (ESIB 2007: 9). EUA bases it’s TRENDS 
report primarily on an own survey of higher education institutions, including 
quantitative as well as qualitative methods (Crosier et al. 2007: 14f.).  
 
As can be easily seen the whole stocktaking procedure strongly relies on reliable and 
valid national reports. Therefore a certain degree of window-dressing is likely to take 
place. Concerning the scope of this difference between real and reported achievements 
it has to be noted, that even expert in this field do not share the same assessment and 
recommend to better look at EUA’s TRENDS report116. A single but very illustrative 
example of how the material from EUA and ESIB is handled can be found in the 
London Communiqué: "Our stocktaking report, along with EUA’s Trends V report, 
                                                 
114 Although in clear contrast to the Lisbon Scorecard, the Bologna Scorecard does not classify countries 
as "heroes" or "villains" (Bannermann 2001), since it is "not designed to make comparisons between 
countries" (Bologna Process Stocktaking 2005). Since the only pressure to comply with the action lines 
stems from these comparisons, it is a little bit strange that they are officially treated as inevitable side-
effects. 
115 That were not always submitted on time, and did not always directly answer to the questions that were 
asked (Bologna Process Stocktaking 2007). 
116 "There is no country that dares to say: no I have not done it, and you go through and everything is 
green, but if you go and speak to the universities and to the students you see that everything is red 
eventually. So this is not something to trust. On the contrary, I trust more the TRENDS of the 
universities, what brings out hundreds of problems" (Interview 2: 374) "There is some degree of window 
dressing and maybe the countries that say they are dark –green should have had light green" (Interview 3: 
200).This differing views also continue concerning the effectiveness of the whole stocktaking exercise 
(Interview 3: 122f., Interview 2: 402f.).  
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ESIB’s Bologna with student eyes and Eurydice’s Focus on the structure of higher 
education in Europe, confirms that there has been good overall progress in the last two 
years" (London Communiqué 2007). Even a very brief look into the ESIB report 
speaking of "implementation à la carte", "superficially implementation" stating big 
problems in distinct fields (ESIB 2007: 5), unveils that this is not necessarily the case, 
and that the ESIB report has been read apparently very selectively117.  
 
Summing up the findings concerning the stocktaking exercise it can be said that, 
although the measurement of progress has become institutionalized since the ministerial 
meeting in Berlin and although with the invention of the Bologna Scorecard comparison 
between countries has become very easy, the whole stocktaking is still a very soft 
instrument concerning the stimulation of national adaptation. Due to its strong reliance 
on national reports and selectively consideration of data stemming from other sources 
there is still room left for a certain degree of window dressing, too.  
                                                 
117 In spite of this the reports from ESIB or EUA are clearly driven by distinct motivations, too and of 
course not absolute truths. "In effect, academics and experts, often through their associations, act as new 
political actors [...] Even education is not immune from this as European-wide associations struggle to 
achieve for their members information and influence" (Lawn 2006: 282).  
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11 Explaining the genesis of the Bologna-Regime 
 
11.1 Agenda Formation  
 
"The stage of agenda formation encompasses the emergence of an issue on the political 
agenda, the framing of the issue for consideration in international forums and the rise 
of the issue to a high enough place on the international agenda to warrant priority 
treatment"(Levy et al. 1995: 282) 
 
The Bologna Process did not simply start with the signing of the "Joint declaration of 
European ministers of education" in Bologna in June 1999 but with the "Joint 
declaration on harmonization of the architecture of the European higher education 
system by the four ministers in charge for France, Germany, Italy and the United 
Kingdom"118 at the Sorbonne University in May 1998. Therefore the process should be 
actually named Sorbonne (-Bologna) Process. This is how the process of coordinating 
European higher education structures is sometimes depicted. It is true that these 
intergovernmental meetings that took place at the Sorbonne and in Bologna were 
important "visible starting points" for "action to make the patterns of the national higher 
education systems more similar across Europe"  (Teichler 2006: 455) but clearly the 
story had not just begun in Paris in 1998. The Bologna Declaration, as well as the 
Sorbonne Declaration did not come out of the blue. Instead they build upon several 
European initiatives in this policy field, like the ERASMUS mobility program that 
started in 1987, the Magna Charta Universitatum from 1988119 or the Lisbon 
Convention from 1998 (Langan 2004: 446). Nonetheless the Sorbonne Declaration 
cannot be regarded solely as a simple continuation of already existing initiatives and 
programmes at the European level, be it European Union, Council of Europe or other 
intergovernmental action. This is mainly due to the aim of harmonizing the degrees and 
                                                 
118 All mentioned main documents can be found at 
http://www.ond.vlaanderen.be/hogeronderwijs/bologna/. 
119 In many articles dealing with the origins of the Bologna Process the Magna Charta of European 
Universities that was signed at the 900th anniversary of the Bologna University in 1988, by 388 rectors 
from universities all over the world, is depicted as one important starting point. Although the Bologna 
Declaration directly refers to this document, one should not overlook that only one part of the Magna 
Charta stresses the need for enhanced mobility among students and teachers, accompanied by 
corresponding measures. With its emphasis of university principles stemming from the 19th century, this 
document stands "between the times" (Schriewer 2005). In fact the mentioning of the Magna Charta in 
the Bologna Declaration mainly has to be regarded as an attempt to integrate the academic community 
that had not been strongly involved in the preparation phase. Not at least because it was the universities 
that had to implement the action lines eventually. 
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the cycles. Although discussions about the invention of a two-tier study structure in 
continental Europe are nothing completely new - since the 1990ies the idea of having 
similar structures of study and degrees like the Anglo-Saxon countries has become 
popular. Also due to the fact that foreign students from economically upcoming Asian 
countries preferred the USA, the UK and Australia - the Sorbonne Declaration came as 
a great surprise. Not only because of its content. Other countries criticized the four 
signatory countries for changing that quickly their mind – they had always refused 
harmonization in discussion in the European council – and their solo effort  (Teichler 
2005: 89-90). It is also important to stress the point that the original motivations that lay 
behind the Sorbonne Declaration were completely national ones (Interview 4: 27-30). 
Of course these interests arose partly out of developments in the European but also the 
worldwide higher-education environment. Fostering mobility and international 
competitiveness surely were important stimuli (Hackl 2001a: 105). Nonetheless it were 
not primarily those common goals that lead to the Sorbonne Declaration, but a parallel 
of domestic interests among ministers of education of three big European states (France, 
Germany, Italy), which were caught up and used by the French minister. The right 
timing (Interview 2:35) and individual leadership in the person of Claude Allègre the 
French Minister for National Education, Research and Technology therefore did play a 
role. As "a typical policy entrepreneur, Allègre made the Sorbonne celebrations the 
opportunity to act collectively" (Corbett 2005: 195). The main reason for this collective 
action can be identified in the need for European support for national higher education 
reforms. The next chapter analyzes this national level. 
11.1.1 National interests 
 
In France the higher education system faced multiple problems. Besides problems of 
funding and high drop-out rates especially the dualism of mass universities and grandes 
écoles created pressure for reform (Corbett 2005: 195). Well aware of the difficulties a 
reform of the French higher education system would entail, already in 1997 Allègre 
commissioned a report about reforming the French higher education system 
(Martens/Wolf 2006: 155). This report "Pour un modèle européen d’enseignement 
supérieur", known as the Attali-Report (Attali 1998) was finished in February 1998. 
Besides the demand for a more homogenous higher education system that should help to 
overcome the cleavage between universities and grands écoles a tiered model is also 
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recommended. The first stage (la licence) should encompass 3 years, the second (la 
maîtrise) 5 years and the third (le doctorat) eight years (Attali 1998). What makes this 
report even more interesting in this context is the explicit demand after a European 
solution120: "une harmonisation des cursus et des modes d’organisation des universités, 
une politique européenne de l’enseignement supérieur devra émerger" (Attali 1998: 28). 
The initiative for this "grands chantiers de l’Union pour la prochaine décennie" (Attali 
1998: 29) should - of course - stem from France. 
 
In Italy Allégres colleague Luigi Berlinguer - Minister for Public Instruction, University 
and Research - also faced big problems concerning the Italian higher education system. 
Especially the enormous rise in student numbers over the last thirty years caused big 
problems. Due to the mainly unchanged higher education system that could not very 
well cope with these student numbers, the duration of study lengthened and the drop out 
numbers increased. In Italy reform was already on its way, since already in 1990 an 
additional three-year diploma universitario degree had been invented. But this 
additional degree that did not replace the still existing "laurea" degree was not well 
accepted by students. So Minister Berlinguer, in office since 1996 tried to introduce 
reforms. This attempt, turned out to be very difficult, especially due to resistance in the 
higher education community (Racké 2007: 33). 
 
In Germany the discussions and efforts to introduce higher education reforms have 
intensified since the beginning of the 1990ies. The discussion encompassed already at 
this point  questions of international competitiveness of German higher education 
institutions (Eurydice 2005a: 134; Eckardt 2005: 36-42). Jürgen Rüttgers – German 
Minister for Education, Science, Research and Technology - who started a reform of the 
Framework Act for Higher Education in 1996, was not only interested in giving 
universities more autonomy, shorten duration of studies and achieving better completion 
rates. He also thought about levering the Länder competences121 and as a consequence 
                                                 
120 It is noteworthy in this context that "using" Europe as a catalyst for reforms in the national higher 
education system seems to have longtime tradition in France.  After the 1968 student revolts, already 
Edgar Faure one of Allégres predecessors sought European support for French university reform (Corbett 
2005). 
121 In Germany the competences regarding higher education are divided between the federal government 
and the federal states. The responsibilities for the ongoing business lie mainly in the range of the Länder. 
According to the constitution or Basic Law (Grundgesetz) the federal government has the competence to 
lay down general principles for the structuring of the higher education system (Grundgesetz Art. 75). By 
the amendment of the Basic Law the Federal Government got the power to provide framework 
 87
breaking reform blockade (Martens/Wolf 2006: 156). Hence for the German case the 
struggle for competences between the Federation and the Länder has to be taken into 
consideration. Regarding the question of a two-tiered system it is interesting to note that 
Rüttgers also planned the invention of Bachelor- and Master courses, and "already had a 
law, not yet accepted in his drawers" (Interview 6: 146), that was strongly debated 
between government and opposition (Die Welt, 14.2.1998), and faced opposition of 
some Länder governments, too122 (Racké 2007). 
11.1.2 Preparing a first intergovernmental declaration – two-level gamblers at work? 
 
Following the evidence given above the three ministers had not (only) common goals in 
mind when meeting at the Sorbonne. Instead they mainly initiated this Declaration to 
use it for domestic reform projects. Basically the concept of two-level games is well 
suited to capture the underlying dynamics. Situated in a privileged position between the 
national and the European level national ministers have privileged access to information 
and enjoy a widened room for maneuver to pursue their own interests (Putnam 1988) to 
play so called two level games123. In this conception states are not being regarded as 
unitary actors that cooperate at the international level. Also an understanding of national 
governments/governmental representatives as just being problem-solving oriented 
honest brokers of their domestic constituencies is neglected here. Klaus Dieter Wolf’s 
(1999) new raison d’état - approach takes up the logic of two-level games and adopts it 
                                                                                                                                               
legislation, concerning the general principles of higher education (Eurydice 2005a). These general 
principles enter into the so called Framework Act for Higher Education (Hochschulrahmengesetz), which 
was first enacted in 1976. It is important to note, that everything that is not mentioned in the 
Hochschulrahmengesetz is automatically business of the Länder. The 16 Länder enact their laws on the 
basis of the Hochschulrahmengesetz and stipulate the details. 
122 Even before the Conference at Bologna in 1999, the possibility to invent study programmes according 
to the Bachelor/Master structure was provided in Germany with the amendment of the Framework Act for 
Higher Education (Hochschulrahmengesetz) on 20 August 1998 (BGBl. 24.8.1998 I S. 2190) This was 
thought of being a kind of test stage (Alesi et al. 2005: 2). This test stage ended in 2002 when Bachelor- 
and Mastercourses were defined as a standard offer of the higher education institutions. 
123 The concept of two-level games is mainly applied in the context of the European Union most 
elaborated in the work of Andrew Moravcsik (Moravcsik 1993): Intergovernmental bargaining at the 
European level also strengthens governments vis-à-vis their home politics. It’s the national governments 
that are "able to take initiatives and reach bargains in Council negotiations with relatively little constraint. 
The EC provides information to governments that is not generally available. Intergovernmental 
discussions take place in secrecy […] Domestically, parliaments and publics generally have little legal 
opportunity to ratify EC agreements […] National leaders undermine potential opposition by reaching 
bargains in Brussels first and presenting domestic groups with an ‘up or down’ choice" (Moravcsik 1993: 
515). Nonetheless the concept of two-level games can also be used for other international fora in which 
national politicians enjoy privileged access. See therefore for example (Zangl 1999). 
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to match cases of self-binding intergovernmental cooperation124. Not at least to unveil 
the undemocratic aspects of these intergovernmental governance structures beyond the 
nation states. Self-binding cooperation at the international level is used by strategic 
acting government representatives to widen their domestic room for maneuver 
concerning the enforcement of their preferred policies (Martens/Wolf 2006; Wolf 
1999). Exactly these dynamics can be regarded in the preparation of the Sorbonne 
Declaration. Especially the French minister for education, science and technology 
Claude Allégre in spite of claiming to act European (Allègre 1999) was very eager to 
use Europe as an excuse for reforming French higher education structures. This explains 
why he was also very active in fostering the Sorbonne initiative. Soon after entering 
office in 1997 he planned forward to use the 800th anniversary of the Sorbonne as an 
occasion for an European initiative (Witte 2006: 124). But also German minister 
Rüttgers and his Italian colleague Berlinguer were in need of a "European excuse" 
(Interview 6: 134) or at least some "external political support" (Interview 4: 32) for their 
domestic reform projects. The question why only these three plus the British minister 
signed the Declaration at the Sorbonne can be easily answered: Because Claude Allègre 
did only invite them to sign. This can be traced back to his consideration of who the 
other grand nations were, that were important to get on board, to his personal ties 
established in the Carnegie Group125 (Witte 2006: 125), but also to lack of time for 
consultations with more countries and the conviction that the others would follow as a 
matter of course126.  
 
Whilst the two-level picture, or the new raison d’état approach is well suited to explain 
the motivations of the French, German and Italian ministers to engage in a European 
cooperation initiative this does not apply to the United Kingdom. The two-cycle system 
did already exist here. After reforms of the higher education system in the 1990ies, 
especially the Further and Higher Education Act of 1992 the binary system was 
abolished and the two systems merged into one (Theisens 2001). Regarding the 
attractiveness of the British higher education system and its competitiveness it can be 
                                                 
124 In short, "the term ‘new raison d’état’ describes a pattern of intergovernmental interaction triggered by 
transborder interdependence, transnational society-formation and growing domestic pressures. It involves 
not only self-assertion vis-a-vis other states, but also, at the same time and in complex interconnection 
with this, a search for external support in securing internal room for manoeuvre" (Wolf 1999: 347). For 
more on this approach see chapter 13. 
125 "A regular informal meeting of ministers in charge of research in the G8 countries" (Witte 2006). 
126 According to Allègre (2000) quoted from (Hackl 2001a): "Puis nous nous sommes dit: en matière 
universitaire, si la France, L’italie, l’allemagne et la Grande-Bretagne sont pour, les autres suivront". 
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stated, that it already was one of the most attractive and competitive system in the 
whole world. Therefore the British government and its representative Tessa Blackstone 
the Junior Minister for Higher Education did regard the French (/German/Italian) 
initiative as a chance to pass over the own reference model to the others (Interview 2: 
34). Since it was assumed in the UK that the participation would not entail the necessity 
to change the own higher education structures, the possibility to directly influence this 
European initiative and the prospect of an emerging European-wide competition for 
students and resources (where the own position was assumed as being strong) persuaded 
Blackstone to join this club (Corbett 2005; Martens/Wolf 2006; Racké 2007). 
 
 The declaration itself was prepared by officials of the four countries shortly before the 
Sorbonne celebration. No officials of other countries or experts from the European 
Commission were involved in the drafting process (Hackl 2001a: 105). In the draft for 
the Sorbonne Declaration the 3-5-8 cycle model, as proposed in the Attali report was 
included, but this was taken out in the final version, not at least due to resistance from 
the British minister (Interview 6:150-160). Nonetheless this model did cause some 
confusion127, and the proximity in time between the publication of the Attali report and 
the Sorbonne Declaration made these two documents merge into one in the perception 
of many actors in higher education (Hackl 2001b: 21). 
11.1.3 The Sorbonne Declaration  
 
The "Joint Declaration on harmonization of the Architecture of the European Higher 
Education System" that was finally adopted consisted of three concrete objectives and 
the common declaration of intent to "create a European area of higher education". The 
declaration additionally – but aiming into the same direction – demands the "creation of 
an open European area of higher learning" and the creation of a "Europe of 
knowledge"128.  
 
                                                 
127 It has to be pointed out that the Sorbonne Declaration did cause confusion not only in this respect, as 
the following anecdote may exemplarily illustrate: Roberto Mezzaroma, Italian member of the European 
Parliament wrote to the Commission to inform him about a harmonization of degree courses at Italian 
universities, and about the structure and length of this project. The answer provided by Mrs. Cresson the 
former European Commissioner for Education, Research and Science did very clearly show that the 
Commission was well aware what’s going on and where her limits were (1999/ C 325/004). 
128 With the aim to "humanise Europe" (Corbett 2005: 195) the declaration stresses that "Europe is not 
only that of the Euro, of the banks and the economy: it must be a Europe of knowledge as well". 
 90
The three concrete main objectives can be identified in the plea for: 
- increased mobility of students and academics 
- facilitated student mobility and employability 
- a consolidation (improvement) of Europe’s international competitiveness 
through education 
 
The means to reach these goals are lined out broadly and encompass cooperation and 
progressive harmonization with the restriction to respect the diversities. It is noteworthy 
that mainly structural changes or reforms, as already implied in the title with the term 
"architecture" are envisaged. The invention of a two-cycle structure, the use of credits 
and improved mutual recognition of degrees are highlighted. Concerning the concrete 
instruments the text remains very vague. "Strengthening of already existing experience, 
joint diplomas, pilot initiatives, and dialogue with all concerned", is all the Sorbonne 
Declaration provides in this respect. 
 
Clearly the Sorbonne Declaration has to be regarded as a political statement rather than 
a binding agreement. The content of this declaration is vague and there is enough room 
left for interpretation (Hackl 2001a: 105). Nonetheless when analyzing the individual 
objectives and means it becomes evident that the Sorbonne Declaration is strongly 
based on established ideas emerging from distinct sources (Corbett 2005: 196): The 
"European higher education area" has already been proposed as one objective in the 
SOCRATES program (Hackl 2001a: 107). Other specific ideas such as the credit system 
and recognition procedures have their sources in programmes such as ERASMUS, 
TEMPUS (Corbett 2005: 196) and draw on existing technical programmes like ECTS129 
– which is a Commission product originally (Interview 4:180) - or the NARIC-ENIC 
network130 (Neave 2002: 186). Concerning recognition the Lisbon Convention of 
1997131 that is also directly mentioned in the Sorbonne Declaration has to be noted too. 
But not only problems concerning the mobility of students have already been 
recognized by the European Commission for example in her Green Paper on "the 
obstacles to transnational mobility" (COM/96/0462 final). Already in the Delors’ 1993 
                                                 
129 ECTS = European Credit Transfer System 
130 NARIC = National Academic Recognition Information Centre; ENIC = European Network of National 
Information Centres 
131 Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher Education in the European Region 
(CETS No.: 165). 
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White paper "on growth, competitiveness and employment" (COM/93/700 final) the 
connection between competitiveness and education has been made. The employability 
goal can also be found in this paper. Interestingly the Sorbonne instruments also 
resemble the action lines outlined in the White paper132. In contrast to all these well 
developed issues taken from other sources the Sorbonne Declaration contains one real 
innovation: the two-cycle structure. The introduction of this "biggest novelty in 
European higher education policy for 50 years" constituted in effect also "the glue 
which would hold the Bologna Process together" (Corbett 2005: 196)133. 
11.1.4 Reactions to the Sorbonne Declaration 
 
As already mentioned above the Sorbonne Declaration came as a surprise and did cause 
some annoyance, especially in other EU countries that were initially not invited to join 
this initiative. This is mainly due to two reasons:  
 
1. The declaration did contain the term "harmonization", already in its 
title. In the international context of higher education this comes near to 
breaking a taboo. But as Witte (2006: 128) points out this can partly 
be traced back to the different meanings of "harmonization" in English 
and French. The connotation of the English term "harmonization" with 
"standardization" is not present in French134. Here "convergence" 
rather than "unification" is encompassed by this term. Understandably 
the British minister was heaped reproaches on for signing 
(Martens/Wolf 2006: 156).  
2. The Sorbonne Declaration states in the last paragraph: "We call on 
other Member States of the Union and other European countries to 
join us in this objective [...]", which was widely regarded as an affront 
in multiple other EU countries, that had neither been invited to 
participate in the preparation nor to join this initiative from the 
                                                 
132 For example "exchanges of experience and good practices and developing joint projects" (White 
paper) sounds very much the same like "strengthening of already existing experience, joint diplomas"  
(Sorbonne Declaration). 
133 Most scholars agree, that this change of degree structures constitutes the essence or core of the 
Bologna Process (Kehm/Teichler 2006; Zgaga 2005). 
134 As Corbett (2005: 81) shows, difficulties concerning the meaning of the term harmonization 
(especially concerning the different meaning in English and French) did already occur in the context of 
the EC’s education policy in the 1970ies. 
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beginning on. (Interview 5:38, Interview 6: 22-37). In this sense it was 
interpreted as "an attempt by the big-4 EU countries to impose on all 
others a single model that would threaten diversity and leave other 
countries with just the options of complying or being left out" (Haug 
2006). 
 
Some countries did join the initiative and follow the invitation to sign the Sorbonne 
Declaration in the following: Romania, Bulgaria, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark and 
the Czech Republic. Some countries (Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia) intended to sign 
(Haug/Kirstein 1999). Other countries – although not rejecting the goals and aims of the 
Sorbonne initiative – wanted to make it clear that this was not the right way reform 
processes at the European level were started. Especially the other EU countries, mainly 
smaller countries wanted to signal this to the four, big Sorbonne signatories (Interview 
7: 22). When EU ministers for education met during the Austrian Presidency in Baden 
23-24 October 1998 for an informal Education Council the Sorbonne Declaration was 
discussed and the Austrian chair clearly communicated this disapproval to the four 
countries (Europe Daily Bulletins, No 7329 – 24/10/1998). Nonetheless it was 
acknowledged that the initiative of the four big countries was at least concerning the 
content not without reason135 (Interview 7:135-142). Since the Italian minister Ortensio 
Zecchino renewed the invitation for a follow-up conference in spring 1999 in Bologna, 
an idea his forerunner Luigi Berlinguer had already promoted at the Sorbonne Forum 
(Haug/Kirstein 1999), it was discussed how to bring new life into this initiative (Hackl 
2001a: 107-108). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
135 This shift may not come as a big surprise, since not only the big four countries planned to change the 
structures of their higher education systems.  Taking the Austrian case for example, plans to invent a 
tiered system were discussed even before this meeting (Die Presse 2.9.1998, Der Standard 13.10.1998).  
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11.2 Institutional Choice 
 
"Institutional choice takes an issue from the point where it becomes a priority item on 
the international agenda to the point of agreement on the provisions of a specific 
regime" (Levy et al. 1995: 282) 
11.2.1 Preparation and reformation 
 
Among the ministers meeting in Baden there was general agreement to delegate the task 
of preparing the next conference to a working group established within the meeting of 
the Directors General for higher education of the EU member states136 (Interview 5: 62-
70). This meeting took place a few days later and a "Sorbonne follow-up working 
group", compromised of  representatives from the Troika (Austria, Germany, Finland), 
Italy (host country of the next conference), France, the UK,  the European Commission, 
the Confederation of European Union Rectors’ Conferences and the Association of 
European Universities (CRE), was set up (Hackl 2001a: 108). It was agreed that the 
country holding the EU Presidency, which was at that time Austria should held the 
chair. Nonetheless after the end of the Austrian Presidency and the start of the German 
Presidency in January 1999, the German representative did not want to take over the 
chair. So the Austrian representative still held the chair (Interview 5: 120-125). Hence 
this time, in clear contrast to the Sorbonne drafting the preparatory process was not only 
driven by governmental officials. The task of this group, which met four times between 
December 1998 and May 1999, was to prepare the conference of Bologna. Following 
the argumentation above it becomes clear that the meeting in Bologna cannot be simply 
depicted as the successor to the Sorbonne meeting but also as a reaction to it. Already at 
this point it was acknowledged that the Bologna meeting would encompass a much 
wider circle of participants and would be based on a wholly new declaration (Witte 
2006: 129). 
 
                                                 
136 EU member state’s Directors General for higher education, have already been meeting twice a year 
since the German Presidency in 1994: One time usually under participation of the Confederation of EU 
Rectors’ Conferences and the Association of European Universities. Normally this meeting would not 
have been a joint one (with the Rectors’ Conference and the Association of European Universities) but 
since it was Austria’s first presidency there was desire for a more encompassing approach (Hackl 2001a), 
which was an advantageous proceeding for the future (Interview 5: 69). 
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In preparation for the Bologna conference a study was carried out by two experts (Jette 
Kirstein and Guy Haug137) that were appointed by the Confederation of European Union 
Rectors’ Conferences and the Association of European Universities (CRE). They also 
participated in the meetings of the "Sorbonne follow-up group", acting for this purpose 
as a "Steering Committee" (Haug/Kirstein 1999; Hackl 2001a). With the financial 
support of the European Commission the project report "Trends in learning structures in 
higher education" was written by Kirstein and Haug and completed in June 1999. This 
Trends survey covered countries from the European Union of the Fifteen plus the three 
additional members of the European Economic Area: Iceland, Liechtenstein and 
Norway138. Their task was on the one hand to provide a database mapping the 
convergence and divergence of higher education systems, covering degree structures, 
admission and tuition fees, organization of the academic year and credit transfer 
systems (Haug/Kirstein 1999). On the other hand the confusion and concern the 
Sorbonne Declaration had released should be absorbed, and the problem why European 
coordination was needed should be reframed. This was done in a chapter called "The 
Sorbonne Declaration of 25 May 1998: what it does say, what it doesn’t" 
(Haug/Kirstein 1999). Here the discussions that followed the use of the term 
"harmonization" as well as the confusion about a 3-5-8 model as mentioned in the Attali 
report were clarified. To reframe the problem Guy Haug who is regarded as being very 
influential at this stage of the preparation process (Corbett 2005: 199) and as the 
unofficial "author" of the Bologna Declaration itself (Interview 5:139-144), also dwelt 
on two further issues: European competitiveness on the international education market 
and the close link to the European labor market (Haug/Kirstein 1999). Summed up 
Kirstein and Haug’s "mission was very much to rescue the Sorbonne Declaration, which 
had started on the wrong foot" to clarify especially the means with which certain goals 
should be reached and "to make it less obligatory" (Interview 6: 42-50).  
 
Before the conference in Bologna the working group discussed technical details as well 
as questions of competences. Invitations were sent to all EU member states and 
                                                 
137 Both of them are experts in this policy field and are also familiar with Community policies, since they 
have working experience in the ERASMUS bureau (Hackl 2001b). Here it should be mentioned 
additionally that it is sometimes assumed that European higher education is framed by only a few experts 
(Interview 3: 356), and that the European policy space in education is being shaped by a "constant 
interaction between small groups of linked professionals, managers and experts" (Lawn 2006: 275).  
138 One could suspect this selection of countries as a clear sign of increasing economic rationales 
determining the agenda. But since the EEA countries did also participate in EU education programmes 
the "Erasmus-impact" can also contribute to an explanation. 
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associated countries. Since the Commission representative stressed the point that this 
declaration should not include activities already performed by the Community but go 
further, it was discussed if the declaration should be a purely intergovernmental one or a 
mixed one. This question if Community responsibilities should also be included was not 
solved in the framework of this working group. Finally a draft of the declaration to be 
adopted by the ministers was prepared and sent out to all ministries that were invited for 
feedback. In the following the main questions and comments were summarized (Hackl 
2001a: 108). It should be stressed at this point that only EU member states did 
participate in the preparation. At the same time especially the members of the working 
group did shape the draft-declaration (Interview 6:24).  Although in the end signing, 
other countries were not involved at this stage (Interview 5: 161-164). So weren’t the 
students. Although being the ones that were primarily concerned by the intended 
reforms students and student unions were not involved in the preparation process at all. 
During the meeting at Bologna ESIB representatives were present even though not 
invited (ESIB 2006; Haug 1999). This non-involvement is also regretted in an own 
declaration that was prepared during the conference at Bologna called the "Bologna 
Students Joint Declaration" (ESIB 1999). 
11.2.2 The conference at Bologna  
 
The Bologna conference that was held, as the name already implies at the University of 
Bologna on 18 and 19 June 1999, was divided into two parts. The first day was 
organized by the University of Bologna in cooperation with the Confederation of 
European Union Rectors’ Conferences and the Association of European Universities. 
During this "academic" day the first TRENDS study was presented and discussed. 
Academics and other civil servants from the invited countries discussed in working 
groups important issues concerning the European higher education space. The results of 
these discussions were presented to the ministers by the President of the Association of 
European Universities Kenneth Edwards the following day, the "ministers day", which 
was the second major part of this conference. Afterwards the ministers did also discuss 
the draft declaration introduced by the Italian Minister (Hackl 2001a: 108-109). 
Interestingly discussions about the declaration text, that had been prepared by the 
working group during the last nine months continued there (Witte 2006: 131). Certain 
phrases were negotiated and some even deleted in the last minutes before the signing 
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procedure (Interview 5: 27-30). The ministers therefore met in a "little chamber 
immediately before the signing to discuss the last controversial questions, before 
entering the former church where the official signing-ceremony took place" (Interview 
7: 120-125, own translation). One of the most important still open-question concerned 
the role of the European Commission. Although the European Commission was present 
at the Conference, involved in the preparation of it and also contributing as a major 
sponsor she was finally kept out (Racké 2007). Especially the French minister Allègre 
and his colleague Blackstone from the UK, the only original Sorbonne signatories 
present at Bologna, were very strongly against the involvement of the European 
Commission (Interview 4: 53-55, Interview 6: 160-164). But also the other EU member 
states did not want the European Commission to be too much involved. In fields where 
the EU does not possess competences according to the Treaties the member states did 
not want to accept Commission intervention. Additionally the Commission was also  
know for her competence stretching attitude which was not appreciated in an 
intergovernmental cooperation where the national ministers were themselves looking 
forward to a widened room of maneuver for national reforms (Interview 7: 175-195, 
Interview 5: 170-200). Since already the Sorbonne Declaration had been signed by non- 
EU countries, as mentioned above, and these countries were invited to join from the 
beginning on, applying EU instruments was not possible (Interview 2: 215-218, 
Interview 6: 215-220). It is important here to keep in mind that these additional 
countries maybe were invited to join not at least due to this reason – to keep the 
Commission out139 (Martens/Wolf 2006: 157).  
 
The Bologna Declaration about the "European Higher Education Area" finally was 
signed by 31 representatives of 29 European countries140, EU members as well as non-
EU members. The Flemish Community of Belgium and the German Permanent 
Conference of the Ministers of Culture in the German Länders 
(Kultusministerkonferenz) were also represented and signed. Liechtenstein, that is 
counted as being part of the first round of Bologna signatories was not present because 
                                                 
139 The connection between the EU/European Commission and this intergovernmental initiative cannot be 
fully discussed in this paper but will be an important part of the overall project and therefore analyzed 
elsewhere in detail. 
140 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Denmark, France, Finland,, Germany, Hungary, 
Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovak Republic, Sweden, Spain, Swiss Confederation, United Kingdom 
(Bologna Declaration 1999).  
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the relevant minister had not been invited unintentionally (Interview 6: 63). Nonetheless 
Liechtenstein was recognized as a Bologna signatory in the following. Finally the 
ministers decided to meet again in Prague in May 2001, to assess the progress reached 
and to discuss further action. 
11.2.3 The Bologna Declaration 
 
Building on the Sorbonne Declaration the Bologna Declaration of 19 June 1999 also 
mentions three main goals and six additional instrumental objectives or action lines 
(Lourtie 2001: I; Reinalda/Kulesza 2005: 21) as well as the already known declaration 
of intent to "establish the European higher education area". Likewise the Sorbonne 
Declaration a reference to a "Europe of Knowledge" is made. The three main goals the 
Bologna Declaration contains concern: 
- international competitiveness  
- mobility  
- employability 
The means that have been formulated very vaguely in the Sorbonne Declaration are 
replaced in the Bologna Declaration by six more encompassing action lines: 
- adoption of a system of easily readable and comparable degrees 
- adoption of a two-cycle system (undergraduate and graduate), with a first cycle 
lasting a minimum of three years 
- establishment of a system of credits (like the ECTS) 
- promotion of mobility by overcoming obstacles for students and staff 
- promotion of European cooperation in quality assurance 
- promotion of the necessary European dimensions in higher education 
 
To reach the goals mentioned above and to accomplish all action lines 
intergovernmental cooperation within the framework of existing competences under 
acceptance for the diversities was chosen. The Bologna Declaration also contains a time 
span within the objectives should be reached ("in any case within the first decade of the 
third millennium") as well as an impetus for follow-up procedure. Therefore in contrast 
to the very vague Sorbonne Declaration this text is regarded as being "much more of an 
administrative document" (Hackl 2001a: 110). 
 
 98
As stated above the Bologna Declaration does very much build on the Sorbonne 
Declaration. This can according to Haug (1999) be noticed in three dimensions: First 
both documents share the same overall goal, of establishing a European higher 
education space. Second, both documents are based on joint ministerial action and third, 
the emphasize lies in both documents on structure rather than content. An additional 
similarity can be identified in the fact that for the first time the international 
attractiveness of European higher education is paid attention to (Haug 2006). 
Nonetheless important differences can be identified, too. They concern on the one hand 
the drafting procedure and here especially the widened circle of participants – as noted 
in the previous chapter – but also the content. The text adopted at Bologna does not only 
state more objectives, they are also formulated more precisely here (Hackl 2001a). 
Promoting cooperation in quality assurance and the promotion of European dimensions 
in higher education are new objectives. The focus on quality assurance does very much 
go back to the TRENDS I (Haug/Kirstein 1999) report (Corbett 2005: 198). The 
promotion of a European dimension in the end is an objective that has even older roots. 
Already in a Resolution of the Council from 1988141 the goal of promoting the 
European dimension in education was formulated. One more important aspect of the 
Bologna Declaration should not be overlooked. Although being a purely 
intergovernmental document based on the joint agreement of national ministers for 
education, a vague invitation to institutions of higher education to participate in this 
process in the following can be noticed. 
 
11.3 Operationalization 
 
"Operationalization covers all those activities required to transform an agreement on 
paper into a functioning social practice" (Levy et al. 1995: 282) 
 
The process of setting up the organizational structure (see: chapter 10.3) mainly lasted 
from the meeting in Bologna in 1999, until the ministerial conference held in Berlin 
2003. Only a few changes happened afterwards: Some members and consultative 
members were additionally invited at the conferences in Bergen and London. 
Furthermore the stocktaking exercise was extended and advanced since the Berlin 
                                                 
141 Resolution of the Council and the ministers of education meeting within the Council on the European 
dimensions in education of 24 May 1988 (Official Journal C 177, 06/07/1988  P. 0005 - 0007) 
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ministerial conference (see: chapter 10.4). Interestingly the first attempt to structure the 
organization of this coordination process took place at the informal meeting of EU 
ministers on 23-25 September, in Tampere142. There the establishment of two groups (a 
consultative group and a steering group) preparing the ministerial meeting in Prague in 
2001 was decided (Reinalda/Kulesza 2005: 21; Lourtie 2001). The fact that it was the 
EU ministers that took the decision clearly shows that especially EU members are in 
position to steer the process. This evidence can also be noticed when looking at the role 
the Presidency of the EU plays in the organization of the follow-up structure (see: 
chapter 10.3). To avoid long-winded historical descriptions of the organizational 
development the following three tables have been prepared to visualize the development 
of the follow-up structure in a nutshell. 
 
Table 2: Follow-up structure between Bologna and Prague 
 Composition Mandate 
Consultative 
Group /  
Enlarged 
Group 
All signatory states, the European 
Commission, and EUA’s predecessor 
organizations143. Since 2000: also the Council 
of Europe, EURASHE and ESIB as observers. 
Coordinate, provide 
support (e.g. 
organization of 
seminars), prepare the 
next ministerial 
meeting (e.g. develop 
draft program). 
Steering 
Group 
EU enlarged troika countries (Presidency, the 
previous and two successive presidencies), the 
European Commission, EUA’s predecessor 
organizations, and the country hosting the next 
ministerial conference 
Coordinate, provide 
support (e.g. 
commission of a 
specific report), 
prepare the next 
ministerial meeting. 
(Hackl 2001a; Lourtie 2001; Reinalda/Kulesza 2005; Witte 2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
142 see: http://presidency.finland.fi/netcomm/News/showarticle774.html  
143 As already noted elsewhere: The European University Association (EUA) is the is a result of the 
merger between the Association of European Universities (CRE) and the confederation of European 
Union Rectors’ Conferences that took place in Salmanaca in 2001. 
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Table 3: Follow-up Structure between Prague and Berlin 
 Composition Mandate 
Follow-up 
Group 
(BFUG) 
All signatory states, new participants and the 
European Commission. Chair: EU Presidency. 
Observers: EUA, EURASHE, ESIB, Council 
of Europe. 
Develop and monitor 
the process, draft the 
next communiqué, 
arrange official 
seminars to specific 
topics. 
Preparatory 
Group 
(BPG) 
Countries hosting the previous and the next 
ministerial conference, two EU member states, 
two non-EU member states (these four elected 
by the Follow-up Group), EU Presidency, 
European Commission. Chair: Country hosting 
the next ministerial meeting. Observers: EUA, 
EURASHE, ESIB, Council of Europe 
Plan the next 
ministerial conference.
(Prague Communiqué 2001; Witte 2006) 
 
Table 4: Follow-up Structure after Berlin 
 Composition Mandate 
Follow-up 
Group 
(BFUG) 
All members of the Bologna Process, the 
European Commission. Consultative members: 
Council of Europe, EUA, EURASHE, ESIB, 
UNESCO/CEPES. Chair: EU Presidency. 
Vice-Chair: host country of the next 
ministerial conference. 
Overall steering of the 
process. Prepare the 
next ministerial 
conference. 
Coordinate activities 
for progress, monitor 
implementation. 
Prepare reports for the 
next ministerial 
meeting. 
Follow-up 
Group 
Board 
EU Presidency, host country of next 
ministerial conference, preceding and 
following EU Presidencies, three participating 
countries (elected by BFUG for one year), the 
European Commission. Consultative members: 
Council of Europe, EUA, EURASHE, ESIB. 
Chair: EU Presidency. Vice-Chair: host 
country of the next ministerial conference. 
Oversee work between 
BFUG meetings. 
Responsibilities 
further defined by 
BFUG. 
Official 
Secretariat 
Personnel provided by the country hosting the 
next ministerial conference. 
Support overall 
follow-up work.  
Tasks further defined 
by BFUG. 
(Berlin Communiqué 2003) 
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With minor changes144 this follow-up structure persisted since the ministerial 
conference in Berlin in 2003 (see also: chapter 10.3). As can be noticed, besides the big 
biennial ministerial conferences, a limited but nonetheless lively follow-up environment 
and at least some degree of organizational structure have developed. This can be 
witnessed by the establishment of a now relatively consolidated follow-up and 
stocktaking activity but also by the surrounding activity. Here the official Bologna 
seminars (see: Table 11) that are organized either by national ministries or stakeholders, 
contribute to the strategic further development of the process and serve as important 
fora for policy formulation in preparation of the ministerial conferences (Witte 2006: 
138). Since the ministerial conference in 2003 participation in these seminars is also 
open to representatives from third countries (Berlin Communiqué 2003). Besides these 
official Bologna seminars a lot of additional stakeholders’ workshops, and conferences 
take place. The big stakeholder organizations EUA, ESU (former ESIB) and EURASHE 
hold their main conferences just before the ministerial conferences take place145. There 
also statements directed at the ministers’ meetings are adopted146. These meetings seem 
to have become routine in the meantime, which also points at the establishment of the 
overall process.  
 
Clearly the operationalization stage of regime building actually encompasses more than 
just the "European" stage. An assessment if the "agreement on paper" has become a 
"functioning social practice" (Levy et al. 1995: 282), would also entail the analysis of 
what has happened at the national level. Since the research questions of this dissertation 
do not encompass the implementation at the national level this exercise has to be 
accomplished elsewhere147. Nonetheless a few preliminary observations will be 
presented in the following. Concerning one of the main action lines of this initiative – 
the invention of a tiered system (after the Berlin conference a three cycle system, 
                                                 
144 In Bergen a few consultative members (Education International Pan-European Structure, ENQA and 
Businesseurope - the former UNICE) were added to the BFUG (Bergen Communiqué 2005).  
145 5th ESIB Convention 21-23 February 2003 - 2nd EUA Convention 29-31 May 2003 – EURASHE 
13th Annual Conference 5-6 June 2003 => Ministerial Conference in Berlin 18-19 September 2003; 9th 
ESIB Convention 17-21 March - 3d EUA Convention 31 March -2 April 2005 – EURASHE 15th Annual 
Conference 28-29 April 2005 => Ministerial Conference in Bergen 19-20 May 2005; 13th ESIB 
Convention 16-19 March 2007 – 4th EUA Convention 29-31 March 2007 – EURASHE 17th Annual 
Conference 26-27 April 2007 => Ministerial Conference in London 17-18 May 2007.  
146 See for example: EUA’s Salmanaca Declaration, ESIB’s Göteborg Student Convention, ERASHE’s 
Vilnius statement for Bergen. 
147 Additional arguments that speak against the analysis of the effects at the national level can be found in 
chapter 6.6 (footnote 46). 
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including the doctoral level) – much progress can be detected at the surface. According 
to TRENDS V (Crosier et al. 2007: 17) 82% of institutions – replying to this 
questionnaire – reported to have the three cycle system in place compared to  53% in 
2003. At the beginning of the academic year 2006/07 this three cycle structure was in 
place in nearly all signatory countries. Only in Andorra, the German-speaking 
Community of Belgium and Sweden has not been implemented at all until the beginning 
of 2007 (Eurydice 2007a: 15). This development is taken as a proof for the advanced 
stage of implementation of the three cycle study structure (Bologna Process Stocktaking 
2007: 2). Going a little more into the details reveals that not even half of the countries 
involved have fully implemented this three-cycle structure. Due to gradual invention of 
the new cycles in most countries full implantation will only be reached after a 
transitional phase of several years. In some countries students can choose between 
following the new study structure or pre-reform long programmes. Certain studies like 
medicine are still organized in a single cycle in more than half of the participating 
countries. Exceptions cover a lot of different studies, ranging form teacher education in 
Austria to art studies in Poland (Eurydice 2007a: 15-20). A study undertaken by ESU 
(ESIB 2007) also points to problems concerning access to the second cycle for first 
cycle graduates favoring Bachelor graduates stemming from the same institution and to 
suspected increasing gender inequalities (low female participation in the second and 
third cycle). This study also points out that the invention of the three cycle structure is 
not accompanied by real curricula reforms in many countries, which may impose 
negative consequences on the employability of Bachelor graduates (ESIB 2007: 38).  
 
Looking at another important action line – the invention and implementation of the 
European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System (ECTS) – it can be stated that 
ECTS was already in place in a majority of countries in 2006/07 and it is also used in a 
majority of these countries for both the transfer and accumulation of credits (Eurydice 
2007a: 25-29). Following TRENDS V (Crosier et al. 2007: 37-39) over 75% of 
institutions reporting used the ECTS as a transfer system in 2007. Looking beyond these 
numbers big problems concerning the correct use of ECTS still remain. The TRENDS 
V study speaks of widespread “incorrect or superficial use of ECTS” (Crosier et al. 
2007: 8), ESU points to difficulties concerning the correct measuring of student 
workload as being the most severe problem in the implementation of ECTS (ESIB 
2007: 38). Although these briefly stated observations – that engage with two of the most 
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prominent Bologna Process action lines – are of course not representative for the whole 
implantation process in the participating countries, they nonetheless point to two 
interesting points: First, implementation does take place widespread and it can be surely 
stated even now this process has overcome the stage of being just an agreement on 
paper. Second, implementation and its quality differ strongly between countries and/or 
action lines. It is therefore impossible to generally speak of successful implementation. 
Nonetheless at least for the European level taken altogether a successful implementation 
can be stated as depicted above in this chapter. 
 
11.4 Reviewing the hypotheses 
 
Since the last few chapters have discussed and analyzed the regime building process 
informed by and according to the regime theoretical framework employed, it is 
necessary at this point to come back to the hypotheses corresponding to the first 
research question. Hence in the following these hypotheses will be assessed in the light 
of empirical evidence. The two hypotheses that are engaged with an explanation of the 
genesis of the Bologna-Regime are discussed separately. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: For successful regime formation the presence of effective 
entrepreneurial leadership on the part of the individuals is required. 
 
The focus on entrepreneurial leadership stems from Oran Young’s institutional 
bargaining model (Young 1994) and is depicted in a comprehensive way in chapter 
6.4.2. As noted there, entrepreneurial leaders are individuals that have besides their 
catalytic role in these regime building processes, the skill to overcome the danger of 
logjams in negotiations by (re-)framing the issues at stake, inventing new institutional 
arrangements and broker the overlapping interests of the parties involved. Additionally 
they may also serve as agenda setters concerning the form in which an issue is presented 
at the international level. Entrepreneurial leaders are not representatives of major states 
(Young 1991, 1994). Concerning the regime building process that has been depicted in 
the chapters above, it is important to distinguish between other forms of leadership and 
entrepreneurial leadership. In the first phase of the regime building process the French 
minister for education Claude Allègre did play an important role especially concerning 
the setting of the agenda, since it was him that initiated the Sorbonne Declaration, and 
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brought the idea of coordinated European higher education systems and especially 
coordinated, tiered study structures on the agenda again. Therefore he has already been 
attributed "leadership" (Corbett 2005) but it is not the kind of leadership meant by this 
hypotheses. As an agent of a major state  he could be classified as a "structural leader" 
(Young 1991: 288). Although important in setting the agenda this is not the kind of 
leadership we are interested in here. Nonetheless at a later point in this process real 
entrepreneurial leadership can be discovered. 
 
It is here important to remember that the initiative that lead to the signing of the 
declaration in Bologna, did not proceed uncontested. There has not been a smooth 
transition between the Sorbonne initiative and the signing of the Bologna Declaration. 
Some aspects of the Sorbonne Declaration were widely criticized and did cause 
annoyance among other European countries that had not been invited to join this 
initiative from the beginning on. Especially the fact that the declaration contained the 
term "harmonization" and that this initiative looked like an attempt of the big four 
countries to impose their envisaged model on other countries made it impossible to 
carry on without stopping (see chapter 11.1.4). Hence in this preparatory phase for the 
Bologna conference EUA’s predecessor organizations delegated the task of working out 
a study mapping divergence and convergence of European higher education systems to 
Guy Haug and Jette Kirstein. Additionally the Sorbonne Declaration should be 
"improved" (Corbett 2005: 197), by clearing and absorbing the confusion and concern it 
had produced. Guy Haug performed this reframing task in his chapter "The Sorbonne 
Declaration of 25 May 1998: what it does say, what it doesn’t" (Haug/Kirstein 1999). 
Additionally to his contribution in clearing the confusion about the 3-5-8 model (see 
chapter 11.2.1) Haug also made the connection to European competitiveness on the 
international education market and the link to the European labor market. He was also 
very concerned with getting quality  assurance written into the Bologna Declaration 
(Corbett 2005: 198). As already mentioned elsewhere Haug’s "mission was very much 
to rescue the Sorbonne Declaration, which had started on the wrong foot" to clarify 
especially the means with which certain goals should be reached and "to make it less 
obligatory" (Interview 6: 42-50). Additionally to this reframing task Haug had been 
very active in "selling" these outcomes and compromises to the national ministers and 
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ministries in Europe148. One should remember that at this point it had not been clear 
how many would actually sign (Interview 6). The engagement did work out and at the 
ministerial conference in Bologna in 1999 29 countries did join the initiative. Summing 
up it can be stated that the role of Guy Haug acting as an entrepreneurial leader had 
been at least very helpful in a difficult phase of this process. He was active in reframing 
and reshaping the problem to overcome difficulties and foster compromise. This 
evidence does support hypothesis 1a that assumes entrepreneurial leadership to be one 
necessary factor for successful regime formation. Nonetheless another very important 
fact should not be left out here: It had been two stakeholder organizations (the 
Association of European Universities and the confederation of European Union 
Rectors’ Conferences) that originally demanded, and the European Commission that 
financially supported this first TRENDS study, which also underlines the importance 
non-state actors and international organizations play in the process of successful regime 
building.  
 
Hypothesis 1b: An international regime is created mainly by a small group of actors 
whose ex ante power position can be regarded strongest. 
 
If one was to regard the Bologna Process as a hundred per cent successor to the 
Sorbonne Declaration the mentioned hypothesis would be strongly supported. But since 
this is not the case as already demonstrated in this dissertation (see chapter 11) this issue 
deserves further investigation. Coming back to the institutional choice tree (see Figure 
2) introduced in chapter 6.5 (Jupille/Snidal 2006), I argue that the Sorbonne initiative 
may be better understood as an example of ad hoc cooperation rather than an example 
of institutional creation. The immediateness and the vagueness of this declaration 
support this assessment. Although the Sorbonne initiative that did really just encompass 
a small group of powerful actors did strongly influence the agenda setting phase, it 
cannot be concluded that the whole Bologna-Regime which is in my view residing 
much lower on the institutional choice tree, was mainly created by these actors. The 
involvement of universities’ stakeholder organizations exemplarily mirrors this fact. 
This also applies to the preparation of the Bologna conference by the "Sorbonne follow-
                                                 
148 The important role Haug played in this phase has also been underlined by other deeply involved actors 
(Interview 5: 140-150, Interview 3: 357). 
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up working group" that was not only composed of representatives of the Sorbonne 
signatory countries but also from Austria (which held also the chair), Finland, the 
European Commission and EUA’s predecessor organizations. As can be regarded a lot 
more actors were involved in this phase of the regime building process than just the four 
Sorbonne signatories: Representatives of national ministries, of the European 
Commission, stakeholder organizations and experts in the field of higher education. It 
therefore can be concluded that also smaller states (Interview 5) and also universities 
through their representatives (Interview 2) did play a role at least in the preparatory 
phase.  
 
It is difficult to assess the impact all these different actors had on the regime building 
process it should nonetheless not be overseen that the Bologna Declaration did finally 
very much build on the Sorbonne Declaration invented and shaped by the four big 
countries (see chapter 11.2.3). Therefore it can be reasoned that the UK, Germany, Italy 
and France did have disproportionately high influence concerning the content of the 
Bologna Declaration, although it was mainly other actors149 that furthered the 
preparation process until the Bologna conference (Interview 4:46). Notwithstanding that 
they were at least partly involved in the preparation of the Bologna Declaration, for 
many of the other – manly smaller – states it had been a question of jumping on to the 
bandwagon, or not. As a consequence a clear me-too effect can be discovered. To be 
part of this initiative and not being left out was a very important motivation especially 
for smaller states to join in150. This bandwagoning effect can most obviously be 
regarded given the fact that even countries joined whose reform plans did originally go 
into other directions than the tiered system151. Summing up the main points of this 
discussion it becomes clear that, although the four big countries did have very high 
influence concerning the content of the Bologna Declaration one cannot reason that it 
was only them who did create this regime. The influence and activity of other actors 
                                                 
149 On the one hand the other (smaller) European Union countries declaring their disapproval of the 
Sorbonne solo run in Baden (see chapter 11.1.4), on the other hand the diverse Sorbonne follow up group 
members. 
150 The data stemming from the e-mail survey underlines this point (Interviews 8, 11, 15, 16, 17). 
Additionally it is clear that the chance of getting European support for domestic reforms was as attractive 
to these countries as it had been for the Sorbonne initiators in the beginning (see interviews 11, 19). 
151 Here a good example is Austria where shortly before the Bologna initiative the 
"Universitätsstudiengesetz 1997" (BGBl. 48/1997) was adopted, which did contain the maintenance of 
the "Diplomstudien" - in contrast to a tiered BA-MA system. Since it was clear that the mainstream was 
moving in the other direction jumping on the bandwagon too, did seem inevitable (Interview 7: 46-55). 
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especially in the preparatory phase but also at later stages (see chapter 11.3), do not 
support this hypothesis. 
 
11.5 Summary 
 
Since the question how the Bologna-Regime did develop has been depictured in a 
comprehensive way, it seems useful to concentrate on the explanatory aspects: Why did 
this European regime aiming at a cooperation regarding the structures of higher 
education systems emerge?  
 
It has been shown that although the intergovernmental meetings at Bologna and at the 
Sorbonne surely were the most visible corner stones of this cooperative attempt the 
following development cannot be reduced or even explained by just looking at these 
two conferences. Instead the Bologna Process should be regarded as a crystallization of 
pre-existing trends and not as an isolated phenomenon. The emergence of a European 
labor market, increasing interdependences in higher education fostering an emerging 
higher education market, increasing student numbers and mobility as well as already 
existing European initiatives (e.g. ERASMUS, Lisbon Convention) in this policy field 
constitute the background for the initiative. Although fostering mobility, employability 
and international competitiveness were important stimuli (and advertising slogans as 
well) it should not be overlooked that finally it was the domestic interests of some 
European governments that really got the ball rolling.  
 
The parallel of domestic interests among ministers of education of three big European 
states which were caught up and used by the French minister, the right timing and 
individual leadership in the person of Claude Allègre the therefore do explain why the 
cooperation at the European level did begin in the first place (Chapter 11.1). This 
cooperation at the international level can be interpreted as an act of strategic 
government representatives to widen their domestic room for maneuver concerning the 
enforcement of their preferred policies (Chapter 11.1.2): In this case national reforms of 
the higher education systems (Chapter 11.1.1).  
 
Although it would be a misinterpretation to regard the Bologna Process as being just a 
successor to the Sorbonne Declaration of the four big countries, some continuity can be 
 108
experienced (Chapter 11.2.3). It soon was acknowledged by other governments that the 
initiative of the four big countries was at least concerning the content not without 
reason. The possibility to reform their own systems with the support of a European 
initiative and some kind of bandwagon effect concerning the two-cycle structure 
(Interview 7: 50-55) do explain the continuation of this initiative (Chapter 11.2).  
 
Regarding the two hypotheses that have been developed to explain the emergence of 
this regime it is interesting to note that the empirical evidence supports the first one, 
stressing the importance of entrepreneurial leadership in the creation of a new regime. 
The second hypothesis that saw the creation of a regime mainly due to a core group of 
powerful actors could not be supported. Anyhow the disproportionate influence of these 
powerful actors concerning the content of the Bologna Declaration could be asserted. 
Altogether it is useful to remember for future research projects engaged with the 
explanation of regimes building, that multiple actors take part in this process and a 
restriction on just a few powerful actors narrows the view too much. 
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12 Explaining the form of the Bologna-Regime 
 
The chapters above have engaged with the question why and how the Bologna-Regime 
did emerge. The following paragraphs engage with answering the second research 
question. Therefore in this chapter research question 2 – how can the institutional 
design of the Bologna-Regime be explained? – will be worked on. The division into 
question 2a and 2b will also be continued here. Since the necessary background facts, a 
detailed description of the Bologna-Regime as well as an analysis of its genesis have 
already been incorporated in this dissertation, this chapter will proceed in more focused 
way. To avoid unnecessary redundancy, the answering of the research questions will be 
structured by the respective hypotheses. This focus on the hypotheses that will each be 
analyzed in accordance with the empirical evidence, allows a structured and compact 
presentation of the results.  
 
12.1 Why does this cooperation take place outside the EU? 
 
Concerning the question why the Bologna Process does take place outside the European 
Union, one could just refer to the lacking treaty base for questions of higher education 
structures (art. 149/1 TEC). But bearing in mind the Commissions’ experience, the 
extensive EU activities in this policy field, and also the upcoming "soft law" in the 
framework of the EU like the Open Method of Coordination it needs a little bit more 
explanation. When it comes to explaining the choice of international institutions ex post 
it is important to include the prior institutional status quo (chapter 6.5). For this case of 
cooperation in the field of higher education the task of mapping the existing institutional 
environment has already been performed (chapter 9). There it is shown that concerning 
matters of higher education besides the European Union, the Council of Europe, 
UNESCO and the OECD are the main institutions actively engaged. It is in my view 
nonetheless no overestimation to treat the European Union as the focal institution 
concerning the wish to further coordinate structures of higher education in Europe. This 
is due to the EU’s steadily growing impact in this policy field. Especially the successful 
action programmes dedicated to fostering mobility exemplarily mirror that fact. Here it 
is interesting to note that these programs also contributed to the overall need for more 
and closer coordination (chapter 9.1). Besides this thematically closeness the overall 
coordination capacity of the European Union also has to be taken into consideration. 
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Hence treating the EU as the focal institution for an attempt to coordinate structures of 
higher education in Europe can be well argued for, since "focalness" applies when an 
institution "has worked well for similar problems in the past" and is regarded as the 
""natural" forum for dealing with a particular cooperation problem" (Jupille/Snidal 
2006). Here it is noteworthy that an institution can promote its own "focalness" 
concerning a problem. A proceeding in which the EU, especially the European 
Commission has longtime experience.  
 
Framed this way it is a legitimate question to ask why the existing focal institution has 
not been used, since the use of this existing focal institution normally is the least costly 
resolution152 (Jupille/Snidal 2006: 22). The two hypotheses 2a and 2b that are stated in 
the following give different but not conflictive answers to this question. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Lack of congruence concerning membership between the EU and the 
group of actors engaged in the cooperative initiative aiming to coordinate the higher 
education systems, leads to the dismissal of the EU as the appropriate institutional 
solution. 
 
Comparing the map which shows the countries that joined the Bologna initiative 
between 2003 and 2005 with an actual map encompassing all European Union countries 
makes the decoupling between membership in the EU and in the Bologna-Regime that 
has taken place in the meantime very obvious (see: Figure 12). But besides such nearly 
manipulative visualizations it is helpful to remember that already the Sorbonne 
Declaration was signed by non- EU countries. Importantly these countries were invited 
to join the Bologna initiative from the beginning on. Among the Sorbonne Declaration 
signatories were the then non-EU member states Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic and Switzerland. Therefore applying EU instruments was hardly possible 
(Interview 2: 215-218, Interview 6: 215-220). It is important here to keep in mind that 
these additional countries maybe were invited to join not at least due to this reason – to 
keep the European Commission out (Martens/Wolf 2006: 157). There is also evidence 
that at least some of the non-EU countries present at the conference in Bologna did 
                                                 
152 This does not mean that the focal institution is regarded as being the optimal solution for solving the 
cooperation problem but since costs and uncertainty increase down the institutional choice tree (Figure 2), 
the actors involved have strong incentives to accept it as a kind of "good enough" solution (Jupille/Snidal 
2006). 
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actively engage and ask for a solution outside the European Union (Interview 20). 
Altogether these findings do support hypothesis 2a, that this asymmetry concerning 
membership in the European Union and the group of actors wishing to coordinate their 
higher education policies, lead to a dismissal of the EU as the appropriate institutional 
solution. Regarding the role EU members do play in this process (e.g. EU Presidency 
holds in chair in BFUG: see 10.3), and the role the European Commission has taken in, 
in the meantime one should nonetheless not overvalue the role and influence of non-EU 
members. Clearly issues dealt with in this process like student mobility do not stop at 
national borders. Mobility in higher education also transcends the borders of the 
European Union. Nonetheless it can be seen in related fields that EU solutions are 
sometimes even then possible when non-EU members participate, as is the case with the 
action programmes153 (see chapter 9.1). Hence this "diverging membership" hypothesis 
alone is not enough to explain the fact that a solution outside the framework of the EU 
has been created.  
 
 
Hypothesis 2b: When powerful actors have alternative institutional preferences the EU, 
will not be selected as the appropriate institutional solution. 
 
With the signing of the Sorbonne Declaration the big four EU countries France, 
Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom already unveiled their open preference for a 
coordination of their higher education systems outside the EU framework. This did not 
change until the Bologna conference. Hence the French minister and his colleague from 
the UK, the only original Sorbonne signatories present at Bologna, were very strongly 
against the involvement of the European Commission (Interview 4: 53-55, Interview 6: 
160-164), in Bologna too. During the ministerial conference especially the French 
minister Allègre strongly opposed the Commission (Interview 6:224). But also the other 
EU member states did not want the European Commission to be too much involved. 
Because she was known for her competence stretching attitude which was not 
appreciated in an intergovernmental cooperation where the national ministers were 
themselves looking forward to a widened room of maneuver for  their individual 
national reforms (Interview 7: 175-195, Interview 5: 170-200). Hence "it had been a 
                                                 
153 But not only in this field: The Schengen agreement, where the non-EU members Iceland, Norway and 
Switzerland participate serves as a good example. 
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central and important job to have the Commission on board but not in the lead" 
(Interview 5: 174f, own translation). Although other actors like the representatives of 
national governments preparing the conference are regarded as not having been without 
any influence, the Sorbonne signatories are regarded as the main actors concerning this 
question (Interviews 10, 11, 17, and 19). They did not have to face very much 
opposition stemming from other country representatives who themselves regarded a 
solution outside the EU as the superior institutional choice. Nonetheless hypothesis 2b 
is supported, as demonstrated above.  
 
12.2 Why does this cooperation solely base on soft coordination? 
 
In this chapter the soft form of the Bologna-Regime is discussed and analyzed from 
several different theoretical perspectives. Again the respective hypotheses provide the 
guiding direction in the following. 
 
Hypothesis 3a: Governments choose soft coordination when no compromise about the 
concrete goals exists. 
 
Concerning the question why the whole process bases on soft coordination, the 
hypothesis developed by Schäfer (2005) in the context of the European Employment 
Strategy does not hold in this case. Governments may choose soft cooperation when no 
compromise about the concrete goals exists, but regarding the Bologna Process this is 
simply not the case. The Bologna Declaration focuses much more on specific goals and 
concrete content than on methods and the measurement of progress154. Although the 
stocktaking exercise has in the meantime also become more institutionalized, it is as 
already stated elsewhere (chapter 10.4) still a very soft instrument. Especially the strong 
reliance on national reports and the selectively consideration of data stemming from 
other sources still leave some opportunity for window dressing. Regarding the content it 
can be stated that especially the formulation of the action lines do mirror a common 
interest. Clearly as already stated elsewhere it was the interest in domestic higher 
education reforms that started this initiative in the end. But this does not mean that the 
goals and action lines on which the ministers in Bologna agreed are not to be taken 
                                                 
154 Actually the Bologna stocktaking exercise is a very soft instrument, mainly basing on national reports. 
Here countries are not ranked and labeled "heroes" or "villains" as in Lisbon case. For more on the 
stocktaking exercise see chapter 10.4. 
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seriously. The fact that the whole process had been originally very much informed by a 
desire for domestic higher education reform (see chapter 11.1) does not necessarily 
preclude that the goals and action lines of the Bologna agreement were at least for a 
certain proportion in line with these reform attempts155. Besides the aim to facilitate 
mobility and increase the overall European competitiveness with the invention of the 
two-cycle system, there surely existed secondary, additional goals like the aim to 
shorten the length of studies156. Nonetheless the large part of the goals and action lines 
were quite uncontested, and already established since stemming from European Union’s 
action programmes157. Summing up the main points one can not conclude that the 
national governments did choose to coordinate the higher education systems in a very 
soft way, substituting content with procedure as Schäfer (2005) suggests. Therefore at 
least in this case hypothesis 3a is not supported by the empirical evidence. Since the 
hypothesis does not state that in reverse, when compromise about the goals exists 
governments will always choose harder forms of cooperation, it would be a big 
misinterpretation to regard the hypothesis as falsified. However, soft coordination 
seems to have more virtues than just to plaster nonexistent compromise about certain 
goals. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Governments choose soft coordination to widen their room of maneuver 
and to minimize unintended consequences, as far as possible.  
 
Following this view governments agree on specific goals but try to avoid very 
formalized and binding structures and procedures. They enjoy a widened room of 
maneuver the less formalized an institution is, and the less binding its coordination 
instruments become. This widened room of maneuver that governments mainly enjoy 
due to their privileged position in a two- (or multi) -level environment (see chapter 6.4) 
can be very helpful for them (or also individual ministers) to overcome domestic reform 
                                                 
155 As already mentioned, in Germany as well as in France the invention of a tiered study system had 
already been on the reform agenda. 
156 The suspicion (or hope – depending on the source) that the Bologna Declaration was used by national 
governments only to restructure the system to shorten the time of study has not been only expressed by 
student’s representatives (Evelyn Lehmann, president of the Swiss students union in: The Guardian, 
1.10.2003; Winfried Pohl, professor at University of Nuremburg in: The Guardian, 6.7.2004; Sigurd 
Höllinger, former Austrian Director General for higher education, federal ministry for education, science 
and culture in: Der Standard, 26.5.2001). 
157 "If I take the Bologna Declaration’s six points, five of these six are cut and paste from Erasmus" 
(Interview 3: 52-53). 
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logjam. Unintended consequences in contrast refer to the fact that all actions are mainly 
taken under incomplete information. Agency losses, unequal distributional benefits but 
also changes of preferences may occur (Elster 1989; Menon 2003; Pierson 1996). Hence 
actors learning from past experiences may decide trying to avoid these unintended 
consequences. The choice of soft coordination instead of harder forms can therefore be 
interpreted as a strategy to avoid these unintended consequences, at least to decrease the 
frequency and gravity of accidents (see chapter 6.7). Hence the question concerning this 
hypothesis is, if the governments involved in the Bologna-regime building process, did 
take into account these considerations. 
 
Following the discussion of hypothesis 3a above, at least the precondition that there was 
agreement on specific goals is met. Regarding the question if the fear of unintended 
consequences did play a role in the considerations about how this coordination should 
be framed, it is not easy to come to a definite answer. Presumably unintended 
consequences of other initiatives in this policy field (maybe also in other ones) did 
influence the actors. It has already been discussed why this initiative does not take place 
in the European Union but surely also experiences with extensive ranking and 
benchmarking for example in the OECD context, that has been very influential (see 
chapter 9.2), maybe counted as relevant factors at this. Nonetheless it is difficult to 
measure this fear of unintended consequences. Neither the expert interviews, nor the e-
mail survey suggest that it did play a role in the process. In contrast the widened room 
of maneuver that can be used for national reforms did play a role, indeed. As has been 
shown in the respective chapter of this dissertation (11.1.1), there already had been 
strong interest in using a "European" solution for domestic reforms in the first phase of 
this process. This did not change in the following and at the Bologna conference many 
ministers, that had not been present in the first round at the Sorbonne, saw their 
possibilities regarding their own national higher education reform plans158. Since higher 
education systems are constantly under reform (Interviews 9, 13), it is not too 
astonishing that in many countries reforms were already planned before the Bologna 
                                                 
158 That this strategy did work out can be seen in many newspaper articles that blame "Bologna" for 
changes in their national higher education structures even if these changes never were included in the 
"Bologna package" (e.g. Der Standard, 21.6.2000, 8.10.2005; Die Presse, 21.03.2002; The Times Higher 
Education Supplement, 19.9.2003). Additionally there has been nearly no article focusing on the fact that 
this initiative is not binding in the end (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 23.1.2004). Bologna is "done", and all the 
reforms that have taken place since 1999 are reported to go back to this initiative. Not only in scientific 
contexts coincidence is often mistaken for cause – a helpful mistake for the national ministers that are in 
position to claim the inevitableness of their individual reforms. 
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conference. Interestingly a couple of them already included the change of degree 
systems159 (Interview 11, 12), a goal that surely was easier to implement with European 
support. Nonetheless it was clear from the preparation phase for the Bologna conference 
on, that too much EU involvement (see above) and central steering was not what was 
desired, since central steering and rigorous follow-up would again have undermined the 
national rooms for maneuver (Interview 5: 78). Summing up the findings state above it 
is clear that governments were in fact influenced by their wish for widened room of 
maneuver concerning the form of this cooperative attempt. Although no argument has 
been found against the second part of hypothesis 3b that unintended consequences 
should be minimized by using soft forms of coordination, no empirical evidence has 
been found to support it. As a consequence hypothesis 3b should be reformulated and 
simply encompass the first part: Governments choose soft coordination to widen their 
room of maneuver. Formulated this way the hypothesis can be regarded as being 
supported. 
 
Hypothesis 3c: When uncertainty and sovereignty costs are high governments prefer 
softer forms of legalization. 
 
This hypothesis draws on the two concepts uncertainty and sovereignty costs. For 
Abbott and Snidal (2000) uncertainty is a problem of incomplete contracting. "In fact, 
given bounded rationality and the pervasive uncertainty in which states operate, they 
can never construct agreements that anticipate every contingency" (Abbott/Snidal 2000: 
433). Soft legalization provides more than one possibility to deal with this 
uncertainty160. Sovereignty costs as used in this concept cover a broad range of 
dimensions (see chapter 6.5). To the first concept – uncertainty – nearly the same does 
apply like to the concept of unintended consequences. Although it is presented very 
logical in the concept of Abbott and Snidal (2000), no evidence could be found in the 
expert interviews and in the e-mail survey that uncertainty did play a central role, or that 
                                                 
159 This is for example also true for the Austrian case. As a consequence of the Sorbonne Declaration the 
invention of Bachelor studies was broadly discussed and planned (Die Presse 2.9.1998, 8.10.1998, 
22.10.1998, 2.4.1999, 10.4.1999, 22.5.1999, 9.6.1999) 
160 In fact agreements can be softened on each of the three dimensions invented in this concept: 
obligation, precision, and delegation. Hence dealing with uncertainty may lead to different outcomes: 
Agreements may be precise but not legally binding, or legally binding but not precise and without much 
delegation (Abbott/Snidal 2000). 
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it was even part of the individual ministers considerations161. Regarding the other 
concept – sovereignty costs – it has to be noted that for most of the actors involved, this 
discussion had already been settled with the signing of the Maastricht treaty in which 
the Communities competences concerning questions of higher education had been 
limited mainly to the provision of supplementary actions. Why the EU framework had 
additionally not been appropriate for this coordination attempt has already been 
discussed above. Additionally the field of higher education is still regarded by the 
majority of experts as a very sensitive field, closely connected to national history and 
culture (Interviews 2, 3, 4, and 5), and therefore the give-up of sovereignty is also 
strongly rejected. It is additionally noteworthy in this context that not everywhere in 
Europe the higher education systems are organized centrally162 (see chapter 8.3). 
Following the discussion above it can be stated that the concepts contained in 
hypothesis 3c also do not contribute too much to the discussion here. No evidence has 
been found that uncertainty (that is also a concept not easy to catch) did play a 
pronounced role in the discussion about the Bologna-Regimes’ institutional form. Since 
the question of sovereignty had been already discussed and settled in the Treaty of 
Maastricht, this concept simply did not play a role in itself. If it would have been 
considered in the discussions, one can surely assume that it would have strengthened the 
drive towards a soft coordinated solution.  
 
Hypothesis 3d: Enactors decide about which form an institution takes. 
 
Here cannot be much added to the findings of the discussion of hypothesis 2b above, 
that focuses on powerful actors institutional preferences to explain why this initiative 
does not take place in the European Union. Since the Sorbonne signatories can be 
regarded as the relevant enactors in Gruber’s (2000)sense (see chapter 6.4.3), the notion 
                                                 
161 Following one expert involved the ministers meeting in Bologna "did not realize what they were 
signing. [...] It was a meeting of their peers. They did not pay much attention, what was in [the Bologna 
Declaration]" (Interview 6: 64-70). Although other actors involved do not fully agree with this statement: 
"I think at least most of the ministers knew what was going on" (Interview 7: 112-123, own translation), 
this proceeding nonetheless shows that questions of uncertainty or the care for unintended consequences 
were not very pronounced – at least at the ministerial level. 
162 For example the responsibility for decision making in the higher education system in the UK is not 
concentrated in any single agency, and higher education institutions still enjoy a high degree of 
autonomy, which is a very prominent and traditional characteristic of the university system in the UK. 
Decision making is shared among a range of public, quasi public and independent agencies162 (OECD 
1997). These agencies are sometimes recognized "formalised intermediary or buffer bodies" 
(Kogan/Marton 2000: 104). 
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that these powerful actors had great impact on the decision about the institutions form 
holds here too. The expert interviews and the e-mail survey support hypothesis 3d that 
assumes the enactors to have the main say concerning the form an institution takes. 
There is evidence that especially the Sorbonne signatories, had an interest to coordinate 
their higher education policies outside the European Union in a very soft and non-
binding way, as already stated in the previous chapter. Nonetheless it should be noted 
here that in its strictness hypothesis 3d presumably goes a bit too far. Although the 
primacy of the powerful founding actors, the enactors concerning the choice of an 
institutions form should not be neglected here (Interviews 2, 12, 17, 19, 20), the role of 
the other governments has to be taken into consideration, too. Again, especially the 
representatives of national governments preparing the Bologna conference are regarded 
as having had at least some influence (Interviews 10, 11, 17, 19). On the other hand it is 
clear that the enactors with their preference for a soft coordination of higher education 
structures did not have to face very much opposition stemming from other governments, 
which themselves regarded a soft solution that granted them enough room for maneuver 
as the superior institutional choice. Taken altogether hypothesis 3d should be 
reformulated stating that it is mainly the enactors that decide about which form an 
institution takes. Framed this way the hypothesis is supported by the empirical 
evidence. 
 
12.3 Summary 
 
The last two chapters have discussed and analyzed the research questions engaged with 
the (soft) form of the Bologna-Regime. Besides the lack of treaty base – that surely is 
one important explanatory factor that cannot be left out – especially the institutional 
preferences of the most powerful actors (in this context the Sorbonne signatories 
Germany, Italy, France and the UK) did provide an explanation why this coordination 
of national higher education policies does not take place in the framework of the 
European Union. Besides this the fact that countries did participate in this initiative 
from the beginning on, that were and still are not members of the EU does also 
contribute to answering this question. But since especially European Union members 
did and do play an important role in this process, the influence of this "asymmetry 
concerning membership in the EU and the group of actors wishing to coordinate their 
higher education policies"-factor on the dismissal of the EU as the appropriate 
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institutional solution should not be overvalued. Other actors that are regarded to have 
had at least some impact and influence like the representatives of national governments 
preparing the Bologna conference, only reinforced the trend to a solution outside the EU 
framework, since the other governments themselves did prefer a solution outside the 
European Union. 
 
The second question that asks why this cooperation is based solely on soft coordination 
has been discussed from several different theoretical perspectives in the chapter above. 
Some of them can contribute to an explanation but some of them cannot. The claim that 
governments choose soft coordination when no compromise about the concrete goals 
exists does not hold in this case, since this initiative focuses much more on specific 
goals and concrete content than on methods and the measurement of progress. Hence 
soft coordination seems to have more virtues than just to plaster nonexistent 
compromise about certain goals. Although often mentioned and mainly very logically 
presented in theoretical concepts engaged with the discussion of institutional form or 
design, there has not been found evidence that uncertainty and unintended consequences 
did play an important role in this case. This does not only go back to the fact that it is 
difficult to detect and measure fear of unintended consequences or the impact of 
uncertainty in institution building processes. Apparently uncertainty did not even play a 
role at all in the ministers’ considerations. Regarding the assumption that concerns 
about possible sovereignty costs did lead to a very soft institutional solution it has been 
shown that this discussion had already been settled in the discussions about the role of 
higher education in the Treaty of Maastricht. Hence although one can assume that if 
sovereignty costs had been considered this would have strengthened the drive towards a 
soft coordinated solution, these questions simply did not occur here. 
 
Taken altogether one can summarize that it had been mainly (but not exclusively) the 
enactors, the powerful founding members that decided about the form of this institution. 
They opted for soft coordination, in contrast to more binding and harder forms. Since 
governments, due to their privileged position in the two-level environment, enjoy a 
widened room of maneuver – which is the bigger the less formalized an institution is, 
and the less binding it’s coordination instruments become – they do of course consider 
this advantage in situations  of institutional building. So it is true that governments opt 
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for soft coordination to widen their room for maneuver, which has been the case in the 
building up of the Bologna-Regime. 
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13 Assessing the democratic legitimacy and quality of the Bologna-Regime 
 
13.1 Introduction 
 
Questions about consequences and effects of distinct regimes and their institutional 
form could deal with multiple issues and include various perspectives, ranging from 
measuring the overall effectivity to questions about the effect on certain actors involved. 
As already mentioned (see: chapter 4), this dissertation does however focus on the 
question about the consequences for the democratic legitimacy of governance. This is 
important because at the international level there exist serious problems and deficits that 
can be exemplarily summarized as follows:  
 
"The input of citizen’s interests is no longer guaranteed by elections, since non-elected 
actors enter the arenas of policy making. In structures of governance where decisions 
are not made by majorities but emerge from bargaining and arguing, effective outputs 
are difficult to achieve. Among these problems, the thorniest issue concerns 
accountability in political processes that are mostly informal, not very transparent, often 
dominated by elites and experts, and provide the actors with opportunities to shift the 
blame to other decision makers"(Benz/Papadopoulos 2007a: 275). 
 
 Besides the fact that I regard a focus on democracy as a very crucial aspect, the analysis 
of international institutions has too often a considerable bias towards stressing the 
positive sides of international cooperation163, whilst neglecting the "dark side of 
intergovernmental cooperation that has always been present – the democratic deficit that 
results from the internationalization of governance" (Wolf 1999: 334). This condition is 
undesirable, since governance beyond the nation state should not only be analyzed 
concerning its effectiveness but with regard to its legitimacy and democratic quality too. 
In international relations these two aspects – effectiveness and democratic legitimacy – 
often stand in a problematic relationship (Wolf 2000: 23). Hence not only gains of 
cooperation but also possible democratic deficits and problems should be discussed.  
 
Although most of the theoretical literature occupied with questions of democracy, is 
situated either at the national level or is engaged with the European Union’s democratic 
                                                 
163 Interestingly there exist even some articles that stress international regimes’ possible (future) 
contribution in fostering democratization and global/cosmopolitan democracy (Bohman 1999; Samhat 
2005). 
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deficit(s)164, some scholars have recognized the growing importance of governance 
beyond the nation state and the need to discuss aspects of democracy also at this level. 
In the following of this chapter I take these approaches as the logical point of 
departure165 and work out the main democratic deficits and problems of governance 
beyond the nation state. As a next step a rough framework for analyzing democratic 
deficits beyond the nation state will be developed, including the relevant benchmarks 
that allow for a useful discussion of the concrete case. Finally the Bologna-Regime 
itself will be assessed, using this rough framework.   
 
13.2 Democracy beyond the nation state: Problems and deficits 
 
First of all it is important to emphasize the fact that the perception and identification of 
problematic aspects and deficits of democracy (not only in the international context), do 
very much rely on the underlying theoretical foundations employed. Put in other words, 
it depends on the glasses we use if we are even able to see problems or if our lenses 
totally fade them out. These theoretical choices also determine which kind of problems 
we are likely to see and which we are not166. The employment of an 
intergovernmentalist point of view certainly solves many problems of democratic 
legitimacy in advance, by mainly stressing the role of democratically elected national 
governments as legitimate representatives of national interests in the international 
system. Nonetheless even for disciples of this theoretical school some problems may 
occur. In the next section of this chapter the main problems and deficits identified in the 
relevant literature will be discussed briefly. 
 
                                                 
164 Actually there exists a lot of literature concerning the democratic deficits of the European Union, from 
very different views ("The picture which scholars draw about democracy in the EU depends upon the 
manner in which they characterize its political system" (Benz/Papadopoulos 2007c: 15)). For an overview 
about the main arguments see for example: (Thomassen/Schmitt 2006). 
165 A more fundamental and far-reaching discussion of democracy itself and theories of democracy cannot 
be delivered in this dissertation. See therefore the relevant literature, for example: (Sartori 1997; Schmidt 
2000). 
166 The discussion about the democratic deficit of the European Union may serve as a good example here: 
See for example (Moravcsik 2002) vs. (Føllesdal/Hix 2006). 
 122
It follows that one should state very clearly which theory or approach one employs167. 
Nonetheless when assessing one empirical case, this commitment to just one theory 
leads to the problem described above, namely the possible disregarding of problematic 
aspects and deficits not covered by this chosen theory. A solution to this problem can be 
found in the literature engaged with the empirical assessment of democratic quality. 
These approaches work out indicators and questions that can be used for a systematic 
assessment of democratic quality. I will build on these approaches to work out a 
framework that can be used to assess the democratic legitimacy or in a broader sense the 
democratic quality of the Bologna-Regime. 
 
Altogether I regard the next steps as an important part of this analysis because this bulk 
of problems and deficits prevents us to be overoptimistic and unrealistic concerning 
democratic legitimacy beyond the nation state. It reminds us that "the structural factor 
of the nature of international society remains as a parameter, limiting the extent to 
which democratic control might be possible" (Smith 1994: 215) and that "it is necessary 
to be realistic about setting democratic criteria and to avoid falling victim to the myth of 
"democratic omnipotence"" (Zürn 2000: 94). "However, recognizing the limits is no 
reason for not trying to reach them" (Smith 1994) and "it is equally important from a 
critical perspective not simply to adjust normative standards to political reality without 
comment" (Zürn 2000). 
13.2.1 Lack of demos 
 
One of the most fundamental critiques posed in this context builds on the lack of a real 
demos at the international level. Hence some scholars question if it is even possible to 
achieve democratic processes beyond the nation-state. They argue that democratic 
legitimacy is only possible within the framework of a demos168. Since there does not 
exist a demos at the European/international level yet, (and is additionally not very likely 
to emerge in the near future) democracy is, according to this view not possible. 
                                                 
167 One problem in this context is the fact that prior to a discussion of questions concerning the 
democratic legitimacy of governance in the international context, a definition of democracy itself has to 
be developed, since the standard model of democracy in the nation state cannot be simply applied here 
(Benz/Papadopoulos 2007c: 4). This poses a challenge to traditional democratic theory, which mainly 
treat "the state as a kind of analytical ceiling to inquiry" (Smith 1994: 193). Though "fundamental 
processes of governance escape the categories of the nation state the traditional national resolutions of the 
key questions of democratic theory and practice are open to doubt" (Held 2003: 522) 
168 Concerning this argument see for example: (Greven 1997; Kielmansegg 1996). 
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Nonetheless, following Zürn (2000: 101) "the potential for democratic processes beyond 
the nation-state must not be ruled out as a matter of principle; rather, it indicates that 
such processes are in their initial stages of development". He emphasizes, that "the 
boundaries of a demos are not given but are politically defined" (Zürn 2000: 99) and 
that for now "democratic governance beyond the nation-state must manage without a 
fully developed, civilly constituted sense of identity comprising all four aspects169 of a 
demos" (Zürn 2000: 109). Hence congruence should be employed as the appropriate 
normative criterion "All those affected by a denationalized issue must be represented in 
the process of international policy formulation" (Zürn 2000: 101). The last point is an 
important one and leads to the next problem and possible deficit. 
13.2.2 Conflict with the principle of symmetry and congruence 
 
One apparently unavoidable problem of state foreign policy is its conflict with the so-
called principle of symmetry and congruence (Wolf 2000: 21). In short this principle 
states that: "Deficits in democratic legitimation arise whenever the set of those, involved 
in making democratic decisions fails to coincide with the set of those affected by them" 
(Habermas 1999: 49)170. It is at this point possible to distinguish between input-
congruence and output congruence (Zürn 1998: 237): input-congruence means the 
congruence between those affected by a decision and those that have impact on the 
decision making process. Output congruence refers to the "overlap between the polity 
and the territory it controls" (Eriksen/Fossum 2007: 15). Or as Held (1995: 224) puts it: 
"symmetry and congruence [...] are assumed at two crucial points: first, between citizen-
voters and the decision-makers whom they are, in principle able to hold to account; and 
secondly, between the ‘output’ (decisions, policies etc) of decision-makers and their 
constituents – ultimately ‘the people’ in a delimited territory" (see: Figure 7). 
                                                 
169 See (Zürn 2000), 99-100. 
170 Only few scholars challenge this symmetry principle. See for example: (Agné 2006). 
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Figure 7: Democratic political community?  
 
Source: (Held 1995: 224) 
 
13.2.3 Lack of accountability 
 
A recent contribution to the question of assessing democracy at the international level, 
rooted in a broader context stems from Benz and Papadopoulos (2007b). They place 
accountability in the center of their argumentation: "While it could be argued that 
effective outputs can be produced by deliberation among experts or within narrow 
circles of actors, decision-makers must also be subject to control. Accountability allows 
those subject to decisions to react to the outputs of governance, and it compels the 
responsible decision-makers to anticipate these reactions. By linking the representatives 
to the represented, accountability becomes the central issue of democratic legitimacy 
from a normative point of view" (Benz/Papadopoulos 2007a: 275). This is neither the 
place to discuss the different concepts of accountability nor their different types and 
specifications171. Hence summing up, at its core the concept of accountability describes 
a relationship between two sets of persons: "A is accountable to B when A is obliged to 
inform B about A’s (past or future) actions and decisions, to justify them, and to suffer 
punishment in the case of eventual misconduct" (Schedler 1999: 17). Although citizens 
should be able to throw the rascals out by voting them out of office (Powell 2000: 47), 
this electoral accountability is not always easy to achieve and especially a problem 
when the intergovernmental level comes into play, since it is even complicated enough 
for voters to evaluate governmental performance inside individual nation states. Whilst 
federal systems or divided governments make it more difficult to identify 
                                                 
171 E.g. Political – legal – financial – administrative – (ethical) accountability / Horizontal – vertical 
accountability / Internal – external accountability (Schedler 1999; Schmitter 2004a). 
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responsibilities, intergovernmental cooperation does even worsen the problem for voters 
to find out the truth172 (Cutler 2004: 19).  
 
Another very problematic – but in my view indissoluble – aspect of political action that 
transcends national borders is taken up by the concept of external accountability. 
Especially in an international or even transnational context internal accountability has to 
be complemented by external accountability173: "Since governance regularly cuts across 
the boundaries of institutions or territories of governments, internal accountability has 
to be complemented by external accountability [...] Decision-makers and those 
scrutinizing their decisions have to consider effects going beyond their jurisdiction if 
they seek democratic legitimacy" (Benz/Papadopoulos 2007a: 276). Especially the 
deficits in external accountability lead to a lack of input legitimacy: "The problem for 
legitimate governance beyond the nation state is to improve on external accountability, 
to make sure that the various governance bodies- from international regimes to public-
private partnerships and cooperative arrangements among non-state actors – can be held 
responsible by those who are affected by their decisions and rules" (Risse 2007: 195). 
 
This critique surely points to an interesting problem of democracy at the international 
level. Nonetheless it should be remarked, that in an international system with increasing 
interconnectedness, where decisions and actions affect increasingly more people, a 
possible solution to this problem is even hard to imagine. 
13.2.4 Dominance of national governments 
 
It is not a very new insight that mainly national governments participate and dominate 
policy making at the international level. Especially the tendency that governments 
dominate legislature in foreign and defense policies is a well know issue174. Since the 
                                                 
172 “It often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the 
punishment of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall” (Hamilton 
1788). 
173 The distinction in internal and external accountability can shortly be described as follows: "Actors are 
internally accountable to those whom they formally represent. External accountability refers to those who 
are affected by decisions but who are not involved in formulating mandates of controlling decision-
makers" (Benz/Papadopoulos 2007c: 19).  
174 There is a tendency that governments dominate legislature in foreign and defense policies. "Because of 
the relative lack of public interest in foreign and defense policies, these come under far less parliamentary 
scrutiny than applies to domestic issues. Even when there are debates or enquiries by committees, the 
government has a formidable trump card in the use of the term ‘national interests’ [...] An added 
advantage possessed by governments is their role in controlling the flow of information [...] This means 
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number of issues that are nowadays handled at the international level has steadily 
increased, this governmental dominance does now apply to more than just these two 
policy fields. One should hereby not forget that the governments’ unique position 
(acting on different levels, superior information) opens the possibility for strategic use 
and abuse and points to a democracy deficit (Zürn 1996: 31, 2000: 103). Additionally 
their officials’ accountability is only indirect (Benz/Papadopoulos 2007c: 18). 
Sometimes the position that intergovernmental agreements do not pose a problem for 
democracy if the participating governments are democratically legitimized and voting 
bases on unanimity is taken up. But this is only true from a merely formal point of view, 
since the factual scope of action for the sovereign is reduced to choose between 
acceptance and refusal (e.g. ratification of an international treaty by national 
parliaments).  The aim for a continuity of foreign policy (a field that widens more and 
more) and high political costs in case of refusal further bias this choice (Wolf 2000: 25).  
 
Here the question arises if a de-governmentalization of governance beyond the state and 
the increase of non-state actor’s participation could contribute to a solution of 
legitimacy problems of international governance. Nonetheless the answers to this 
question cannot be too optimistic. Hence private contributions to legitimate and 
effective governance beyond the state are regarded as supplementary but not 
substitutionally (Wolf 2007). These actors can contribute to improved input- and 
output- legitimacy only if specific conditions are met (Benz/Papadopoulos 2007a: 279). 
Non-state actors have their value in enhancing transparency of international governance 
with their information activity. Nonetheless it should not be overlooked that the 
participation of private actors can generate a democratic deficit itself due to the 
selectivity of their inclusion175 or the organization of these actors themselves 
(Benz/Papadopoulos 2007a).  
 
                                                                                                                                               
that opposition parties, or even members of the government party, simply do not have access to the kind 
of information necessary to reach informed judgments; they may even lack the information they require to 
ask the right questions. This has fundamental implications for the ability of parliamentary bodies to 
oversee policy-making in these areas" (Smith 1994: 209). 
175 This "problem of selectivity is evident at the international level, where NGOs are criticized for 
conveying ‚Northern’ norms while local populations are absent from the stage" (Benz/Papadopoulos 
2007a). The same applies when the inclusion of "stakeholders" is demanded. "Who decides about 
exclusion and inclusion and, thereby, who the ‚stakeholders’ are concerning a particular problem?" (Risse 
2007) 
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In his new raison d’ètat176 approach Klaus Dieter Wolf (1999; Wolf 2000) goes even 
further in his critique of possible threats to democracy caused by governmental 
dominance. This approach builds upon the assumption that governments are strategic 
actors that have an interest in themselves and do not only act as honest, problem-solving 
agents of their constituencies. It takes up government’s unique position, situated in a 
two-level environment between the domestic and the international sphere. To widen 
their room of maneuver at the national level, they enter into mutually binding 
arrangements at the international level177. Hence governments can use self-binding 
intergovernmental cooperation to paradoxically increase their autonomy (Wolf 1999). It 
is important to notice that obviously questions of effective governance do play a role in 
these intergovernmental governance arrangements, at the loss of some external 
autonomy. But self-commitments as a part of these, can contribute "to manipulate the 
domestic context by enhancing the internal autonomy of the executive – within the 
framework of largely non-transparent decision-making processes in which options for 
involvement by non-governmental actors are at best selective and are always subject to 
state review" (Wolf 1999: 341f.). Hence international agreements that entail a mutual 
restriction of external autonomy can have two positive effects for governments. On the 
one hand their problem-solving capacity may be increased, on the other hand they may 
regain room for autonomous action at the domestic level (Wolf 1999: 342). As a 
precondition to this strategy clearly some conditions have to be fulfilled first: state 
actors must be able to commit themselves. Hence the first step is to create "a polity with 
extended and adequately protected governmental options" (Wolf 1999: 342). If such an 
institutional setting is at hand, "consensus in substance among governments about a 
particular program (policy) and about the strategy to realize it (politics) [is necessary]. 
Such a substantial consensus is most likely to be reached in situations where a certain 
                                                 
176 Wolf (2000: 33-55) dismantles the concept of a priori definable or even natural interests of states and a 
consequential raison d’ètat. The concept of new raison d’ètat highlights the fact that raison d’ètat has 
always been an inward-oriented governance technique, too. 
177 This is not a very new strategy since "in the context of an international system based on state 
sovereignty, states ultimately aided one another in their efforts to secure the greatest possible degree of 
autonomy vis-à-vis their particular societal environment by posing military threats to one another. In 
world society, where they are challenged by an increasingly internationalizing society and by the 
disjuncture between the economic geography of globalization and the territorial political geography, 
governments do the same thing by voluntarily entering into mutually binding arrangements. 
Intergovernmental self-commitment enables them to re-establish their claim to regulate economic 
activities and to manipulate the domestic context at the same time" (Wolf 1999: 335). The total account of 
this limitation of external autonomy and increase of internal autonomy may result in an overall increase 
of autonomy and room of maneuver – of governments (Wolf 2000: 63). 
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policy would imply high domestic costs" (Wolf 1999: 342). The existing network of 
international institutions can be used by governments to fend off growing societal 
pressure on their autonomy for action. They might delegate tasks to international 
institutions, knowing that only they themselves have access to these institutions, 
contrary to parliaments, sub-state and other non-governmental actors. Hence 
governments gain a platform detracted as far as possible from non-governmental actors, 
to put through their envisaged programs (Wolf 2000: 91f.). Two remarks still have to be 
made. First, it is important to note that the new raison d’état approach does not only 
state that governments aim at increasing their national room of maneuver. Two-level 
bargaining can be used in both directions (Wolf 2000: 89). Second, this approach does 
not claim that all intergovernmental self-commitments root in this governmental 
strategy: "Issue-specific international agreements may well have their origin in sincere 
problem-solving efforts, or even in pressures from civilian actors" (Wolf 1999: 348). 
 
Summing up, according to the new raison d’état approach the problem for democratic 
governance is, that governance beyond the state – which is to a large part controlled by 
national governments that can act according to the logic described above – is 
increasingly becoming more important. More issues and problems are dealt with at this 
level and can therefore be removed from societal debate and from revision (Wolf 1999: 
347f.). 
13.2.5  The Janus-faced role of international institutions 
 
Besides their beneficial role as catalysts and brokers of cooperation, international 
institutions are often accused of being undemocratic and therefore illegitimate. In fact 
international institutions form Janus-faced entities concerning questions of democratic 
legitimacy: Given that many problems cannot be solved at the level of the individual 
nation states and that many goals can no more be reached by theses formally 
independent nation states themselves due to surrounding conditions outside their sphere 
of influence (Zürn 1998: 238), problems of output legitimacy178 emerge at this national 
                                                 
178 Due to the fact that many approaches that aim at the analysis of governance beyond the nation state 
and its democratic legitimacy, build on the distinction between input- (throughput-) and output- 
legitimacy, a few words will be spent thereon. The distinction originates in the "complex" theory of 
democracy program developed by Scharpf (1970; 1999), which combines empirical and normative 
traditions of theories of democracy. One of its main strength is the fact, that it does besides description 
and explanation also focus on the evaluation of current state and potential from a normative-analytical 
point of view. This theory is sensitive to strengths and weaknesses of democracy (Schmidt 2003: 168). 
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level. With the use or the creation of international institutions the former problems may 
be solved but the problem of democratic legitimacy has only shifted from the national to 
the international level, since international institutions can at best claim indirect 
democratic legitimacy at the moment. The fact that they "tend to be highly responsive to 
national governments" (Nye 2001) cannot only be interpreted in favor of them. I also do 
not agree, that "highly technical organizations may be able to derive their legitimacy 
from their efficacy alone. But the more an institution deals with broad values, the more 
its democratic legitimacy becomes relevant" (Nye 2001). Building on the model of 
input- and output legitimacy (see: Footnote 178), Nye does not take into account that 
even if problems may seem to be highly technical they may be nonetheless highly 
politicized under the surface and entail important consequences179. The more problems 
that are dealt with by international institutions or broadly spoken settled through inter-
state agreements, and the more important these problems become "the more political 
decisions are withdrawn from the arenas of democratic opinion-formation and will-
formation – which are exclusively national arenas" (Habermas 1999: 49). This leads to a 
durable weakening of democratic legitimacy, which is not always very obvious 
(Habermas 1999). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
This "complex" theory of democracy considers the input of the political system – in some fields the 
throughput – and the output. Whereas the analysis of input (and throughput) informs about procedures of 
will-formation, decision-making and conversion structures of democracy, the analysis of output serves to 
describe, explain and advance the quality of governance. Throughput encompasses all features and 
procedures of a political system that forward, filtrate, peter out or transform (into products like legislative 
proposals) the input (Schmidt 2003: 153). Thus throughput-legitimacy is "concerned with the quality of 
governance procedures" (Wolf 2007: 208) In other words: the input-oriented perspective stresses the 
"government by the people", the output-oriented side emphasizes the "government for the people" 
(Scharpf 1999: 16). "Input legitimacy concerns the participatory quality of the decision-making process 
leading to laws and rules. Those who have to comply with the rules ought to have an input in rule-making 
processes. ‘Output’ legitimacy refers to the problem-solving quality of laws and rules" In democratic 
systems, both sources together ensure the legitimacy of the political o order" (Risse 2007: 185) There 
exists a tension between these two forms of legitimacy. The more weight the output-oriented side of 
legitimacy gains the less parliaments are able to control their governments (Schäfer 2006a: 195). It is also 
important to recall that "what has been called input legitimacy and output legitimacy in comparative 
research on democratic regimes may vary across political cultures and regimes, but no regime could 
completely neglect one of the two dimensions of legitimacy and still call itself democratic" (Greven 2000: 
54). 
179 In the field of higher education questions of quality evaluation or assurance and accreditation may 
serve as a good example to underline this argument. Even if a European-level solution is demanded by 
experts in this policy area (Haug 2003), it may not be too surprising that the participating countries did set 
up their own national accreditation systems or agencies themselves due to the fact that the accreditation of 
their higher education institutions is not only a technical issue.  
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13.3 Analytical framework 
 
After having outlined and discussed some – of course this list is exemplarily and not 
exhaustive - of the main problems and deficits of democracy beyond the nation state 
with a focus on international institutions, this chapter aims at the establishment of a 
framework that can be used to assess the concrete case. Following the blueprint outlined 
in the introduction of this chapter the main benchmarks or yardsticks will be worked 
out. Since the answer to this research question is an admittedly important but still not 
the only part of this dissertation, this will be accomplished in a compact and brief way. 
Anyway, due to the increasing occurrence of softer forms of cooperation at the 
international level questions of their democratic legitimacy or their effects on national 
democracy offer an interesting and actual field for further research. In the following 
some actual approaches that engage with the assessment of democratic legitimacy or in 
a broader sense of democratic quality are discussed. Benchmarks for the assessment of 
this particular case – the Bologna-Regime – will partly base on useful benchmarks 
developed in these approaches. 
 
Although surely not the first one (e.g. Dahl 1971) to engage with the assessment of 
democratic quality Beetham (1994) systematically approaches this issue with the 
invention of his model for democratic audit180. The main idea of this model is to assess 
the condition of democracy in a single state. This task is not an easy one, since it is 
neither clear from the outset which auditing standards can be employed usefully nor 
which kind of democracy is actually meant. Hence the "project of a democratic audit, 
then, not only requires a clear specification of what exactly is to be audited. It also 
requires a robust and defensible conception of democracy, from which can be derived 
specific criteria and standards of assessment" (Beetham 1994: 26).  The sheer amount of 
conceptions and definitions of democracy and their contestation (which should not 
surprise us, since "defining democracy is a political act" (Saward 1994: 7)itself) points 
to the difficulties connected with this task. Nonetheless following Beetham (1994: 28), 
all conceptions and definitions of democracy have at least a small consensual core, 
which can be identified in the two "related principles of popular control and political 
equality" which may also serve as useful "guiding thread of a democratic audit" 
                                                 
180 For a critical review about the instrument democratic audit its modifications and applications to certain 
cases see: (Kaiser/Seils 2005).  
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(Beetham 1994: 28). This core definition has to be fulfilled in any system claiming to be 
democratic181. Therefore "the view that democracy is an essentially contested concept is 
wrong, but it is a boundedly contested one" (Lord 2007: 75). Clearly, to serve as useful 
and even measurable criteria for assessment these principles – "popular control over 
public decision making and decision makers" and "political equality or respect and 
voice between citizens in the exercise of this control" (Beetham 2002) – have to be 
broken down and specified. Hence a set of so-called mediating values is identified that 
enable the realization of the two principles in practice: accountability, authorization, 
solidarity, participation, responsiveness, representation, and transparency (Beetham 
2002: 11-12). These values in turn can be used to assess how democratic institutions 
work in practice182. As can be seen this approach builds on a qualitative rather than a 
quantitative assessment of democracy, incorporating the context in which the respective 
institutions are embedded (Beetham 1994: 31). Instead of using a dichotomous scale 
(democratic/non-democratic) a continuum is used. Connected to this it is important to 
mention, that the assessment of democracy with certain indicators and scales still 
remains a judgment not a measurement! Since this model works in the assessment and 
comparison of democracy at the level of states, it has been modified and taken as 
starting point for similar projects.  
 
In a recent publication Lord (2004) for example, adapts Beetham’s (1994) approach to 
allow for a systematic democratic audit of the European Union. Taking the common 
complaints about the European Union’s democratic deficit as a point of departure 
(without neglecting their validity), he delivers – according to himself – the first attempt 
to "apply democratic audition to the EU, or, indeed, to any process of governance 
beyond the state" (Lord 2004: 1).  
 
In their search for adequate criteria to measure democratic legitimacy of soft modes of 
governance in the EU – a field very similar to this one – Borrás and Conzelmann (2007) 
identified four main yardsticks: Parliamentary involvement, societal input, transparency, 
deliberative quality. It is at this point important to remind that Borrás and Conzelmann 
                                                 
181 With this definition the institutional fallacy of declaring the political system of one state (e.g. the 
USA) as basis for assessment (Abromeit 2002: 191) is avoided. 
182 The next steps are the definition of requirements to be met, that these mediating values become 
effective (see therefore the table on page 12 of (Beetham 2004) and questions that allow for a comparison 
(how much/how far?) are worked out (Beetham 2002).   
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also mainly focused on input legitimacy and that some of their criteria are difficult to 
measure empirically, as they themselves admit (Borrás/Conzelmann 2007: 546). 
Nonetheless these yardsticks provide a good starting point. In this project I will also 
concentrate on aspects of input-legitimacy, since I do not share the view, that output-
legitimacy can sufficiently substitute the input side183. Additionally it is not possible to 
assess the problem-solving quality of certain provisions without detailed measurement 
and analysis of their effects and effectivity, a task that can due to several reasons not be 
accomplished in this dissertation184. Hence the focus of the analysis lies on the input- 
(and throughput-) side.  
 
Building on the concepts discussed above a comprehensive assessment of the 
democratic quality of the Bologna Process will be presented in the next chapters of this 
dissertation. The question of how to assess democratic quality and legitimacy of this 
kind of international institution has already been discussed above. This leads to the 
development of benchmarks or criteria that allow for a useful evaluation of the 
Bologna-Regime. The fact that answers given to questions of democratic quality are 
value judgments and not the result of rigid measurement does not preclude theoretical 
considerations and the development of reasonable evaluation criteria. Drawing on the 
concept of democratic audit (1994; Beetham 2004) and the approach of Borrás and 
Conzelmann (2007) some principles have been identified that can be regarded central: 
Accountability, authorization, participation, responsiveness and transparency. 
Requirements for these principles and evaluation criteria in the form of central questions 
have been developed and included too. Principles and criteria that can either only be 
adopted inside a state or are simply not empirically measurable in this case have not 
been taken up here. Table 5 summarizes this assessment scheme that will guide the 
further evaluation of the Bologna-Regime. In my opinion this is a useful and practicable 
tool that permits a reasoned judgment about the Bologna-Regimes democratic quality. 
Surely I admit that this is only one possible approach among others and that other 
                                                 
183 Clearly a democratic political system needs both. In every democratic political system some fields 
stand outside the sphere of political decision making exposed to majority rule (Schäfer 2006a), which 
should increase the efficiency of this system. Independent central banks may serve as an example here 
(Scharpf 1999). Nonetheless a democracy cannot solely rest on government for the people (output-
legitimacy) since „according to this [...] there are no criteria to distinguish a well-performing democratic 
system from a dictatorship delivering the output that people want“ (Thomassen/Schmitt 2006). “Citizens 
want to be informed, to be involved, and to have their concerns taken seriously in democratic politics; it is 
not just better politics “for the people,” it is also “by the people”” (Greven 2000). 
184 See also: Footnote 46. 
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principles and/or evaluation criteria could have been used, too. The result of this 
assessment will consist of informed judgments that allow the depiction of an overall 
tendency. 
Table 5: Assessment scheme for democratic quality 
Democratic 
principles 
Requirements Evaluation criteria – Central questions 
Accountability / 
Authorization 
Clear lines of 
accountability; 
Control of elected over 
non-elected executive 
personnel; 
How much ex-post parliamentarian 
control exists? 
Can decision-makers be held 
responsible? 
Do there take place real discussions of 
results in parliamentary fora? 
Participation / 
Responsiveness  
Rights and capacities to 
participate; 
Accessibility of decision 
makers; 
Deliberative quality; 
To what degree concerned citizens 
have equal access and a chance to 
participate? 
How much response is there to societal 
demands? 
How much real public debate about the 
content exists? 
To which extent do parliamentarians 
participate in the decision-making 
process?  
Is the deliberation open concerning the 
policy substance?  
Are final decisions reached by arguing 
and convincing or by bargaining? 
Transparency Openness to public 
scrutiny; 
To what extent are the decision-making 
process and the results traceable by the 
public? 
How much media-coverage can be 
detected? 
To what extent monitoring, reporting 
and verification procedures in the 
implementation phase exist? 
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13.4 Democratic legitimacy and quality of the Bologna-Regime 
 
13.4.1 Accountability and Authorization 
13.4.1.1  Can decision-makers be held responsible? 
 
Clearly the most important decision making body of the Bologna-Regime is the 
Conference of European ministers responsible for higher education. Here ministers for 
higher education, biannually convene with their peers and adopt the communiqués and 
declarations that further the overall process (see: Chapter 10.3). These ministers clearly 
can be held responsible for their actions by their national parliaments. This can cause 
problems because of information asymmetries, low overall transparency (see: Chapter 
13.4.3), limited chance to participate in the process for parliamentarians (see Chapter 
13.4.2) and minister’s opportunities for two-level gambling (see chapter 13.2.4). 
However, these governmental advantages do not preclude the possibility that they are 
held responsible for their actions taken at the European level.  
 
Apart from these big events that are held only every two years the Bologna-Regime’s 
day-to-day business takes place in two other bodies, the Bologna Follow-Up Group 
(BFUG) and the BFUG Board. Here the main work that is necessary for the further 
development of this initiative is accomplished. This encompasses the preparation of the 
ministerial conferences and the communiqués as well as monitoring activities 
concerning the implementation (see: Chapter 10.3). The members of these two bodies 
are mainly officials of the national ministries that can therefore be held responsible by 
their ministers. Additionally to these national officials a representative of the European 
Commission is also a member of the BFUG and of the Board. In the BFUG voting takes 
place. This does apply for determining the place of the next ministerial conference. 
Nonetheless voting in this forum raises several procedural questions. Apart from 
questions of majority and quorum it is also contestable if there should be one vote per 
country or two. This would help countries with more than just one education system 
(Belgium) or more than one representative in the BFUG, due to the allocation of rights 
and duties between the different levels (Germany, Bosnia and Herzegovina). These 
issues were discussed in detail before the voting for the country to host the ministerial 
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conference in 2009 took place in the Board and in the BFUG185. Still the European 
Commission is allowed to vote too, which poses a problem since this proceeding favors 
EU-member countries that participate against the other Bologna Process members186. 
Although it is strange enough that the Commission has a vote in a European initiative 
that does not take place in the EU framework this issue does also raise questions of 
accountability. The Commission can be held responsible for her actions by the 
European Parliament, in which not all the Bologna Process members are present, since 
they do not belong to the EU.  
 
Taken altogether the Bologna-Regime suffers an eminent European Union-bias that was 
not present from the beginning on, but increasingly crept in. This started with the first 
attempt to structure the follow up process, which took place during an informal meeting 
of EU ministers in Tampere, 1999 (see: Chapter 10.3). Looking at the actual 
organizational structure of the Bologna-Regime does further strengthen this impression. 
Hence the respective EU Presidency chairs the BFUG. The so-called Troika (actual, 
preceding and following EU Presidencies) also forms together with the host country of 
the next ministerial conference and three elected (by the BFUG) members the Board. 
This bias and the strong involvement of the European Commission (besides her 
financial support that is broadly welcomed) are also viewed critically from national 
experts of non-EU countries (Interview 13, Interview 20) that cannot hold the 
Commission responsible for her actions in the Bologna-Regime. What should not be 
overlooked nonetheless is the fact that, voting does not take place very often in the 
BFUG. The issues about which voting does take place are additionally not of far-
reaching consequences (mainly about the place of the next conference and about new 
members of the Board). A similar conclusion could be also drawn concerning the tasks 
of the chair. Summing up the main points it is noteworthy that some gaps concerning 
the possibility to hold the decision-takers responsible exist. Nonetheless the main 
decisions are taken in the ministerial conference and clearly here the ministers can be 
held responsible by their national parliaments. 
 
                                                 
185 See: BFUG9 3b, BFUGB13 9a, BFUGB13 9b (http://www.dfes.gov.uk/londonbologna/) 
186 Admittedly these non-EU members also benefit from the Commission’s financial support. 
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13.4.1.2 Do there take place real discussions of results in parliamentary fora? 
 
A study undertaken by Gornitzka and Langfeldt (2005: 13) reports that "Parliament and 
parliamentary hearings as important arenas where national discussions with respect to 
the Bologna Process have taken place". Since this conclusion is simply based on 
statements of a restricted number of members of Education International this cannot 
really be counted as a proof that the results of the discussions and deliberations on the 
European level are really discussed in the national parliaments. Hence to answer this 
question the parliamentary discussions of three Bologna member states have been 
analyzed187. Interestingly the first two years after the Bologna Declaration itself in none 
of the three countries a parliamentary debate focused on this issue. Table 6 clearly 
shows that this issue had not been discussed very often in none of the three countries. In 
the UK there was nearly no debate at all, which can be maybe deduced from the belief 
that Bologna did not entail any changes to the British system. Germany had the most 
discussions about this issue. This fact mainly mirrors the struggle about competences in 
the field of higher education between Bund and Länder188.  
 
Table 6: Parliamentary debates engaged with the Bologna Process  
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Austria 1 1 0 4 5 2 2 
Germany 0 0 5 8 6 1 8 
UK 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
 
                                                 
187 For the purpose of this question the parliamentary archives of Austria (http://www.parlament.gv.at/), 
Germany (http://www.bundestag.de/) and the UK (http://www.parliament.uk/) have been systematically 
scanned for parliamentary debates that engaged with, or made reference to the Bologna Process. Although 
the results are not representative for all participating countries, the selection of countries still allows 
drawing some conclusions. Since Germany and the UK represent two Sorbonne signatories and Austria 
had been deeply involved in the preparation of the Bologna conference it is righteous to assume that the 
number and intensity of parliamentary debates in these states exceeds the number and intensity of 
parliamentary debates in the other member states. Additionally these three states offer high variation 
concerning the organization of their higher education systems (Austria – mainly central steering, 
Germany – federal system with broad Länder competences, UK – high autonomy of higher education 
institutions). It is important to mention, that this analysis is restricted to debates that made direct reference 
to the Bologna Process. The stenographic protocols have not been scanned for issues like tiered-system 
(BA/MA), quality assurance, lifelong learning, etc.  
188 See  for example: Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographischer Bericht, 165. Sitzung, 16. März 2005 
(Plenarprotokoll 15/165). 
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Nonetheless the sheer number of debates does not say anything about their content189. 
As Figure 8 clearly demonstrates only a minority of all debates can be regarded as being 
real debates. All of these debates did take place in Germany, which again points to the 
question of authority already mentioned above. Additionally these real debates did all 
take place shortly before respectively after the big ministerial conferences in Berlin 
2003 and London 2007. Besides a small number of debates focusing on issues of 
implementation, most of the contributions just made reference to this process. Questions 
of implementation and of course debates in which only reference was made to Bologna, 
were not only restricted to the realm of higher education but did cover a range of topics 
connected with this initiative190.  
 
Figure 8: Classification of parliamentarian debates (1999-2008) 
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Summing up the findings presented above, it can be concluded that real parliamentarian 
discussions of results take place very seldom. The two years that followed the 
conference at Bologna were also marked by a lack of debate about this issue. The 
occurrence of real debates could additionally only be observed in the course of the 
ministerial conferences. Most parliamentarian debates that mentioned the Bologna 
                                                 
189 Since it is necessary to investigate if “there are real and meaningful possibilities that the results […] 
and policies or legislation related to them are amenable to discussion in parliamentary for a, and whether 
the parliamentary for a are able to define the subject and nature of political responsibility” 
(Borrás/Conzelmann 2007), not only the number of debates is essential here. Hence the debates in this 
analysis were divided into three broad categories. Debates in the national parliaments have been classified 
as real debates where issues from the European level are really discussed and critically questioned, 
debates about national implementation where the national implementation of distinct Bologna objectives 
is discussed, and debates in which only a reference is made to the Bologna Process by the way.   
190 For example the amendment of the public services law for officials was debated in the Austrian 
parliament, making reference to the Bologna-model (Stenographisches Protokoll, 89. Sitzung des 
Nationalrates der Republik Österreich, 9. und 10. Dezember 2004). 
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Process just made a short reference to it in a subordinate clause or were engaged with 
questions of national implementation. 
13.4.1.3 How much ex-post parliamentarian control exists? 
 
Taking into account the findings presented above and the ones that come below, it 
becomes evident that real ex-post control by parliamentarians requires sound 
information about the procedures at the European level. Since parliamentarians face a 
limited chance to participate in the process and suffer from an information deficit 
compared to their minister engaged with matters of Bologna real ex-post control is in 
fact very difficult to enforce although indeed possible. This can also be observed on the 
low amount of parliamentary debates that engage with issues connected to the Bologna 
initiative. Altogether it can be concluded that the chances for ex-post parliamentarian 
control are very limited due to the reasons presented above191. 
13.4.2 Participation and Responsiveness 
13.4.2.1 To what degree concerned citizens have equal access and a chance to 
participate? 
 
In the beginning it is important to define who these concerned citizens are in this 
context. Taking the action lines of the different declarations and communiqués as points 
of reference it can be concluded that persons that are affiliated with institutions of 
higher education form the core of citizens that are directly affected. It follows that this 
definition encompasses students of universities as well as for example lecturers at 
Fachhochschulen. Additionally it is necessary to make two important distinctions: First 
between the decision-making process at the European level and the process of 
implementation at the national level192. Second the temporal component has to be taken 
into consideration too, when analyzing the possibility of access and chance to 
participate. An additional, but maybe finally not that pronounced distinction could be 
made between different groups of people. For a condensed visualization of these 
distinctions and the main findings see Table 7. 
 
                                                 
191 This does not mean that no events of strict ex-post parliamentarian control have taken place in any of 
the Bologna member states. Nonetheless this cannot be analyzed in the context of this dissertation. 
192 Here a further distinction could be made between different issues (e.g. quality assurance, degree 
structure, etc.). The 2007 version of Eurydices’ assessment of national higher education structures for 
example included an assessment of student participation in national quality assurance bodies (Eurydice 
2007a).  
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Table 7: Citizens’ access and chances to participate 
 Start of Process Bologna-Regime settled 
European decision-making 
 
 
Depending on group – 
generally low 
 
Stakeholder associations 
have a voice in the process 
National implementation 
 
 
Depending on country 
and/or Institution of HE 
 
Depending on country 
and/or Institution of HE 
 
 
Since already the Sorbonne Declaration had been a mainly inter-ministerial agreement 
one cannot regard the first stage of the whole process as a prime example of a 
participative bottom-up initiative, quite the contrary. With the exception of a 
representative of EUA’s predecessor organizations, all other actors involved in the 
preparation and drafting process prior to the conference at Bologna were governmental 
officials from the national ministries responsible for matters of higher education 
(Interview 6: 20-25). The first TRENDS study (Haug/Kirstein 1999) commissioned by 
EUA’s predecessor organizations did also constitute a relevant and influential 
contribution in this preparation phase (see: Chapter 11.2.1). At the conference itself 
universities’ representatives could no more take influence on the decisions taken by the 
ministers193. Additionally the largest group concerned of the changes involved in the 
Bologna Declaration was neither involved in the preparation nor at the conference itself. 
This was explicitly stated in the so-called "Bologna Students Joint Declaration" from 
1999: 
 
"Finally, we would like to state that we deeply regret that the students were not involved 
with the drafting of the Sorbonne and Bologna Declarations and to the definition of 
their objectives even though we are one of the most important populations concerned by 
the potential reforms. Transparency is needed in the process. Otherwise it will only 
create unnecessary opposition and confusion. We hope that in future discussions, 
national unions of students will be associated on the national level and that ESIB" 
(ESIB 1999) 
 
In the Student Göteborg Declaration things sound slightly different, although it still 
mentions that students had to "invite themselves to the Ministerial meeting" (ESIB 
                                                 
193 Following a conference proceedings, universities felt even duped by ministers hurrying ahead (Nägeli 
1999). 
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2001) in Bologna. Here a "growing recognition of the student input in the process" is 
diagnosed, since student "participation in the Bologna Process is one of the key steps 
towards permanent and more formalized student involvement in all decision making 
bodies and discussion for dealing with higher education at the European level. ESIB – 
the National Unions of Students in Europe, being the representative of students on the 
European level, must be included in the future follow-up of the Bologna Declaration" 
(ESIB 2001). The Prague Communiqué finally mentions the need and desirability of 
student involvement in the establishment of the European Higher Education Area and 
involves an invitation of student’s stakeholder organizations to the follow-up process 
(Prague Communiqué 2001). It is important at this point to mention that this 
involvement – that took place at a rather late point – does not mean that the main 
problems of participation are solved. Although ESU ( = ESIB; see: 1.3 List of 
abbreviations) claims to be the representative of students on the European level this 
does not mean that students from every country participating in the Bologna Process are 
really represented, since not every national student union is a member of ESU. 
Furthermore ESU does not represent students that are not members of their national 
student unions194. Similar matters of fact can be concluded for other stakeholder 
associations that participate as consultants in the meantime in the Bologna follow up 
framework. Interestingly Business Europe, an organization that cannot be regarded as 
representing interests of citizens encompassed by the definition given above, has been 
also invited to participate195.  
 
Clearly the level of national implementation does not stand in the center of the analysis 
here. Therefore some general remarks and conclusions from existing studies engaged 
with these questions will be summarized in the following. In various studies, low 
student participation196 (and even "disrespect of the student opinions" (ESIB 2005)) 
concerning the involvement in the national implementation of the Bologna goals (e.g. 
curricula reforms) is moaned: "Although there has been some progress regarding the 
student involvement in quality assurance, the participation of students in shaping the 
                                                 
194 For example students at Austrian Fachhochschulen were not part of the ÖH the Austrian student union 
until 2007. This changed with in the meantime with the amendment of the Fachhochschul-Studiengesetz 
(BGBl 340/1993 §4a) 
195 This could also serve as a proof for criticisms stressing the creeping marketization of higher education 
in Europe (see: Chapter 8.4). 
196 The 2003 TRENDS report estimates that at "63% of universities in Bologna signatory countries, 
students have been formally involved in the Bologna Process, i.e. through participation in the senate or 
council or at faculty/departmental level" (Reichert/Tauch 2003: 25). 
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EHEA and in higher education governance in more general terms is still far from being 
sufficient and well-established in most Bologna countries. The findings reveal that since 
2005 there has hardly been any improvement on the involvement of students. In some 
cases, the situation even worsened197 as compared to 2005" (ESIB 2007).  
 
Altogether student (non-) participation is at least well documented, which cannot be 
stated for the other groups. One study available has been undertaken by Gornitzka and 
Langfeldt (2005) for Education International198 among its member organizations in 
Europe. This study had the aim to gain comparative data on perceptions and views of 
European academics concerning the Bologna Process. Concerning participation at the 
national level a mixed picture emerged – as suspected above – including no 
participation at all to advanced forms of participation (Gornitzka/Langfeldt 2005: 13). 
This study also underlines the expectation formulated at the beginning of this chapter 
that "the impact of [EI’s] organization’s work with the Bologna Process has varied 
according to the stage of the processes. Its role has been central when the details of the 
national implementation have been worked out; while the impact has been much more 
moderate at the stage when the overarching, principled decisions were made" 
(Gornitzka/Langfeldt 2005: 17). 
 
Summing up the main findings, it can be concluded that the chance to participate and to 
get access for concerned citizens starkly differs in the different stages of the process. 
Whereas during the preparation phase and at the main conference no real citizen 
participation was possible, in the meantime representatives of the main stakeholder 
associations participate on a regular basis. Two restrictions have to be made here: first 
the main framework and the most far-reaching reforms have been decided in the first 
stage without much citizen participation. Now that this central framework is settled, 
participation – which means more or less discussion about details – is possible. Second 
participation at the concrete implementation stage cannot be assessed here. Nonetheless 
it can be stated that there the chances to participate differ from country to country, 
respectively between institutions of higher education and that does also not take place in 
                                                 
197 This report explicitly mentions Austria as an example, where the situation has worsened (ESIB 2007), 
mainly due to the invention of a new university law in 2002 (Universitätsgesetz 2002). See also the 
chapter about Austria in: (ESIB 2005). 
198 Education International is a global union federation composed of 348 member organizations from 169 
countries (http://www.ei-ie.org/). 
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either case. As the example concerning the student’s stakeholder organization ESU, that 
does also not represent all the students concerned from the Bologna Process, has shown: 
equal access for all citizens concerned is not asserted. 
13.4.2.2 How much response is there to societal demands? 
 
It is very difficult to assess the proportion of actions taken that is due to societal 
demands. Again one can make a distinction between the national and the European level 
and between the beginning of the whole process and later stages (see: Table 7). 
Nonetheless taken altogether one can surely state that from the beginning on the 
Bologna initiative had been an elite-driven process and surely not a direct response to 
popular demands. Since there is evidence that this European initiative was even planned 
to be used to foster reforms at the national level and to overcome domestic resistance 
(see: Chapter 11.1.1) it can be concluded that at this point of the process the initiative 
even ran diametrically opposed societal demands. One should also not forget that the 
agenda was strongly influenced by a small group of people, mainly experts in this 
policy field. Hence one could maybe also identify some kind of epistemic community to 
be at work here (Interviews 3:355, Interview 6: 15-20). If anything the Bologna 
initiative was demanded by ministers their officials and some experts, not from the 
society. Since the Bologna goals and the process as a whole were not very much known 
in a broader public in the first years after the 1999 ministerial conference, societal 
demands did not very much focus on this topic. Concerning the implementation of the 
agreed upon action lines, especially the tiered study-structure it is also not the case that 
it was broadly welcomed, especially not in the country from which the reform process 
mainly originated, France (see: THES, 29.04.2005).  
 
Anyhow, viewed from another level things maybe are not that clear. The Bologna 
reform initiative cannot only be discussed concerning its measures that have to be 
implemented. Including the main goals and intentions may make all the difference. 
Since lacking competitiveness of European universities, decreasing employability of 
graduates and also concerns about the length of studies did play a role in the beginning 
one could also regard this initiative as being a part of a larger puzzle. Increasing the 
competitiveness of Europe with this initiative can be of course regarded as one reaction 
(maybe not a perfect one) taken by politicians to societal demand. From the discussion 
above it follows, that the broad goals and intentions that stand behind the Bologna 
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Process can of course be regarded derived from societal demands, but this does not 
apply to the concrete implementation of the Bologna-Regime. Response also requires 
public debate, which is discussed below. 
13.4.2.3 How much real public debate about the content exists? 
 
Since the whole process is organized intergovernmentally public debates will be also 
structured accordingly. Hence it is not my intention to search for a kind of European 
public debate, which would presuppose the existence of a real European public sphere. 
There exist discussions inside of the transnational stakeholder associations but this is 
not what is meant in this context. Furthermore a real public debate can only arise if one 
precondition is met in advance: At least a minimum of common knowledge about the 
cornerstones of a reform initiative has to exist. This knowledge requires transparency, 
information and media coverage (see below). Clearly it is not possible in this 
dissertation to try to identify a public debate and its content in all of the Bologna 
member states. Nonetheless an analysis of selected media that makes up the data source 
for one of the questions in the next section reveals that in the first years of the process 
not even a specialist debate in the newspapers did exist. Additionally there did 
apparently not exist solid information about the basics of this initiative. Therefore it is 
not possible to identify a real public debate about the content of this initiative.  
13.4.2.4 To which extent do parliamentarians participate in the decision-making 
process? 
 
Apart from the first stage of this initiative where only a restricted number of actors had 
the chance to participate, as discussed above the process did stay to a large extent an 
inter-ministerial one. Hence mainly officials from the national ministries responsible for 
matters of higher education (in some cases replaced by well-informed and strongly 
involved members of national universities or rectors’ associations) and representatives 
of the organizations involved in the follow-up participate199. National parliamentarians 
are not regularly involved in this decision making process at the European level. This 
does also apply to member of the European Parliament. The EP is not involved at all 
concerning Bologna and has to rely on information by the European Commission. When 
the Commission supports projects (in the framework of the Bologna Process) they 
                                                 
199 See for example the lists of participants in the BFUG meetings, that can be found on the official 
Bologna secretariat website (e.g.: 
http://www.dfes.gov.uk/londonbologna/uploads/documents/BFUG11Listofparticipants1704.pdf) 
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inform the EP, which in course of this exchange has a chance to deliver its opinions 
(Interview 3: 315-340). One should in this context also not forget the fact that the 
Bologna Process does not take place in a vacuum totally outside the sphere of European 
Union politics. Some Bologna action lines and measures are tightly related to actions 
taken inside the EU200. At the national level parliamentarians are included in the 
implementation process, as far as their approval is needed – which is not in every 
country the case. Nonetheless one should not forget here that parliamentarians’ actual 
influence is often reduced to accepting or refusing the legislative proposals (see Chapter 
13.2.4). Summing up parliamentarians chance to participate is very limited. They also 
face an information deficit compared to their governments or at least the respective 
minister responsible for higher education, which makes it even more difficult to actively 
engage in this process. This opens up the chance for the national ministers to use this 
two-level environment in favor of their reform attempts. 
13.4.2.5 Is the deliberation open concerning the policy substance? 
 
Taking altogether the findings presented in the chapters 10 and 11 of this dissertation, it 
can only be concluded that the cornerstones and main goals of the Bologna-Regimes 
were already fixed from the beginning on. After the Sorbonne Declaration the invention 
of a tiered system – which represents the one big novelty concerning the substance of 
the whole process – was no more open to real challenge. The details of this framework 
were in the following of course open to deliberation, concretion and change but this 
does not apply to the basics.  
13.4.2.6 Are final decisions reached by arguing and convincing or by bargaining? 
 
Since I do not have access to the decision making process in this Bologna-Regime or 
concrete data about this aspect it is not possible to assess the decision making process 
concerning this question. Additionally it is generally not very easy to draw a clear 
distinction between arguing and convincing and bargaining. Anyway, what can be said 
is that in the BFUG hardly ever voting takes place. Hence decisions are mainly reached 
by arguing. Effectively, only the place where the next conference will take place and 
new board members are subject to voting (Interview 4: 165-170). Nonetheless even this 
                                                 
200 Take the example of a European register for quality assurance agencies, which is included in the 2005 
Bergen Communiqué (Bergen Communiqué 2005) as well as in a Recommendation of the Parliament and 
the Council from 15. February 2006 (2006/143/EC), that builds upon a Council Recommendation from 
1998 ((EC) No 561/98). Hence for some issues a system of cross-referencing can be stated. 
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cannot be taken as an indicator for bargaining, since voting may also just be a ritual. 
Two further remarks have to be made in this context: First, in the beginning of this 
initiative not everything (concerning the content) was open to deliberation (see passage 
above). To some extent it was a choice between joining or not joining this initiative. 
This does also apply to new joining members. Second, since there do not exist 
enforcement procedures that ensure appropriate implementation of the reached 
decisions it can be assumed that the Bologna-Regime is not the appropriate forum for 
rounds of negotiations hard as bone201. 
13.4.3 Transparency 
13.4.3.1 Tractability of process and results 
 
When you are searching for the text of the Bologna Declaration in Polish, wondering 
what the last official Bologna seminar was all about or striving to get to know the year 
when Cyprus joined the process this is an easy task for you in 2008 (at least if you 
speak English and have internet-access). All you have to do is just visit the official 
Bologna Process webpage that is regularly updated by the Bologna secretariat. Leaving 
a time machine in the year 1999, even gathering basic information about the Bologna 
Process becomes a specialist’s task. In the next section questions of media coverage are 
independently discussed but it is still legitimate at this place to mention, that the 
Bologna Process was accompanied by an astonishing lack of media coverage. In the 
preparation phase – before one can really speak of a real (Bologna) process – things 
were much worse. Only a small group of experts, involved in the preparation of the 
conference and the new declaration knew what was really going on (see chapter 
11.4.2.1. preparation and reformation), since apparently not even all of the ministers 
convened at the university of Bologna really knew what they were signing (Interview 6: 
66-68, Interview 7: 121-123).  
 
After the meeting at Bologna the situation concerning information about the process and 
the results became slightly better. Nonetheless information about this initiative and the 
original text of the declaration itself were only available at some of the national 
ministries’ webpages, at some national rectors’ conferences’ webpages and on 
                                                 
201 What use is it to insist on one concrete standpoint (especially since the main framework has already be 
settled and is no more open to debate) when the implementation bases on voluntary action? See: (Schäfer 
2005).   
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webpages of some stakeholders associations202. Hence information was not very 
widespread and did not reach a broader public (apparently not even a broader academic 
– and therefore directly affected - public) in the first years following the signing of the 
declaration. The fact that even after 2004 (see section below) newspaper articles 
engaged with just explaining the most fundamental basics of this initiative additionally 
supports this claim. Summing up it was not very easy for the public to retrace the 
process and its results. This opacity did also lead to misunderstandings concerning the 
role of the EU and the Bologna-Regime’s legal obligation. One could suspect that these 
were not always unwanted or accidentally203.  
 
Since the ministerial meeting in Berlin the problems as described above do no more 
fully apply. Already before the conference took place, a website (http://ww.bologna-
berlin2003.de) was set up that contained the main documents and information as well as 
links to the participants204. Since then, prior to every conference an own website was set 
up205, covering all the important information (main documents, calendar of events, etc.), 
as well as additional information and news. Due to the fact that in the meantime loads of 
additional information about the Bologna Process and its results can be found on 
multiple websites206 this information deficit has decreased. Since the main decision 
have already been taken shortly before the Bologna conference in 1999 and until the 
Berlin meeting in 2003, this does however not change the unsatisfactory overall 
impression concerning the traceability of the decision process and it’s results.  
 
                                                 
202 See the link list in the document: (Confederation of EU Rectors' Conferences/Association of European 
Universities (CRE) 2000) 
203 For example, the former rector of the University of Regensburg Alf Zimmer did warn against action 
taken by the ECJ in case of non-implementing the tiered system according to Bologna (Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 23.1.2004). Even if this was rather due to strategic reasons (fast implementation?) and not due to 
ignorance, the fact that this initiative lends itself to such strategic misinterpretations and manipulative 
misuses points to possible problematic consequences of lacking information and transparency. 
Concerning the question of legal bindingness – in fact it is not binding – the same game was played. 
Therefore the lacking transparency of the Bologna Declarations’ legal scopes that invited for strategic 
interpretations may enhance "the perception that Europeanisation leads to a democratic deficit" (Hackl 
2001a). See also (Brunkhorst 2006) on this point.   
204 See: Minutes of the 2nd Meeting of the Bologna Preparatory Group 
(http://www.ects.ch/docs/lehre/bologna/europa/wichtige/bpg1212.pdf) 
205 http://www.bologna-berlin2003.de/ => http://www.bologna-bergen2005.no/ => 
http://www.dfes.gov.uk/londonbologna/ => http://www.ond.vlaanderen.be/hogeronderwijs/bologna/ 
206 This ranges from national ministerial information-platforms (e.g.  
http://www.bmwf.gv.at/submenue/euinternationales/bolognaprozess/) to studies and reports published by 
stakeholder associations like ESU (e.g. http://www.esu-
online.org/documents/publications/bwse2007.pdf.) 
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13.4.3.2  Media Coverage 
 
Concerning the news coverage and the presence of the Bologna Process (see: Figure 9) 
in the media two main conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of selected 
newspapers207. Firstly, the preparation phase as well as the two years following the 
conference at Bologna show a considerable and amazingly nearly complete lack of 
articles engaged with a discussion of, or even sound information about this issue. Even 
the weekly-published Times Higher Education Supplement, a magazine specialized on 
matters of higher education that published as expected always the highest number of 
Bologna-relevant articles, did only contain six relevant articles in the year 1999. This 
very low news coverage begins to change slowly from the year 2002 onwards, although 
still then the Bologna reform process – and increasingly its implementation – is 
apparently of only minor relevance. It is interesting in this context, that even in the year 
2004 and 2005 the fundamental basics of the Bologna Process (main goals, participants) 
are explained to the obviously uninformed readership (e.g. Der Standard, 5.6.2004, 
8.10.2005). It is regarded as being understandable that one has never heard of the 
"cryptic term" Bologna Process and its content (Die Welt 15.4.2004, 16.10.2004).   
 
Secondly, mainly actual domestic issues shape the discussion in the newspaper articles 
and their frequency. One could assume that the events at the European level, the 
ministerial conferences (Prague 2001, Berlin 2003, etc.) would be accompanied by an 
increase in corresponding newspaper articles. But this is simply not the case. In fact, 
national developments and debates about issues of higher education reform influence 
the news coverage by a far larger degree. Evidence for this claim can be attached for 
example to the very strong increase in the number of articles published in The Guardian 
in 2003. Due to this increase the number of articles considerably exceeds the 
corresponding number in the Austrian and German newspapers. The reason for the 
increase is the publication and the following heated debate about the so-called White 
Paper engaged with the future of higher education in the United Kingdom (White Paper 
                                                 
207 For the purpose of this question three quality newspapers have been systematically scanned for articles 
(reports, analysis and comments), containing a discussion, information or at least a cross reference to the 
Bologna reform process. Although the results are not representative for all participating countries, the 
selection of newspapers still allows drawing some conclusions. Since newspapers from Germany and the 
UK (two Sorbonne signatories) and Austria (starkly involved, holding EU Presidency in the preparation 
of the Bologna conference) have been used it is righteous to assume that the media presence of the 
Bologna Process exceeds the presence in newspapers from other countries. For comparison the Times 
Higher Education Supplement – a magazine specialized on issues of higher education that is published on 
a weekly basis – has been included in the analysis and graph.  
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2003), that was presented to the parliament in January 2003. Besides this mainly 
national discussions – that of course make reference to the Bologna Process otherwise 
they would not have been included – events at the European level do only to a very 
small degree stimulate reporting. So, the German newspaper Die Welt did contain the 
majority of its 2003 articles on the Bologna Process following the ministerial 
conference in Berlin (Die Welt 19.-21.09.2003). Interestingly the same does not apply 
to the ministerial meeting in London in 2005 and the Guardian’s reporting. 
 
Figure 9: Bologna Process – Media presence 
 
 
13.4.3.3 Monitoring, reporting and verification (in the implementation phase) 
 
Clearly a process based on peer-pressure, naming- and blaming needs reliable, 
comparable data. Hence the preparation of corresponding monitoring reports is 
indispensable for the success of such a process. Since the Bologna-Regime does not 
include any other enforcement procedures than the ones described above, one can 
expect a well functioning monitoring and reporting procedure to be in place. And indeed 
there exists a group of people who is responsible for the preparation of so-called 
stocktaking reports to be presented at the biannual ministerial conferences. In the next 
section I will look a little closer at this stocktaking exercise. Since the main arguments 
are already included and discussed in chapter 10.4. I will focus on the central aspects 
that are of relevance here to avoid unnecessary redundancy.  
 
Taken literally the Bologna Declaration itself burdens the national ministers responsible 
for higher education convened, with the assessment of "the progress achieved and the 
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new steps to be taken" (Bologna Declaration 1999). Other (independent) measures to 
monitor progress were not included in the original plan. Therefore before the ministerial 
conference in Berlin in 2003 only background reports, summing up the outcomes of the 
main events at the European level, rather than analyzing the progress at the national 
level were prepared. These reports (Lourtie 2001; Zgaga 2003) did not contain 
comparable data themselves. This does not mean that no assessment of the progress did 
take place at all, but not systematically and not by clear appointment. National efforts to 
comply with the Bologna guidelines and the overall effort were partly assessed by 
EUA’s TRENDS studies as well as EURYDICE’s reports.  
 
As already mentioned official stocktaking and reporting did not take place until the 
ministerial conference in Berlin 2003. There the establishment of an own stocktaking 
exercise was decided with the goal of measuring the mid-term progress until the 
conference in Bergen in 2005. One point that is problematic in this context: The main 
data sources on which the whole stocktaking exercise is based are national reports 
submitted by the participating countries, although some additional data stems from 
EURYDICE, EUA and ESIB reports too (for more on the different methods of data 
collection of these reports, and the problems entailed see chapter 10.4). Nonetheless the 
main data sources are the national reports. These are not always submitted on time, and 
do not always directly answer to the questions that are asked (Bologna Process 
Stocktaking 2007). Taken altogether the whole stocktaking procedure strongly relies on 
reliable and valid national reports, which makes a certain degree of window-dressing 
possible and the effectiveness of peer-pressure based on these reports unlikely. 
 
13.5 Summary 
 
Returning to the main intention of this chapter – that is the elaboration of the Bologna-
Regimes democratic legitimacy and quality – one can now summarize the reasonable 
judgments that have been discussed above.  
 
Altogether a rather mixed picture emerges. Problems of accountability have turned out 
to be not the worst deficits in this regime. Especially the ministers involved can be held 
responsible by their national parliaments, even though this may be difficult due to 
information asymmetries, lack of transparency and their unique position in this two-
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level environment. Rather problematic in this context is the strong involvement of the 
European Commission and the overall EU-bias that had not been present from the 
beginning of the initiative but did increasingly creep in. Chances for real ex-post 
parliamentarian control are very limited especially due to the already mentioned 
informational deficit. The very low number of parliamentary debates that really engage 
with a discussion of the results supports this claim.  
 
Participation of concerned citizens heavily depends on which stage of the process 
(temporal component), which level (European or national) and to a lesser degree which 
group of people one is looking at. Especially in the beginning – during the preparation 
phase and at the main conference at Bologna – no real citizen participation was 
possible. In the meantime however at least the main stakeholder associations regularly 
participate and they also have a voice in this process. Due to the internal organization of 
these stakeholder associations equal access for all citizens concerned cannot be asserted. 
As an additional restraint it has to be noted that especially the main framework and the 
far-reaching changes have been decided in the first stage without much citizen 
involvement. This also points to the problem that this process altogether does not depict 
a direct response to societal demands but is rather an elite-driven initiative that’s policy 
substance was already fixed in the beginning and not very open to discussion. Real 
public debates could also not be identified. 
 
One of the most problematic aspects of the Bologna-Regime concerns the overall 
transparency. Especially in the beginning of the whole process a nearly complete lack of 
information and media coverage made it very difficult to trace this process without 
specialist knowledge. Monitoring and reporting activities were also not institutionalized 
on a regular basis at the beginning. Fortunately things have improved since then. 
 
From a more general point of view one could now come to the conclusion that since the 
whole initiative is nothing binding, government’s accountability is formally secured and 
concerned citizens can now also participate through their stakeholder associations 
everything is finally fine in this regime concerning democratic legitimacy. Besides the 
considerable European Union bias that discriminates participants from non-EU 
countries nonetheless not everything is finally fine. Ministers had the chance and also 
some time for their higher education reforms following the Bologna conference, which 
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had additionally not been a meeting responding to demand from society. Non-existent 
citizen participation, low media coverage and informational deficits made it possible to 
start a clear top-down reform process confronting the uninformed and not involved with 
a European reform agenda of which nobody really knew if it was binding or not. Now 
that the main reforms have taken place and the Bologna reform process is relatively on 
track problems of transparency have decreased and stakeholder associations can also 
participate. Hence the inclusion of this temporal dimension sheds a different light onto 
the Bologna-Regime concerning questions of democratic legitimacy and quality, and it 
makes us aware of possible democratic deficits due to an internationalization of 
governance and the need to look very closely at the action of governments situated on 
more than just the national level. 
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14 Conclusion 
 
It has been the aim of this dissertation to come to explanations for the emergence of the 
Bologna Process and for its institutional form. Here especially the questions why this 
initiative does take place outside the EU framework and why this cooperation is only 
soft coordinated, stood in the center of the analysis. This research agenda was 
complemented by an assessment of the democratic legitimacy and quality of this 
institution. Theoretically the first part of this dissertation does mainly build upon regime 
theory. Since regime theory does to large extent neglect questions of democratic 
legitimacy the respective part of the analysis does widen the theoretical spectrum and 
also builds upon the concept of democratic audit. Hypotheses were derived and 
developed from these theories that guided the whole research process. From a 
methodological point of view it can be stated that this research project bases on a single 
case study. Besides primary data like the official communiqués data stemming from 
expert interviews with experts in this policy field and from a comprehensive e-mail 
survey were analyzed and used for answering the research questions. Altogether these 
findings are broadly discussed and also already summarized in the respective chapters. 
Therefore the following of this chapter focuses on a discussion of the empirical and 
theoretical contributions of this research project. Since it is not always very easy to 
discuss them separately the bulk of these issues are included in the section engaged with 
the theoretical contributions. Finally avenues for further research and some remarks 
concerning the future prospects of the Bologna Process itself will be made. 
 
14.1 Empirical contributions 
 
When this research project started, only a few articles and working papers did engage 
with the analysis of the Bologna Process. Hardly any of those could provide an 
explanation for the emergence of this process that was based on empirical data and prior 
theoretical reflection. Concerning the form and democratic legitimacy of this process no 
research did exist at all. Although this has changed a little in the meantime for the first 
point, questions concerning the form of this initiative to coordinate higher education 
policy at the European level are still awaiting their answers. Hence this dissertation does 
especially contribute to the empirical understanding of the Bologna Process by 
providing a systematic, theory-based analysis of the causes that lead to this initiative 
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and of its following institutional development. Above all the latter one is important in 
this context, since this research project is the first one that engages with the analysis of 
the form of this regime. Apart from the case itself another small piece has been added to 
the puzzle of understanding the dynamics of cooperation in different policy fields in 
Europe. Finally it is demonstrated in this dissertation that questions of democratic 
legitimacy and quality of a distinct regime can not only be discussed theoretically apart 
from the concrete case. Instead it is possible to make an assessment that is based on 
certain indicators and benchmarks that are applied to the concrete case. This is no claim 
that it is possible to easily measure the democratic quality of an institution but that these 
value judgements can at least be informed by empirical observations.  
 
14.2 Theoretical contributions 
 
Again, it could be demonstrated in this dissertation that explaining the emergence of 
institutions at the international level deserves a lot more than just an ex-post focus on 
the function and functioning of these institutions. The same does apply to an 
interpretation that treats the emergence of these institutions only as logical derivations 
of existing salient problems quasi as functional solutions. Hence the analysis of the 
genesis of the Bologna-Regime provided in this dissertation tries to avoid simplistic and 
unicausal explanations. Therefore pre-existing trends and problems in the policy field of 
higher education as well as the interests of strategically acting governments have been 
included in the discussion, too. It could be shown that it was in the beginning above all 
the parallel of interests among a small group of European ministers responsible for 
higher education, who aimed at widening their room for maneuver concerning the 
enforcement of their preferred domestic policies, that started the initiative. Like in other 
forms of governance at the European level governmental exploitation of the advantages 
provided by a two-level environment and the possibility to obtain leverage for domestic 
reform or at least a helpful European excuse could be observed. Clearly their approach 
can only be properly understood in the wider temporal context. Increasing 
interdependences in higher education but also in related policy areas – inside Europe as 
well as beyond – a steadily growing student population and the increasing importance of 
the so-called higher education market did enhance pressure exerted on their national 
systems of higher education. Not to speak of issues and problems situated inside the 
individual national higher education systems like increasing length of studies, 
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decreasing overall competitiveness under conditions of resistance against reform due to 
path-dependences or a specific allocation of rights and duties. Already existing 
European initiatives and cooperation in this policy field together with experts' 
recommendation for a common solutions framework reinforced these existing 
dynamics.  
 
From a regime theoretical point of view it is on the one hand very interesting to note 
that especially the need for entrepreneurial leadership in the creation of a regime could 
be observed here very well. On the other hand the assumption that a regime is created 
mainly by a core group of actors with the strongest ex ante power position could not be 
supported in this case. Although a group of powerful actors exerting disproportionate 
influence in the regime building process could be identified, it could nonetheless be 
shown that other actors involved were not only additional but influential and necessary 
in this phase.  
 
It had also been the aim of this research project to shed some light on the actual 
dynamics of cooperation in a distinct policy field at the European level. Here especially 
the question why this initiative to coordinate European higher education did take place 
outside the European Union framework – understood in this context as the logical focal 
institution – stood in the center of interest. Put shortly, it had been demonstrated that not 
only the lack of treaty base or the transboundary nature of the coordination problem – 
many issues of higher education also transcend the borders of the European Union – can 
be employed as explanations. Instead, especially the institutional preferences of the 
most powerful actors, supported by most other actors in the regime building process 
could be identified as crucial. The conjecture that asymmetry concerning membership in 
the EU and the group of actors aiming to coordinate their higher education policies did 
play a role in the dismissal of the EU as the appropriate institutional solution did not 
prove true, since it turned out that – although the initiative did take place outside the EU 
– it was nonetheless above all EU member states that were in control. Hence it is also 
important not to underestimate the role EU member states play in the process and the 
role and influence of the European Commission. These findings again demonstrate that 
besides the classic Community method also other forms of cooperation exist at the 
European level that can additionally not be regarded as a pre-step to further integration. 
Nonetheless the intense Commission involvement and the reliance on patterns borrowed 
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from inside the EU context – like the role of the Presidency in the follow-up – show that 
the borders are not that clear-cut but have become blurred. Since this fuzziness does 
also apply to the concept of Europeanization it may be eventually legitimate to speak of 
a Europeanization of higher education, as a mere description not an explanation. 
Interestingly the concept of path dependence may not only be applied to account for the 
stickiness and reform resistance of national systems of higher education but also to 
explain the slowly but steadily increase of European Union influence concerning the 
Bologna Process. Even without formal mandate coordination concerning a lot of higher 
education matters and related issues take place in the EU framework, which may 
account for the creation of self-reinforcing sequences.   
 
Interestingly the findings to the question why the cooperation in the framework of the 
Bologna-regime does only base on soft coordination did above all point to some 
difficulty for a theory-based explanation. Hence most of the hypotheses applied had to 
be refined or simply did not prove true in this case. Focusing on the main findings it can 
be stated that soft coordination has proven to have more merits than just cover 
governments' inability to agree on concrete common goals. Nor is it the fear of 
governments about unintended consequences due to uncertainty, as often mentioned in 
theoretical concepts that could be detected as the explanation for their preference of soft 
coordination. What could be shown in this dissertation anyhow, is that on the one hand 
governments employ soft coordination to widen their room for maneuver and on the 
other hand that it is especially the powerful founding members of a regime – the so-
called enactors – that decide about the form of this institution. In the case of the 
Bologna-regime they opted for soft coordination.   
 
Clearly questions that engage with the form or design of regimes are very common in 
the respective theoretical literature. This can be traced back not at least to the fact that 
they are just at the surface merely technical or boring. Far from this, clearly the form of 
a regime also entails consequences concerning the distribution of gains or losses as well 
as implications for the democratic legitimacy of governance. Whilst the first ones – 
questions of distribution – are well embedded in the neoliberal and realist regime theory 
tradition and therefore regularly taken up, regime theory largely neglects effects on 
democracy and possible democratic deficits. This disregard is regrettable, since 
governance beyond national borders is increasingly becoming important, not at least 
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due to the fact that many issues cannot more be handed by a single state alone. One part 
of this dissertation has already shortly discussed some of the most salient problems and 
deficits of democracy in this context. It has also been discussed that the interaction of 
democratically elected governmental representatives at the international level does not 
necessarily prevent the emergence of democratic shortcomings. Since regime theory 
does not provide a useful framework for this kind of analysis a framework for analysis 
has been developed in this dissertation mainly building on the literature engaged with 
democratic auditing.  
 
For the concrete case, the Bologna-regime it could be shown that above all the inclusion 
of the temporal dimension does unveil many problematic aspects and deficits 
concerning the democratic legitimacy and quality of governance. Especially the first 
phase in which the establishment of this regime, the development of its main principles, 
norms and rules took place, was marked by several problematic aspects ranging from 
non-existent citizen participation, to low media coverage and informational deficits that 
made it possible to start a clear elite driven, top-down reform process confronting the 
uninformed and not involved with a European reform agenda of which nobody really 
knew if it was binding or not. After this first important phase of the whole process in 
which the main decisions were taken the time to allow for a little more democracy had 
come: Problems of transparency decreased and the participation of at least a certain 
amount of citizens concerned through their stakeholder associations is now partially 
secured. Taken altogether it could be demonstrated that the accountability of 
governmental representatives is at least formally secured although they are surely 
favored against their principles – the national parliaments – due to information 
asymmetries, the low overall transparency and their privileged position in this two-level 
environment.  
 
Summing up these findings it can be concluded that regime building processes should 
not be only discussed concerning their effectivity and problem-solving capacities but 
also from a standpoint that includes questions of democratic legitimacy and quality as 
well. Besides the importance of including the temporal dimension that could be asserted 
in this dissertation especially the need to look closely at the action of governments 
situated on more than just one level – and therefore equipped with the possibility to 
exploit this two-level environment – could be demonstrated.  
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This dissertation makes especially three contributions to a comprehensive theoretical 
understanding of actual dynamics in the policy field of higher education and to a further 
development of critical theory-based policy analysis in general:  
 
First of all, it could be demonstrated that the application of regime theory – a strand 
of theory usually used in International Relations – to a policy field in which it has 
not been used before to my knowledge is not only possible but a fruitful proceeding 
that helps to avoid and overcome shortcomings of other theoretical approaches that 
have been regularly used to similar cases. Especially the strong intergovernmental 
character of the Bologna Process – that has admittedly decreased in the meantime – 
with all its implications is embedded in regime theory and could therefore also be 
demonstrated very well in this case. Clearly this focus on governmental actors has 
its deficits too. Hence the role of experts in the agenda shaping process and their 
problem solving contributions do not stand in the center of analysis. Here theoretical 
approaches that build upon the concept of epistemic communities are maybe better 
suited to go into those details. Nonetheless non-governmental actors have not been 
neglected in this analysis, as the hypothesis engaged with entrepreneurial leadership 
clearly demonstrates. A very helpful additional contribution of regime theory 
concerns its usefulness in providing a conceptual framework and dividing the 
process into different stages. Taken altogether this surely is one main strength of 
this approach that should not be undervalued.  
 
Second, it could be demonstrated that an analysis that primarily aims at the 
explanation of a certain case can be useful accomplished with the combination of 
different theoretical approaches rather than just using a single one. Besides regime 
theoretical approaches stemming from the realist and neoliberal school of thought 
especially the two-level game model and the institutional choice tree that also 
considers the institutional status quo as a crucial factor in the analysis did contribute 
to this analysis. The latter model also helped to link the discussion of existing 
cooperation in European higher education with the explanation of the concrete case 
and to provide a useful theoretical explanation of the European Unions’ role at the 
beginning of the whole process. It could also be shown that the two-level model is a 
very useful theoretical tool, when it comes to explaining the action of governmental 
 158
actors. Altogether it could be demonstrated that the approaches used in this research 
project are better suited to explain the regime building itself than the concrete form 
this regime takes.  
 
Third, a solution to the considerable – and for the critical scientist unsatisfactory – 
neglect of the dark side of cooperation at the international level could be provided in 
this dissertation. Regime theory is not sensitive to problems and deficits of 
democracy. Hence this research project does also contribute to overcome this 
dissatisfactory lack with the development of an assessment scheme that can be used 
to systematically analyze a regime’s democratic quality and come to qualified 
judgments (not measurements!) in the following. Clearly this proceeding is only one 
possible way of approaching the issue of democratic legitimacy and quality. 
Nonetheless I regard this justified proceeding that builds upon existing concepts of 
democratic audit as a vital and important part of this research project. Even if some 
of the evaluation criteria may not be perfect ones, this framework nonetheless 
allows for a systematical assessment of a distinct case, the provision of the overall 
picture concerning its democratic quality and the pointing out of certain problematic 
aspects and deficits. Eventually this auditing framework is open to discussion, 
further development and refinement. It would additionally be very interesting to 
apply the framework – in adapted and refined form – to other cases, and see if 
common patterns can be detected. Besides these considerations that are mainly of 
theoretical interest also practical conclusions and lessons may be drawn by actors 
involved in the policy making process to reduce problems and deficits of 
democracy.  
 
14.3 Future prospects 
 
Clearly this dissertation mainly focused on the European level, not at least due to the 
regime theoretical approach employed. Therefore an in-depth analysis of what has 
happened in the field of higher education policy at the national or even sub-national 
level could not be delivered. Only the part that discusses the agenda formation stage of 
this regime building process partially touches some relevant developments at the 
national level. Hence further research in this policy field and on this case could maybe 
focus a bit more on the developments at the national level. This proceeding would also 
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entail the building upon other theoretical approaches, like those engaged with policy 
convergence for example. As already mentioned the operationalization stage of a regime 
building process does also encompass more than just the European level. Therefore only 
the analysis of the implementation at the national level would unveil if the agreement 
successfully has been transformed into a working social practice finally. The 
observations concerning the national implementation that are presented in the respective 
chapter of this dissertation exemplarily underline the need for further – detailed – 
research. Taken altogether an analysis of the developments and changes that took place 
at the national level and their retroactivity on the European level seems to be a very 
interesting and promising field or further research. Since the so-called European Higher 
Education Area should be completed by the year 2010 it is additional highly advisable 
to independently assess the reforms and actions taken and the overall progress and 
achievements of the Bologna Process.  
 
Interestingly, especially one aspect of this dissertation raises important questions for 
further research: It could be demonstrated that the Bologna-regime as it was planned 
from the beginning on was at least concerning its legal standing strictly separated from 
the European Union. Too much influence of the European Commission should be 
avoided. As has been shown this clear-cut dividing line has become blurred in the 
meantime. The European Commission has become a full member of the follow-up 
process – which has additionally concerning its structure a clear bias towards favoring 
EU member states – and also financially contributes to the overall process. Not only at 
the level of advertising the Bologna Process is marked by the Commission as being part 
of a bigger framework (“Education and Training 2010”) that also integrates the 
Copenhagen process (cooperation in the field of vocational education and training) 
which is situated inside the EU framework. Both contribute according to the 
Commission to the reaching of the Lisbon objectives. Apart from this mere rhetorical 
level close connections and increasing cross-referencing can be detected that also lead 
to concrete actions (e.g. the setup of just one European register of quality assurance 
agencies). Therefore it seems unavoidable to ask how all these developments fit into the 
larger picture of policy making at the European level, how they can be conceptually 
interpreted and theoretically explained, and which effects on the democratic legitimacy 
of governance, both at the national and at the European level can be expected at large. 
Additionally it is of interest to analyze which role soft coordination will finally play in 
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the process of European policy making that is characterized more and more by a 
decreasing integrationist dynamic and the upcoming of alternative modes of 
governance.   
 
Altogether this dissertation did engage with a theory-based, informed analysis from a 
political science perspective of a very recent and dynamic process in a policy field that 
is increasingly and quickly changing. Since this process is far from being finished the 
full amount of changes that it will finally have on the coordination of higher education 
policy at the European level, on the different European systems of higher education, on 
universities and last but not surely not least on students and teachers cannot fully be 
estimated now. One also has to wait and see the consequences that this dynamic 
initiative which started originally solely as a voluntary inter-ministerial agreement will 
have on related fields and if and how the process will proceed after its scheduled finish 
in 2010. Hence from an institutionalist perspective it will be of great interest to watch 
the further development of the structures that have been established at the European 
level. It can be expected that this cooperation will not suddenly end then, since some 
effort has been invested into the establishment of this regime which has in the meantime 
proven its usefulness for fostering national higher education reforms too. Presumably 
the taken line will be continued and the Bologna reform agenda will further broaden, as 
it has steadily since the beginning of this initiative. Following the logic of path-
dependency the reliance on intergovernmental cooperation will continue. However it 
can be estimated that the loose connection to the European Union, especially through 
Commission involvement will persist and maybe even deepen in some fields, which can 
nonetheless not be taken as a sign for an upcoming integration of higher education. 
What surely can be stated is the fact that although the number and interconnectedness of 
institutions, organizations and agencies engaged with matters of higher education at the 
European level has steadily increased in the last decade, the main level where decisions 
are taken in this field is still the national level. Partially national governments or 
ministers may even be strengthened.  
 
Concerning critics of the Bologna Process it has to be noted, that their predictions and 
concerns should be taken seriously. Although I do not share the bulk of these 
pessimistic forecasts, I nonetheless want to express the hope – and this is a final 
personal statement – that all of these recent developments won’t lead to a reduced 
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comprehension of higher education as solely being professional training oriented 
towards the short-term requirements of the labor markets and big companies, for the 
sake of the European competitiveness. Instead it is highly desirable that higher 
educations intrinsic value, its importance as an enabling, emancipatory practice will still 
be recognized and that the possibilities and chances a real common higher education 
space could provide will be deployed for a further shedding of limitations inside Europe 
as well as beyond. 
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15 Appendix 
 
15.1 Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 10: Types of soft law 
 
 
Figure 11: International institutions influencing national higher education policy 
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Figure 12: New Bologna member countries (2003-2005) 
 
 
Source: (Crosier et al. 2007: 71) 
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Table 8: List of primary data208 
 
Declarations and Communiqués adopted by the ministers: 
 
Sorbonne Declaration, 1998: Joint declaration on harmonisation of the architecture of 
the European higher education system by the four ministers in charge for France, 
Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. May 25. Paris, the Sorbonne. 
 
Bologna Declaration, 1999: The European higher education area. Joint declaration of 
the European ministers of education. June 19. Bologna. 
 
Prague Communiqué, 2001: Towards the European higher education area. Communiqué 
of the meeting of European ministers in charge of higher education. May 19. Prague. 
 
Berlin Communiqué, 2003: Realising the European higher education area. Communiqué 
of the conference of ministers responsible for higher education. September 19. Berlin. 
 
Bergen Communiqué, 2005: The European higher education area - achieving the goals. 
Communiqué of the conference of European ministers responsible for higher education. 
May 19-20. Bergen. 
 
London Communiqué, 2007: Towards the European Higher Education Area: responding 
to challenges in a globalised world. Communiqué of the conference of European 
ministers responsible for higher education. May 18. 
 
Progress Reports: 
 
TRENDS I: Haug, Guy/Jette Kirstein, 1999: Trends in learning structures in higher 
education. Project report.  
 
TRENDS II: Haug, Guy/Christian Tauch, 2001: Towards the European higher 
education area: Survey of main reforms from Bologna to Prague. 
 
TRENDS III: Reichert, Sybille/Christian Tauch, 2003: Progress towards the European 
higher education area. Bologna four years after: Steps toward sustainable reform of 
higher education in Europe. 
 
TRENDS IV: Reichert, Sybille/Christian Tauch, 2005: European universities 
implementing  
Bologna. 
 
TRENDS V: Crosier, David/Lewis Purser/Hanne Smidt, 2007: Trends V: Universities 
shaping the European Higher Education Area. An EUA Report.  
 
                                                 
208 All mentioned documents can be found at the official Bologna webpages (the actual as well as the 
former ones) http://www.ond.vlaanderen.be/hogeronderwijs/bologna/, http://www.bologna-
bergen2005.no/, http://www.bologna-berlin2003.de/; the Council of Europe’s webpage 
http://www.coe.int/, and ESIB’s webpage http://www.esib.org/.  
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"Lourtie-Report": Lourtie, Pedro, 2001: Furthering the Bologna Process. Report to the 
ministers of education of the signatory countries. Prague. 
 
"Zgaga-Report": Zgaga, Pavel, 2003: Bologna Process between Prague and Berlin. 
Report to the ministers of education of the signatory countries. Berlin. 
 
Bologna Follow-up Group, 2005: "From Berlin to Bergen". General report of the 
Bologna Follow-up Group to the Conference of European ministers responsible for 
higher education. Oslo. 
 
Bologna Process Stocktaking, 2005: Report from a working group appointed by the 
Bologna Follow-up Group to the Conference of European Ministers Responsible for 
higher education. Bergen. 
 
Zgaga, Pavel, 2006: Looking out: The Bologna Process in a global setting. On the 
"external dimension" of the Bologna Process. Oslo. 
 
Bologna Process Stocktaking, 2007: Report from a working group appointed by the 
Bologna Follow-up Group to the Ministerial Conference in London. 
 
Statements of participants and stakeholders: 
 
ESIB, 1999: Bologna Students Joint Declaration from 19 June 1999.   
 
ESIB, 2001: Student Göteborg Declaration. Göteborg. 
 
ESIB, 2005: Bologna with student eyes. Bergen. 
 
ESIB, 2007: Bologna with student eyes. 2007 edition. London. 
 
 
European Commission, 2003: The role of the universities in the Europe of knowledge. 
COM (2003) 58 final. Brussels. 
 
European Commission, 2006: From Bergen to London. The EU Contribution. Brussels. 
 
"Salamanca Convention": Message from the Salamanca Convention of European higher 
education institutions, 2001: Shaping the European Higher Education Area. Salamanca. 
 
EURASHE, 2002: Eurashe policy statement on the Bologna-Prague-Berlin Process. 
Galway. 
 
Council of Europe, Contribution of the Council of Europe to the Bologna Process 
(various editions: 1999-2001, 2001-2003, 2004, 2003-2005, 2005, 2006). Strasbourg.  
 
 
Other relevant Documents: 
 
"The Magna Charta of European Universities", 1988. Bologna.  
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"Lisbon Convention": Council of Europe, 1997: Convention on the recognition of 
qualifications concerning higher education in the European region. European Treaty 
Series  
No. 165. Lisbon. 
 
European Council, 2000: Presidency Conclusions. Lisbon. 
 
"The Copenhagen Declaration": European Ministers of Vocational Education and 
Training, and the European Commission, 2002: On enhanced European cooperation in 
vocational education and training. Copenhagen. 
 
 
Table 9: Expert Interviews 
Date Place Interview Partner 
6.4.2006 Vienna Commission Official 
15.11.2006 Brussels Commission Official 
16.11.2006 Brussels Commission Official 
16.11.2006 Brussels Commission Official 
12.12.2006 Vienna Chairman of Sorbonne follow-up group 
12.1.2007 Vienna Ex- Commission Official, Expert for Higher 
Education 
29.1.2007 Vienna Former Austrian Minister for Science 
 
 
Table 10: BFUG/BFUG Board meetings 
BFUG meetings BFUG board meetings 
17-18 April 2007, Berlin, Germany 
5-6 March 2007, Berlin, Germany 
12-13 October 2006, Helsinki, Finland 
6-7 April 2006, Vienna, Austria 
12-13 October 2005, Manchester, UK 
18 May 2005, Bergen, Norway 
12-13 April 2005, Mondorf, Luxembourg 
1-2 March 2005, Mondorf, Luxembourg 
12-13 October 2004, Noordwijk, the 
Netherlands 
9 March 2004, Dublin, Ireland 
14 November 2003, Rome, Italy 
 
23 January 2007, Berlin, Germany 
1 September 2006, Helsinki, Finland 
13 June 2006, Vienna, Austria 
25-26 January 2006, Vienna Austria 
15 June 2005, Luxembourg 
18 May 2005, Bergen, Norway 
26 April 2005, Brussels airport, Belgium 
11 April 2005, Mondorf, Luxembourg 
25 January 2005, Brussels airport, 
Belgium 
9 December 2004, Gjerdrum, Norway 
13 September 2004, the Hague, the 
Nederlands 
14 June 2004, Dublin, Ireland 
29 January 2004, Oslo, Norway 
14 November 2003, Rome, Italy 
Source: http://www.dfes.gov.uk/bologna/ 
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Table 11: Official Bologna Seminars (2002-2007) 
Date  Location Title/Topic 
2002, March 12-13 Amsterdam "Working on the European dimension 
of quality" 
2002, April 11-12 Lisbon "Recognition issues in the Bologna 
Process" 
2002, Mai 30-31 Stockholm "Joint degrees within the framework of 
the Bologna Process" 
2002, October 11-12 Zurich "Credit transfer and accumulation – the 
challenge for institutions and students" 
2003, February 19-20 Athens "Exploring the social dimension of the 
European Higher Education Area" 
2003, March 14-15 Helsinki "Master-level degrees" 
2003, March 27-28 Copenhagen "Qualification structures in higher 
education in Europe" 
2003, April 11-12 Mantua "Integrated Curricula – implications 
and prospects" 
2003, June 5-7 Prague "Recognition and credit systems in the 
context of lifelong learning" 
2003, June 12-14 Oslo "Student participation in governance in 
higher education" 
2004, Mai 6-7 Stockholm "Joint degrees – further development" 
2004, June 4-5 Gent "Bologna and the challenges of 
eLearning and distance education" 
2004, July 1-2 Edinburgh "Learning outcomes" 
2004, July 28-30 Santander "Assessment and accreditation in the 
European framework" 
2004, September 23-24 Strasbourg "Public responsibility for higher 
education and research" 
2004, October 11-12 Noordwijk "Designing policies for mobile 
students" 
2004, October 22-23 Bled "Employability and its link to the 
objectives of the Bologna Process" 
2004, November 4-6 Warsaw "New generation of policy documents 
and laws for higher education: Their 
thrust in the context of the Bologna 
Process" 
2004, November 23-24 St. Petersburg "Bachelor’s Degree: What is it?" 
2004, December 3-4 Riga "Improving the recognition system of 
degrees and periods of studies" 
2005, January 13-14 Copenhagen "The framework of qualifications for 
the European Higher Education Area" 
2005, January 27-28 Paris "The social dimension of the European 
Higher Education Area and world-wide 
competition" 
2005, February 3-5 Salzburg "Doctoral programmes for the 
European knowledge society" 
2005, February 14-16 Warsaw "Co-operation between accreditation 
agencies" 
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2006, March 30 – April 1 Vatican City "The Cultural Heritage and Academic 
Values  
of European Universities  
and the Attractiveness of the EHEA." 
2006, June 24-26 Athens "Putting European Higher Education 
Area on the Map: Developing 
Strategies for Attractiveness" 
2006, July 12-14 Swansea, Wales "Enhancing European Employability" 
2006, September 21-22 Berlin "Joint Degrees – A hallmark of the 
European Higher Education Area?" 
2006, September 28-29 Oslo "Looking out! Bologna in a global 
setting. The external dimension of the 
Bologna Process" 
2006, December 7-9 Nice "European doctoral studies in 
transition" 
2007, January 25-26 Riga "New challenges in recognition" 
2007, February 8-9 London "Making Bologna a Reality"- Mobility 
of staff and students 
Sources: http://www.bologna-bergen2005.no/; http://www.bmbwk.gv.at/ 
 169
16 Bibliography 
 
Abbott, Kenneth W./Duncan Snidal, 2000: Hard and soft law in international 
governance. In: International Organization 54(3), 421-456. 
Abromeit, Heidrun, 2002: Wozu braucht man Demokratie? Die postnationale 
Herausforderung der Demokratietheorie. Leske+Budrich: Opladen. 
Agné, Hans, 2006: A dogma of political theory and globalization: Why politics need not 
include everyone it affects. In: European Journal of International Relations 
12(3), 433-458. 
Alesi, Bettina/Sandra Bürger/Barbara M. Kehm/Ulrich Teichler, 2005: Bachelor and 
master courses in selected countries compared with Germany. Bonn, Berlin:  
<http://www.bmbf.de/pub/bachelor_master_en.pdf>. 
Allègre, Claude, 1999: Discourse au 40e anniversaire de la conférence de recteurs 
européens. 20 et 21 Mai 1999. Bordeaux 
<http://www.education.gouv.fr/realisations/education/superieur/cre.htm>. 
Amaral, Alberto/António Magalhaes, 2004: Epidemiology and the Bologna Saga. In: 
Higher Education 48, 79-100. 
Archibugi, Daniele/Alberto Coco, 2005: Is Europe becoming the most dynamic 
knowledge economy in the world? In: Journal of Common Market Studies 43(3), 
433-459. 
Attali, Jaques, 1998: Pour un modèle européen d’enseignement supérieur. Rapport. 
Ministère de l'éducation nationale, de la recherche et de la technologie 
<ftp://trf.education.gouv.fr/pub/edutel/rapport/1998/attali_modele_europeen.pdf
>. 
Axelrod, Robert, 1984: The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books. 
Bache, Ian, 2006: The Europeanization of higher education: Markets, politics or 
learning? In: Journal of Common Market Studies 44(2), 231-248. 
Balzer, Carolin/Kerstin Martens, 2005: International higher education and the Bologna 
Process. What part does the European Commission play? In: epsNet Kiosk Plus: 
THE NET Journal of Political Science 3(1) 
<http://www.epsnet.net/Publications/KioskPlus3/kioskplus3.htm>. 
Balzer, Carolin/Alessandra Rusconi, 2006: From the Commission to the member states 
and back: A comparison of the Bologna and the Copenhagen process. In: Kerstin 
Martens/Alessandra Rusconi/Kathrin Leuze (eds.), New Arenas of Educational 
Governance – The Impact of International Organisations and Markets on 
Educational Policymaking. Houndsmill: Palgrave. 
Bandilla, Wolfgang/Peter Hauptmanns, 1998: Internetbasierte Umfragen als 
Datenerhebungstechnik für die empirische Sozialforschung? In: ZUMA-
Nachrichten 43, 36-52 
<http://www.gesis.org/Publikationen/Zeitschriften/ZUMA_Nachrichten/docume
nts/Gesamtversionen/ZN_43_Gesamt.pdf>. 
Bannermann, Edward, 2001: The Lisbon Scorecard. The status of economic reform in 
Europe. Center for European Reform 
<http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/wp_scorecard.pdf>. 
Barblan, Andris, 2002: The international provision of higher education: Do universities 
need GATS? In: Higher Education Management 14(3), 77-92. 
Barkholt, Kasper, 2005: The Bologna process and integration theory: Convergence and 
autonomy. In: Higher Education in Europe 30(1), 21-29. 
 170
Barnes, John, 1999: Funding and university autonomy. In: Mary Henkel/Brenda Little 
(eds.), Changing relationships between higher education and the state. London: 
Jessica Kingsley, 162-190. 
Batinic, Bernard/Michael Bosnjak, 2000: Fragebogenuntersuchungen im Internet. In: 
Bernard Batinic (ed.) Internet für Psychologen. 2. überarbeitete und erweiterte 
Auflage. Göttingen: Hogrefe. 
Beetham, David, 1994: Key principles and indices for a democratic audit. In: David 
Beetham (ed.) Defining and measuring democracy. London, Thousand Oaks, 
New Delhi: Sage Publications, 25-43. 
Beetham, David, 2002: Introduction. In: David Beetham/Sarah Bracking/Iain 
Kearton/Nalini Vittal/Stuart Weir (eds.), The state of democracy: Democratic 
assessment in eight nations around the world. The Hague, Longon, New York: 
Kluwer Law International, 9-16. 
Beetham, David, 2004: The quality of democracy: Freedom as the foundation. In: 
Journal of Democracy 15(4), 61-75. 
Benum, Edgeir, 2005: Norway and the OECD connection. Convergence in European 
research and higher education before "Bologna". Paper presented at: The Third 
Conference on Knowledge and Politics. May 18-20, University of Bergen 
<http://ugle.svf.uib.no/svfweb1/filer/1281.pdf>. 
Benz, Arthur/Yannis Papadopoulos, 2007a: Conclusion. Actors, institutions and 
democratic governance: comparing across levels. In: Arthur Benz/Yannis 
Papadopoulos (eds.), Governance and democracy. Comparing national 
European and international experiences. London, New York: Routledge. 
Benz, Arthur/Yannis Papadopoulos (eds.), 2007b: Governance and democracy. 
Comparing national, European and international experiences. In. London, New 
York: Routledge. 
Benz, Arthur/Yannis Papadopoulos, 2007c: Introduction. Governance and democracy: 
concepts and key issues. In: Arthur Benz/Yannis Papadopoulos (eds.), 
Governance and democracy. Comparing national European and international 
experiences. London, New York: Routledge, 1-26. 
Bergen Communiqué, 2005: The European higher education area - achieving the goals. 
Communiqué of the conference of European ministers responsible for higher 
education. May 19-20. Bergen. 
Berlin Communiqué, 2003: Realising the European higher education area. Communiqué 
of the conference of ministers responsible for higher education. September 19. 
Berlin. 
Betz, Joachim, 2003: AKP- Abkommen (Lomé Abkommen). In: Andreas Boeckh (ed.) 
Lexikon der Politik. Band 6. Berlin: Directmedia, 24-28. 
Beukel, Eric, 2001: Educational policy: Institutionalization and multi-level governance. 
In: Svein S. Andersen/Kjell A. Eliassen (eds.), Making policy in Europe. 
London: Sage, 124-139. 
Blitz, Brad K., 2003: From Monnet to Delors: Educational co-operation in the European 
Union. In: Contemporary European History 12(2), 197-212. 
Bogner, Alexander/Wolfgang Menz, 2002: Das theoriegenerierende Experteninterview.  
Erkenntnisinteresse, Wissensformen, Interaktion. In: Alexander Bogner/Beate 
Littig/Wolfgang Menz (eds.), Das Experteninterview. Theorie, Methode, 
Anwendung. Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 33-70. 
Bohman, James, 1999: International regimes and democratic governance: political 
equality and influence in global institutions. In: International Affairs 75(3), 499-
513. 
 171
Bologna Declaration, 1999: The European higher education area. Joint declaration of 
the European ministers of education. June 19. Bologna. 
Bologna Follow-up Group, 2005: "From Berlin to Bergen". General report of the 
Bologna Follow-up Group to the Conference of European ministers responsible 
for higher education. Oslo <http://www.bologna-
bergen2005.no/Bergen/050503_General_rep.pdf>. 
Bologna Process Stocktaking, 2005: Report from a working group appointed by the 
Bologna Follow-up Group to the Conference of European Ministers Responsible 
for higher education. Bergen <http://www.bologna-
bergen2005.no/Bergen/050509_Stocktaking.pdf>. 
Bologna Process Stocktaking, 2007: Report from a working group appointed by the 
Bologna Follow-up Group to the Ministerial Conference in London.  
<http://www.ond.vlaanderen.be/hogeronderwijs/bologna/documents/WGR2007/
Stocktaking_report2007.pdf>. 
Borchard, Ralf, 2003: Interdependenztheoretische Ansätze. In: Jürgen Kriz/Dieter 
Nohlen/Rainer-Olaf Schultze (eds.), Lexikon der Politik. Band 2. Berlin: 
Directmedia, 195-197. 
Borrás, Susana/Thomas Conzelmann, 2007: Democracy, legitimacy and soft modes of 
governance in the EU: The empirical turn. In: European Integration 29(5), 531-
548. 
Brakel, Reinout van/Jeroen Huisman/Anneke Luijten-Lub/Mattijs Maussen/Marijk Van 
der Wende, 2004: External evaluation of Erasmus. Institutional and national 
impact. Final report. Center for Higher Education Policy Studies (CHEPS) on 
behalf of European Commission DG EAC 
<http://ec.europa.eu/education/programmes/evaluation/erasmusextan_en.pdf>. 
Brunkhorst, Hauke, 2006: Bologna oder der sanfte Bonapartismus der transnational 
vereinigten Exekutivgewalten. In: Zeitschrift für Philosophie und 
Sozialwissenschaft 1, 1-6 <http://www.uni-
flensburg.de/philosophie/PDF_Daten/ZPS_2.1.pdf>. 
Campbell, David F.J., 2006: Nationale Forschungssysteme im Vergleich. Strukturen, 
Herausforderungen und Entwicklungsoptionen. In: Österreichische Zeitschrift 
für Politikwissenschaft 1, 25-44. 
Caporaso, James, 2007: The promises and pitfalls of an endogenous theory of 
institutional change: A comment. In: West European Politics 30(2), 392-404. 
Caporaso, James A./Joerg Wittenbrinck, 2006: The new modes of governance and 
political authority in Europe. In: Journal of European Public Policy 13(4), 471-
480. 
Checkel, Jeffrey T., 2005: It's the process stupid! Process tracing in the study of 
European and international politics.  ARENA Working Papers,(26): Centre for 
European Studies. University of Oslo <http://www.arena.uio.no/publications>. 
Cini, Michelle, 2003: Intergovernmentalism. In: Michelle Cini (ed.) European Union 
Politics. Oxford, New York, Auckland: Oxford University Press, 93-108. 
Confederation of EU Rectors' Conferences/Association of European Universities 
(CRE), 2000: The Bologna Declaration on the European space for higher 
education: an explanation.  <ec.europa.eu/education/policies/educ/bologna>. 
Corbett, Anne, 2003: Ideas, institutions and policy entrepreneurs: towards a new history 
of higher education in the European Community. In: European Journal of 
Education 38(3), 315-330. 
 172
Corbett, Anne, 2005: Universities and the Europe of knowledge. Ideas, institutions and 
policy entrepreneurship in European Union higher education policy, 1955-2005. 
Baskingstoke: Palgrave. 
Corbett, Anne, 2006: Higher education as a form of European integration: How novel is 
the Bologna process?  ARENA Working Papers,(15), Oslo: Center for European 
Studies. University of Oslo <http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-
papers2006/papers/wp06_15.xml>. 
Crosier, David/Lewis Purser/Hanne Smidt, 2007: Trends V: Universities shaping the 
European Higher Education Area. An EUA Report.  
<http://www.ond.vlaanderen.be/hogeronderwijs/bologna/documents/EUA_Tren
ds_Reports/Final_Trends_Report_V_May.pdf>. 
Cutler, Fred, 2004: Government responsibility and electoral accountability in 
federations. In: The Journal of Federalism 34(2), 19-38. 
Dahl, Robert A., 1971: Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition. New Haven, London: 
Yale University Press. 
De Prado Yepes, César, 2006: World regionalization of higher education: Policy 
proposals for International Organizations. In: Higher Education Policy 19, 111-
128. 
De Wit, Kurt, 2003: The consequences of European integration for higher education. In: 
Higher Education Policy 16, 161-178. 
De Witte, Bruno, 1993: Higher education and the constitution of the European 
Community. In: Claudius Gellert (ed.) Higher Education in Europe. London: 
Jessica Kingsley, 185-202. 
Denzin, Norman K., 1970: The research act in Sociology. A theoretical introduction to 
sociological methods. London: Butterworths. 
Denzin, Norman K./Yvonna S. Lincoln, 2000: Introduction: The discipline and practice 
of qualitative research. In: Norman K. Denzin/Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds.), 
Handbook of qualitative research. Second Edition. Thousand Oaks, London , 
New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1-28. 
Dillman, Don A., 2000: Mail and Internet Surveys. The Tailored Design Method. New 
York, Chichester, Weinheim: John Wiley and Sons. 
Dittrich, Karl/Mark Frederiks/Marc Luwel, 2004: The implementation of 'Bologna' in 
Flanders and the Netherlands. In: European Journal of Education 39(3), 299-
316. 
Douglass, John A., 2006: The waning of America's higher education advantage: 
International competitors are no longer number two and have big plans in the 
global economy.  CSHE Paper,(9): Center for Studies in Higher Education 
<http://repositories.cdlib.org/cshe/CSHE-9-06/>. 
Eckardt, Philipp, 2005: Der Bologna-Prozess. Entstehung, Strukturen und Ziele der 
europäischen Hochschulreformpolitik. Bonn: Books on Demand. 
Eckstein, Harry, 1975: Case study and theory in political science. In: Fred I. 
Greenstein/Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), Handbook of political science. Bd.7: 
Strategies of inquiry. Reading: MA: Addison-Wesley, 79-138. 
Elster, Jon, 1983: Sour grapes: Studies in the subversion of rationality. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Elster, Jon, 1989: Nuts and bolts for the social sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Enders, Jürgen, 2002: Higher education, internationalisation, and the nation-state: recent 
developments and challanges to governance theory. Paper presented at: 
 173
Consortium of Higher Education Researchers (CHER) 15th Annual Conference, 
Vienna <http://www.iff.ac.at/hofo/CHER_2002/pdf/ch02ende.pdf>. 
Eriksen, Erik Oddvar/John Erik Fossum, 2007: Europe in transformation: How to 
reconstitute democracy?  RECON Online Working Paper,(1):  
<http://www.reconproject.eu/>. 
ESIB, 1999: Bologna Students Joint Declaration from 19 June 1999.  
<http://archiv.bmbwk.gv.at/medienpool/9423/students_declaration.pdf>. 
ESIB, 2001: Student Göteborg Declaration. 
ESIB, 2005: The black book of the Bologna process. Bergen: The National Unions of 
Students in Europea <http://www.bologna-bergen2005.no/Docs/02-
ESIB/0505_ESIB_blackbook.pdf>. 
ESIB, 2006: ESIB and the Bologna process- creating a European Higher Education 
Area for and with students. ESIB policy paper.  <http://www.esib.org/>. 
ESIB, 2007: Bologna with student eyes. 2007 edition. London <http://www.esu-
online.org/documents/publications/bwse2007.pdf>. 
European Commission, 2002: The European research area. An internal knowledge 
market. Brussels: European Commission. DG for Research 
<http://ec.europa.eu/research/era/leaflet/en/index_en.html>. 
European Commission, 2006: Commission staff working document. Progress towards 
the Lisbon objectives in education and training. Report based on indicators and 
benchmarks 
<http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/2010/doc/progressreport06.pdf>. 
Eurydice, 1999: Organization of higher education structures in Europe (1998/99). 
Brussels: Eurydice <http://www.eurydice.org/>. 
Eurydice, 2000a: Key data on education in Europe. Brussels, Luxembourg: Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities <http://www.eurydice.org/>. 
Eurydice, 2000b: Two decades of reform in higher education in Europe: 1980 onwards. 
Brussels:  <http://www.eurydice.org/>. 
Eurydice, 2003: Focus on the structure of higher education in Europe. National trends in 
the Bologna process - 2003/04 edition. Brussels 
<http://www.eurydice.org/ressources/eurydice/pdf/0_integral/038EN.pdf>. 
Eurydice, 2005a: The education system in the federal republic of Germany 2003. A 
description of responsibilities, structures and developments in education policy 
for the exchange of information in Europe. Bonn: Konferenz der Kultusminister 
der Länder <http://www.kmk.org/dossier/dossier_en_ebook.pdf>. 
Eurydice, 2005b: Im Blickpunkt: Strukturen des Hochschulbereichs in Europa - 
2004/05. Nationale Entwicklungen im Rahmen des Bologna-Prozesses. 
Brussels:  <http://www.eurydice.org/>. 
Eurydice, 2005c: Key data on education in Europe 2005. Brussels, Luxembourg: Office 
for Official Publications of the European Communities 
<http://www.eurydice.org/>. 
Eurydice, 2007a: Focus on the structure of higher education in Europe 2006/07. 
National trends in the Bologna process. Brussels: Eurydice 
<http://www.eurydice.org/>. 
Eurydice, 2007b: Key data on higher education in Europe. 2007 edition. Brussels, 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 
<http://www.eurydice.org/>. 
Faschingeder, Gerald, 2005: Bildung und Herrschaft. Alternativen zur Ökonomisierung 
der Bildung. In: Gerald Faschingeder/Bernhard Leubolt/Pia Lichtblau/Oliver 
Prausmüller/Johannes Schimmerl/Angelika Striedinger (eds.), Ökonomisierung 
 174
der Bildung. Tendenzen, Strategien, Alternativen. Wien: Mandelbaum Verlag, 
203-220. 
Field, Heather, 2003: Integrating tertiary education in Europe. In: The Annals of the 
American Academy 585, 182-195. 
Flyvbjerg, Bent, 2006: Five misunderstandings about case-study research. In: 
Qualitative Inquiry 12(2) 
<http://flyvbjerg.plan.aau.dk/Publications2006/0604FIVEMISPUBL2006.pdf>. 
Føllesdal, Andreas/Simon Hix, 2006: Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU: A 
response to Majone and Moravcsik. In: Journal of Common Market Studies 
44(3), 533-562. 
Froschauer, Ulrike/Manfred Lueger, 2003: Das qualitative Interview. Zur Praxis 
interpretativer Analyse sozialer Systeme. Vienna: WUV. 
Furlong, Paul, 2004: British higher education and the Bologna Process: an interim 
assessment. Paper presented at: epsNet Annual Conference, Prague 
<http://www.epsnet.org/2004/pps/Furlong.pdf>. 
George, Alexander L./Andrew Bennet, 2005: Case studies and theory development in 
the social sciences. Cambridge et al.: MIT Press. 
Gläser, Jochen/Grit Laudel, 2004: Experteninterviews und qualitative Inhaltsanalyse als 
Instrumente rekronstruierender Untersuchungen. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. 
Goodin, Robert B., 1996: Institutions and their design. In: Robert B. Goodin (ed.) The 
theory of institutional design. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gornitzka, Ase, 2007: Networking administration in areas of national sensitivity - The 
Commission and European higher education.  ARENA Working Papers,(2), 
Oslo: Center for European Studies. University of Oslo 
<http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-
papers2007/papers/wp07_02.xml>. 
Gornitzka, Ase/Liv Langfeldt, 2005: The Role of academics in the Bologna Process.  
Education International Working Paper, 15: Education International 
<http://data.ei-
ie.org/Common/GetFile.asp?ID=2282&mfd=off&LogonName=Guest>. 
Greven, Michael Thomas, 1997: Der politische Raum als Maß des Politischen: Europa 
als Beispiel. In: Thomas König/Elmar Rieger/Hermann Schmitt (eds.), 
Europäische Institutionenpolitik. Frankfurt/New York: Campus, 45-65. 
Greven, Michael Thomas, 2000: Can the European Union finally become a democracy? 
In: Michael Thomas Greven/Louis W. Pauly (eds.), Democracy beyond the 
state? The European dilemma and the emerging global order. Lanham, Boulder, 
New York, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 35-61. 
Grieco, Joseph M., 1988a: Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: A realist critique of 
the newest liberal institutionalism. In: International Organization 42(3), 485-
507. 
Grieco, Joseph M., 1988b: Realist theory and the problem of international cooperation: 
Analysis with an amended prisoner's dilemma model. In: The Journal of Politics 
50, 600-624. 
Grieco, Joseph M., 1993: The relative-gains problem for international cooperation. In: 
American Political Science Review 78(3), 729-735. 
Grubb, Norton W., 2003: The roles of tertiary colleges and institutes: Trade-offs in 
restructuring postsecondary education. Paris: OECD 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/49/35757628.pdf>. 
Gruber, Lloyd, 2000: Ruling the world. Power politics and the rise of supranational 
institutions. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
 175
Gruber, Lloyd, 2001: Power politics and the free trade bandwagon. In: Comparative 
Political Studies 34(7), 703-741. 
Gruber, Lloyd, 2005: Power politics and the institutionalization of international 
relations. In: Michael Barnett/Raymond Duvall (eds.), Power in Global 
Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 102-129. 
Haas, Peter M., 1992: Introduction: Epistemic communities and international policy 
coordination. In: International Organization 46(1), 1-36. 
Habermas, Jürgen, 1999: The European nation-state and the pressures of globalization. 
In: New Left Review I(235), 46-59. 
Hackl, Elsa, 2001a: The intrusion and expansion of community policies in higher 
education. In: Higher Education Management 13(3), 99-117. 
Hackl, Elsa, 2001b: Towards a European area of higher education: change and 
convergence in European higher education.  European University Institute (EUI) 
Working Papers, 9, San Domenico: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies <http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/WP-Texts/01_09.pdf>. 
Halász, Gábor, 2003: European co-ordination of national education policies from the 
perspective of the new member countries. In: Roger Standaert (ed.) Becoming 
the best - Educational ambitions for Europe. CIDREE Yearbook 3. Enschede: 
CIDREE, 89-118 <http://www.oki.hu/article.php?kod=english-art-Halasz-
European.html>. 
Hamilton, Alexander, 1788: The Federalist No. 70.  
<http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa70.htm>. 
Hartmann, Eva, 2004: Der globale Bildungsmarkt. Hegemoniekämpfe um 
Qualitätsstandards und Anerkennung von Abschlüssen. In: Prokla 137, 565-585. 
Hasenclever, Andreas/Peter Mayer/Volker Rittberger, 1997a: Regimes as links between 
states: three theoretical perspectives.  Tübinger Arbeitspapiere zur 
internationalen Politik und Friedensforschung,(29): Center for International 
Relations/Peace and Conflict Studies, Institute for Political Science, University 
of Tübingen <http://tobias-lib.ub.uni-
tuebingen.de/volltexte/2000/142/pdf/tap29.pdf>. 
Hasenclever, Andreas/Peter Mayer/Volker Rittberger, 1997b: Theories of international 
regimes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Hatzopoulos, Vassilis, 2007: Why the Open Method of Coordination is bad for you: A 
letter to the EU. In: European Law Journal 13(3), 309-342. 
Haug, Guy, 1999: Visions of a European future: Bologna and beyond. Keynote address 
at the 11th EAIE Conference. Maastricht 
<http://www.eaie.org/about/speech.html>. 
Haug, Guy, 2003: Quality assurance/accreditation in the emerging European Higher 
Education Area: a possible scenario for the future. In: European Journal of 
Education 38(3), 229-240. 
Haug, Guy, 2006: The Bologna process and the Lisbon strategy: mutual dependencies. 
In: Eric Froment/Jürgen Kohler/Lewis Purser/Lesley Wilson (eds.), EUA 
Bologna Handbook. Making Bologna work. Berlin: Raabe. 
Haug, Guy/Jette Kirstein, 1999: Trends in learning structures in higher education. 
Project report (Trends I).  
<http://www.ond.vlaanderen.be/hogeronderwijs/bologna/documents/EUA_Tren
ds_Reports/TRENDS_I-June1999.pdf>. 
Haug, Guy/Christian Tauch, 2001: Towards the European higher education area: Survey 
of main reforms from Bologna to Prague (Trends II). European University 
Association 
 176
<http://www.ond.vlaanderen.be/hogeronderwijs/bologna/documents/EUA_Tren
ds_Reports/TRENDS_II-April2001.pdf>. 
Held, David, 1995: Democracy and the global order. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Held, David, 2003: The transformation of political community: Rethinking democracy 
in the context of globalization. In: Robert Dahl/Ian Shapiro/José Antonio 
Cheibub (eds.), The democracy sourcebook. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
London: The MIT Press, 516-525. 
Helfferich, Cornelia, 2004: Die Qualität qualitativer Daten. Manual für die 
Durchführung qualitativer Interviews. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften. 
Heller, Donald E./Kimberly R. Rogers, 2006: Shifting the burden: Public and private 
financing of higher education in the United States and implications for Europe. 
In: Tertiary Education and Management 12(2), 91-117. 
Héritier, Adrienne, 2002: New modes of governance in Europe: policy making without 
legislating?  IHS Working Paper Political Sciences Series, 81, Wien: Institut für 
Höhere Studien <http://www.ihs.ac.at/>. 
Hewson, Claire/Peter Yule/Dianna Laurent/Carl Vogel, 2003: Internet research 
methods. A practical guide for the social and behavioural sciences. London: 
Sage. 
Hoffmann, Stanley, 1995: The European Sisyphus. Essays on Europe 1964-1994. 
Oxford: Westview Press. 
Huisman, Jeroen/Marijk Van der Wende, 2004: The EU and Bologna: are supra- and 
international initiatives threatening domestic agendas? In: European Journal of 
Education 39(3), 349-357. 
Huntington, Samuel P., 1969: Political order in changing societies. New Haven, 
London: Yale University Press. 
Jachtenfuchs, Markus, 2003: Regieren jenseits der Staatlichkeit. In: Gunther 
Hellmann/Klaus Dieter Wolf/Michael Zürn (eds.), Die neuen internationalen 
Beziehungen. Forschungsstand und Perspektiven in Deutschland. Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 495-518. 
Jongbloed, Ben, 2003: Marketisation in Higher Education, Clark's Triangle and the 
Essential Ingredients of Markets. In: Higher Education Quarterly 57(2), 110-
135. 
Jongbloed, Ben/Jos Koelman/Hans Vossensteyn, 1994: Comparing costs per student 
and costs per graduate. An analysis of Germany, Great Britain and the 
Netherlands. In: Leo Goedegebuure/Frans van Vught (eds.), Comparative policy 
studies in higher education. Utrecht: Lemma, 65-94. 
Jupille, Joseph/Duncan Snidal, 2006: The choice of international institutions: 
Cooperation, alternatives and strategies. Draft of July 7, 2006 
<http://sobek.colorado.edu/~jupille/research/20060707-Jupille-Snidal.pdf>. 
Kaiser, André/Eric Seils, 2005: Demokratie-Audits. Zwischenbilanz zu einem neuen 
Instrument der empirischen Demokratieforschung. In: Politische 
Vierteljahresschrift 46(1), 133-143. 
Kaiser, Robert/Heiko Prange, 2005: Missing the Lisbon target? Multi-level innovation 
and EU policy coordination. In: Journal of Public Policy 25(2), 241-263. 
Keeling, Ruth, 2006: The Bologna process and the Lisbon research agenda: the 
European Commission's expanding role in higher education discourse. In: 
European Journal of Education 41(2), 203-223. 
 177
Kehm, Barbara M./Ulrich Teichler, 2006: Which direction for bachelor and master 
programmes? A stocktaking of the Bologna process. In: Tertiary Education and 
Management 12, 269-282. 
Kelo, Maria/Ulrich Teichler/Bernd Wächter (eds.), 2006: Eurodata. Student mobility in 
European higher education. In. Bonn: Lemmens. 
Keohane, Robert O., 1984: After hegemony. Cooperation and discord in the world 
political economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Keohane, Robert O., 1989: International institutions and state power: Essays in 
International Relations theory. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Kielmansegg, Peter Graf, 1996: Integration und Demokratie. In: Markus 
Jachtenfuchs/Beate Kohler-Koch (eds.), Europäische Integration. Opladen: 
Leske+Budrich, 47-71. 
King, Gary/Robert O. Keohane/Sidney Verba, 1994: Designing social inquiry. Scientific 
inference in qualitative research. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press. 
Knight, Jack, 2001: Explaining the rise of neoliberalism. The mechanisms of 
institutional change. In: John L. Campbell/Ove K. Pedersen (eds.), The rise of 
neoliberalism and institutional analysis. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 27-50. 
Knight, Jane, 2002: Trade talk: An analysis of the impact of trade liberalization and the 
General Agreement on Trade in services on higher education. In: Journal of 
Studies in International Education 6(3), 209-229. 
Kogan, Maurice/Susan Gerard Marton, 2000: The state and higher education. In: 
Maurice Kogan/Marianne Bauer/Ivar Bleiklie/Mary Henkel (eds.), Transforming 
higher education. A comparative study. London: Jessica Kingsley, 89-108. 
Kohler-Koch, Beate, 1989: Zur Empirie und Theorie internationaler Regime. In: Beate 
Kohler-Koch (ed.) Regime in den internationalen Beziehungen. Baden-Baden: 
Nomos. 
Koremenos, Barbara/Charles Lipson/Duncan Snidal, 2001a: The rational design of 
international institutions. In: International Organization 55(4), 761-799. 
Koremenos, Barbara/Charles Lipson/Duncan Snidal, 2001b: Rational design: Looking 
back to move forward. In: International Organization 55(4), 1051-1082. 
Krasner, Stephen D. (ed.) 1983: International regimes. In. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
Krasner, Stephen D., 1988: Sovereignty. An institutional perspective. In: Comparative 
Political Studies 21(1), 66-94. 
Krasner, Stephen D., 1991: Global communications and national power. Life on the 
pareto frontier. In: World Politics 43, 336-366. 
Krasner, Stephen D., 1999: Sovereignty: Organized hypocrisy. Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press. 
Lamnek, Siegfried, 1995: Qualitative Sozialforschung. Band 2: Methoden und 
Techniken. Weinheim: Beltz. 
Langan, Elise, 2004: France & the United States: the competition for university students 
- Bologna and beyond. In: Higher Education Policy 17, 445-455. 
Langthaler, Margarita, 2005: Die Auswirkungen der Bildungsökonomisierung auf die 
Entwicklungsländer. In: Gerald Faschingeder/Bernhard Leubolt/Pia 
Lichtblau/Oliver Prausmüller/Johannes Schimmerl/Angelika Striedinger (eds.), 
Ökonomisierung der Bildung. Tendenzen, Strategien, Alternativen. Wien: 
Mandelbaum Verlag, 155-178. 
 178
Larsen, Kurt/John P. Martin/Rosemary Morris, 2002: Trade in Educational Services: 
Trends and Emerging Issues. In: The World Economy 25(6), 849-868. 
Lassnigg, Lorenz, 2003: Bildungspolitik zwischen Ökonomisierung und öffentlichem 
Gut? Fakten, Widersprüche, Kontroversen.  IHS Working Paper Sociological 
Series, 61, Wien: Institut für Höhere Studien <http://www.ihs.ac.at/>. 
Lawn, Martin, 2006: Soft governance and the learning spaces of Europe. In: 
Comparative European Politics 4, 272-288. 
Lawn, Martin/Bob Lingard, 2002: Constructing a European policy space in educational 
governance: the role of transnational policy actors. In: European Educational 
Research Journal 1(2), 290-307. 
Leech, Beth L., 2002: Interview methods in Political Science. In: PS: Political Science 
and Politics 35(4), 663-664. 
Leitner, Erich, 1993: Developments in European Community politics of higher 
education. Observations from outside. In: Claudius Gellert (ed.) Higher 
education in Europe. London: Jessica Kingsley, 203-217. 
Levy, Marc A./Oran R. Young/Michael Zürn, 1995: The study of international regimes. 
In: European Journal of International Relations 1(3), 267-330. 
Lijphart, Arend, 1971: Comparative politics and the comparative method. In: American 
Political Science Review 65, 682-693. 
Lindblom, Charles E., 1965: The Intelligence of democracy. New York: The Free Press. 
Linsenmann, Ingo, 2002: Die Bildungspolitik der Europäischen Union. In: Werner 
Weidenfeld (ed.) Europa-Handbuch. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische 
Bildung, 523-530. 
Lissmann, Konrad Paul, 2006: Theorie der Unbildung. Wien: Paul Zsolnay. 
London Communiqué, 2007: Towards the European Higher Education Area: responding 
to challenges in a globalised world. Communiqué of the conference of European 
ministers responsible for higher education. May 18. 
Lord, Christopher, 2004: A democratic audit of the European Union. Houndsmills: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Lord, Christopher, 2007: Contested meanings, democracy, assessment and the European 
Union. In: Comparative European Politics 5(1), 70-86. 
Lourtie, Pedro, 2001: Furthering the Bologna process. Report to the ministers of 
education of the signatory countries. Prague: Bologna Follow-Up Group. 
Luijten-Lub, Anneke/Marijk Van der Wende/Jeroen Huisman, 2005: On cooperation 
and competition: A comparative analysis of national policies for 
Internationalisation of higher education in seven western European countries. In: 
Journal of Studies in International Education 9(2), 157-163. 
Maassen, Peter/Frans Van Vught, 1994: Alternative models of governmental steering in 
higher education. In: Leo Goedegebuure/Frans Van Vught (eds.), Comparative 
policy studies in higher education. Utrecht: LEMMA, 35-63. 
Mahoney, James, 2000: Path dependence in historical sociology. In: Theory and Society 
29, 507-548. 
Malan, Thierry, 2004: Implementing the Bologna Process in France. In: European 
Journal of Education 39(3), 289-297. 
March, James G./Johan P. Olsen, 1989: Rediscovering institutions: The organizational 
basis of politics. New York: The Free Press. 
March, James G./Johan P. Olsen, 1998: The institutional dynamics of international 
political orders. In: International Organization 52(4), 943-969. 
 179
Martens, Kerstin/Klaus Dieter Wolf, 2006: Paradoxien der Neuen Staatsräson. Die 
Internationalisierung der Bildungspolitik in  der EU und der OECD. In: 
Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen(2), 145-176. 
Mayntz, Renate, 2004: Governance Theory als fortentwickelte Steuerungstheorie?  
MPIfG Working Paper, 4 (1): Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung 
<http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/workpap/wp04-1/wp04-1.html>. 
Mayntz, Renate/Fritz W. Scharpf, 1995a: Der Ansatz des akteurszentrierten 
Institutionalismus. In: Renate Mayntz/Fritz W. Scharpf (eds.), Gesellschaftliche 
Selbstregelung und politische Steuerung. Frankfurt/New York: Campus. 
Mayntz, Renate/Fritz W. Scharpf, 1995b: Steuerung und Selbstorganisation in 
staatsnahen Sektoren. In: Renate Mayntz/Fritz W. Scharpf (eds.), 
Gesellschaftliche Selbstregelung und politische Steuerung. Frankfurt/New York: 
Campus. 
Mayring, Philipp, 1993: Einführung in die qualtitative Sozialforschung. Weinheim: 
Beltz. 
Mayring, Philipp, 2000: Qualitative content analysis.  Forum Qualitative Social 
Research, 1 (2):  <http://www.qualitative-research.net/>. 
Mayring, Philipp, 2003: Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse. Grundlagen und Techniken. 8. 
Auflage. Weinheim: Beltz. 
Mearsheimer, John J., 1994/95: The false promise of international institutions. In: 
International Security 19(3), 5-49. 
Menon, Anand, 2003: Member states and international institutions: institutionalizing 
intergovernementalism in the European Union. In: Comparative European 
Politics 1, 171-201. 
Meuser, Michael/Ulrike Nagel, 1991: ExpertInneninterviews - vielfach erprobt, wenig 
bedacht. Ein Beitrag zur qualitativen Methodendiskussion. In: Detlev 
Garz/Klaus Kraimer (eds.), Qualitativ-empirische Sozialforschung. Konzepte, 
Methoden, Analysen. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. 
Milner, Helen, 1992: International theories of cooperation among nations. In: World 
Politics 44, 466-496. 
Moe, Terry M., 2005: Power and political institutions. In: Perspectives on Politics 3(2), 
215-233. 
Moravcsik, Andrew, 1993: Preferences and power in the European Community: a 
liberal intergovernmentalist approach. In: Journal of Common Market Studies 
31(4), 473-524. 
Moravcsik, Andrew, 1998: The choice for Europe: social purpose and state power from 
Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Moravcsik, Andrew, 2002: In defence of the 'democratic deficit': Reassessing 
legitimacy in the European Union. In: Journal of Common Market Studies 40(4), 
603-624. 
Nägeli, Rudolf, 1999: Bericht über die Tagung: "The European Space for Higher 
Education". Schweizerische Hochschulrektorenkonferenz 
<http://www.ects.ch/docs/lehre/bologna/europa/laender/hrkberli.doc>. 
Neave, Guy, 2002: Anything goes: Or, how the accommodation of Europe's universities 
to European Integration integrates an inspiring number of contradictions. In: 
Tertiary Education and Management 8(3), 181-197. 
Neave, Guy, 2003: The Bologna Declaration: some of the historic dilemmas posed by 
the reconstruction of the Community in Europe's systems of higher education. 
In: Educational Policy 17(1), 141-164. 
 180
Neave, Guy/Frans Van Vught (eds.), 1991: Prometheus bound: The changing 
relationship between government and higher education in Europe. In. Oxford: 
Pergamon Press. 
North, Douglass C., 1993: Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Nye, Joseph S., 2001: Globalization's democratic defcit: How to make international 
institutions more accountable. In: Foreign Affairs 80(4), 2. 
OECD, 1997: Thematic review of the first years of tertiary education. Country note: 
United Kingdom. Paris <http://www.oecd.org/>. 
OECD, 2004: Internationalisation of higher education.  Policy Brief: Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/60/33734276.pdf>. 
OECD, 2005: Education at a glance. OECD indicators 2005.  <http://www.oecd.org/>. 
OECD, 2006: Selected statistics on higher education - background report for meeting of 
OECD ministers of education in June 2006. Athens 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/7/36960580.pdf>. 
Olsen, Johann P., 2002: The many faces of europeanization. In: Journal of Common 
Market Studies 40(5), 921-952. 
Patrinos, Harry Anthony, 2000: Market forces in education. In: European Journal of 
Education 35(1), 61-80. 
Pechar, Hans, 2003: Internationalisierung, Europäisierung, Globalisierung: Der 
veränderte Kontext internationaler Aktivitäten. In: Karin Messerer/Hans 
Pechar/Thomas Pfeffer (eds.), Internationalisierung im österreichischen 
Fachhochschul-Sektor. Im Spannungsfeld zwischen regionaler Verankerung und 
globalem Wettbewerb. Schriftenreihe des Fachhochschulrates 8. Vienna: WUV 
<http://www.iff.ac.at/hofo/pechar/2003_pechar_internationalisierung_europaesi
erung.pdf>. 
Pechar, Hans, 2006: Vom Vertrauensvorschuss zur Rechenschaftspflicht. Der 
Paradigmenwechsel in der britischen Hochschul- und Forschungspolitik seit 
1980. In: Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, 56-73. 
Pechar, Hans/Ada Pellert, 2004: Austrian universities under pressure from Bologna. In: 
European Journal of Education 39(3), 317-330. 
Pechar, Hans/Ada Pellert/Thomas Pfeffer/Marcus Ludescher/Andrea Waxenegger, 
1998: Internationalisierung der österreichischen Hochschulen.  HOFO Working 
Paper Series, 2, Vienna: IFF Wien <http://www.iff.ac.at/hofo/d1-3.htm>. 
Peters, Guy  B., 1999: Institutional theory in political science. The "new 
institutionalism". London/New York: Pinter. 
Pierson, Paul, 1996: The path to European integration: a historical-institutionalist 
analysis. In: Comparative Political Studies 29(2), 123-163. 
Pierson, Paul, 2000a: Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics. In: 
American Political Science Review 94(2), 251-267. 
Pierson, Paul, 2000b: The limits of design: Explaining institutional origins and change. 
In: Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 13(4), 
475-499. 
Pierson, Paul, 2004: Politics in time. History, institutions, and social analysis. Princeton 
and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Powell, Bingham G., 2000: Elections as instruments of democracy.Majoritarian and 
proportional visions. New Haven/London: Yale University Press. 
 181
Prague Communiqué, 2001: Towards the European higher education area. Communiqué 
of the meeting of European ministers in charge of higher education. May 19. 
Prague. 
Przeworski, Adam/Henry Teune, 1970: The logic of comparative social inquiry. New 
York: John Wiley. 
Putnam, Robert D., 1988: Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level 
games. In: International Organization 42(3), 427-460. 
Racké, Cornelia, 2007: The emergence of the Bologna Process: Pan-European instead 
of EU governance. In: Dirk De Bievre/Christine Neuhold (eds.), Dynamics And 
Obstacles Of European Governance. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 29-
50. 
Radaelli, Claudio M., 2000: Wither europeanization? Concept stretching and 
substantive change.  European Integration online Papers, 4:  
<http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-008a.htm>. 
Radaelli, Claudio M., 2003: The Open Method of Coordination: A new governance 
architecture for the European Union?  1, Stockholm: Swedish Institute for 
European Policy Studies 
<http://www.sieps.se/publ/rapporter/bilagor/20031.pdf>. 
Rauhvargers, Andrejs, 2007: Bologna Process Stocktaking Presentation. Paper 
presented at: Conference of Ministers responsible for Higher Education, London 
<http://www.dfes.gov.uk/londonbologna/uploads/documents/20070517_Rauhva
rgers_Stocktaking_London_final.ppt>. 
Raustiala, Kal, 2005: Form and substance in international agreements. In: The American 
Journal of International Law 99(3), 581-614. 
Rawls, John, 1993: Political Liberalism. The John Dewey Essays in Philosophy. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
Reichert, Sybille/Christian Tauch, 2003: Progress towards the European higher 
education area. Bologna four years after: Steps toward sustainable reform of 
higher education in Europe (Trends III). European University Association 
<http://www.ond.vlaanderen.be/hogeronderwijs/bologna/documents/EUA_Tren
ds_Reports/TRENDS_III-July2003.pdf>. 
Reinalda, Bob/Ewa Kulesza, 2005: The Bologna process - harmonizing Europe's higher 
education. Opladen: Barbara Budrich. 
Risse, Thomas, 2007: Transnational governance and legitimacy. In: Arthur Benz/Yannis 
Papadopoulos (eds.), Governance and democracy. Comparing national 
European and international experiences. London, New York: Routledge, 179-
199. 
Risse, Thomas/Maria  Green Cowles/James Caporaso, 2001: Europeanization and 
domestic change: introduction. In: Maria Green Cowles/James 
Caporaso/Thomas Risse (eds.), Transforming Europe. Europeanization and 
Domestic Change. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1-20. 
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, 2003: Can one or a few cases yield theoretical gains? In: 
James Mahoney/Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds.), Comparative historical analysis 
in the social sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 305-335. 
Ryan, Gery W./Russell H. Bernard, 2000: Data management and analysis methods. In: 
Norman K. Denzin/Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds.), Handbook of qualitative research. 
Second Edition. Thousand Oaks, London , New Delhi: Sage Publications, 769-
802. 
Salerno, Carlo, 2004: Public money and private providers: Funding channels and 
national patterns in four countries. In: Higher Education 48(1), 101-130. 
 182
Salerno, Carlo, 2006: Funding higher education. In: John File/Anneke Luijten-Lub 
(eds.), Reflecting on higher education policy across Europe. A CHEPS resource 
book. Enschede: CHEPS, 72-95 
<http://www.utwente.nl/cheps/documenten/2006crossboek%20pdf>. 
Samhat, Nayef H., 2005: International regimes and the prospects for global democracy. 
In: The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations 6(1), 179-
191. 
Sandholtz, Wayne/Alec Stone Sweet, 1998: European integration and supranational 
governance. Oxford, New York, Athens: Oxford University Press. 
Sartori, Giovanni, 1970: Concept misformation in comparative politics. In: American 
Political Science Review 64(4), 1033-1053. 
Sartori, Giovanni, 1997: Demokratietheorie. Darmstadt: Primus. 
Saward, Michael, 1994: Democratic theory and indices of democratization. In: David 
Beetham (ed.) Defining and measuring democracy. London, Thousand Oaks, 
New Delhi: Sage Publications, 6-24. 
Schäfer, Armin, 2004: Beyond the community method: Why the Open Method of 
Coordination was introduced to EU policy-making.  European Integration 
Online Papers, 8:  <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/>. 
Schäfer, Armin, 2005: Die neue Unverbindlichkeit. Wirtschaftspolitische Koordinierung 
in Europa. Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung. 
Vol. 55. Frankfurt/New York: Campus. 
Schäfer, Armin, 2006a: Die demokratische Grenze output-orientierter Legitimität. In: 
Integration 3, 187-200. 
Schäfer, Armin, 2006b: Resolving Deadlock: Why international organisations introduce 
soft law. In: European Law Journal 12(2), 194-208. 
Scharpf, Fritz W., 1970: Demokratietheorie zwischen Utopie und Anpassung. Konstanz: 
Universitätsverlag. 
Scharpf, Fritz W., 1993: Positive und negative Koordinierung in 
Verhandlungssystemen. In: Adrienne Héritier (ed.) Policy-Analyse. Kritik und 
Neuorientierung. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 57-83. 
Scharpf, Fritz W., 1994: Community and autonomy: multi-level policy-making in the 
European Union. In: Journal of European Public Policy 1(2), 219-242. 
Scharpf, Fritz W., 1997: Games real actors play: Actor-centered institutionalism in 
policy research. Boulder: Westview. 
Scharpf, Fritz W., 1999: Regieren in Europa. Effektiv und demokratisch? 
Frankfurt/Main: Campus. 
Scharpf, Fritz W., 2002: The European social model: coping with the challenges of 
diversity. In: Journal of Common Market Studies 40, 645-670. 
Scharpf, Fritz W., 2005: Problem solving effectiveness and democratic accountability in 
the EU.  IHS Working Paper Political Sciences Series, 107, Wien: Institut für 
Höhere Studien <http://www.ihs.ac.at/>. 
Scharpf, Fritz W., 2006: The joint-decision trap revisited. In: Journal of Common 
Market Studies 44(4), 845-864. 
Schedler, Andreas, 1999: Conceptualizing accountability. In: Andreas Schedler/Larry 
Diamond/Marc F. Plattner (eds.), The self-restraining state. Power and 
accountability in new democracies. Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, London, 
13-28. 
Scherrer, Christoph, 2004: Bildungswesen unter Globalisierungsdruck. Die 
Kernbestimmungen des GATS und deren Folgen. In: Utopie Kreativ 159, 19-29 
<http://www.rosalux.de/>. 
 183
Schickler, Eric, 2001: Disjointed pluralism. Institutional innovation and the 
development of the U.S. congress. Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
Schmidt, Manfred G., 2000: Demokratietheorien. Eine Einführung. 3. Auflage. 
Opladen: Leske+Budrich. 
Schmidt, Manfred G., 2003: Die "komplexe Demokratietheorie" nach drei Jahrzehnten. 
In: Renate Mayntz/Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), Die Reformierbarkeit der 
Demokratie. Innovationen und Blockaden. Frankfurt/New York: Campus, 151-
172. 
Schmimmelfennig, Frank, 2004: Liberal Intergovernmentalism. In: Antje 
Wiener/Thomas Diez (eds.), European Integration Theory. Oxford, New York, 
Auckland: Oxford University Press, 75-94. 
Schmitter, Philippe C., 2004a: The quality of democracy: The ambiguous virtues of 
accountability. In: Journal of Democracy 15(4), 47-60. 
Schmitter, Phillipe C., 2004b: Neo-Neofunctionalism. In: Antje Wiener/Thomas Diez 
(eds.), European Integration Theory. Oxford, New York, Auckland: Oxford 
University Press, 45-74. 
Schriewer, Jürgen, 2005: Bologna und kein Ende. Die iterative Konstitution eines 
europäischen Hochschulraums. In: Rüdiger Hohls/Iris Schröder/Hannes Siegrist 
(eds.), Europa und die Europäer. Quellen und Essays zur modernen 
europäischen Geschichte. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 461-468. 
Seib, Marion, 2005: Nationale und internationale Perspektiven des Bologna-Prozesses - 
Eine kritische Halbzeitbilanz nach der Bergen-Konferenz. In: Politische Studien 
404, 22-33. 
Seifert, Michaela, 2004: Rechtliche Grundlagen des Bologna-Prozesses und der 
Lissabon-Strategie - Europaweite Vereinheitlichung der Studienstrukturen und 
Maßnahmen zur Erleichterung der Anerkennung von Diplomen.  EI Working 
Paper, 56, Wien: Europainstitut Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien <http://epub.wu-
wien.ac.at/dyn/virlib/wp/mediate/epub-wu-01_6de.pdf?ID=epub-wu-01_6de>. 
Senden, Linda, 2004: Soft law in European Community law. Oxford/Portland: Hart 
Publishing. 
Sheehan, Kim, 2001: E-mail survey response rates: A review. In: Journal of Computer-
Mediated Communication 6(2) 
<http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol6/issue2/sheehan.html>. 
Simon, Herbert A., 1985: Human nature in politics: The dialogue of psychology with 
political science. In: American Political Science Review 79, 293-304. 
Smith, Christine B., 1997: Casting the net: Surveying an Internet population. In: 
Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 3(1) 
<http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol3/issue1/smith.html>. 
Smith, Steve, 1994: Reasons of state. In: David Held/Christopher Pollitt (eds.), New 
forms of democracy. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 
192-217. 
Snidal, Duncan, 1991: Relative gains and the pattern of international cooperation. In: 
American Political Science Review 85(701-26). 
Stake, Robert E., 2000: Case studies. In: Norman K. Denzin/Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds.), 
Handbook of qualitative research. Second Edition. Thousand Oaks, London , 
New Delhi: Sage Publications, 435-454. 
Stone Sweet, Alec, 2004: The judicial construction of Europe. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Stone Sweet, Alec/Wayne Sandholtz, 1997: European integration and supranational 
governance. In: Journal of European Public Policy 4(3), 297-317. 
 184
Streeck, Wolfgang, 1995: From market-making to state-building? Reflections on the 
political economy of European social policy. In: Stephan Leibfried/Paul Pierson 
(eds.), European social policy between fragmentation and integration. 
Washington: Brookings, 389–431. 
Streeck, Wolfgang, 1996: Neo-voluntarism. A new European social policy regime? In: 
Gary Marks/Fritz W. Scharpf/Phillipe C. Schmitter/Wolfgang Streeck (eds.), 
Governance in the European Union. London: Sage. 
Streeck, Wolfgang/Kathleen Thelen, 2005: Introduction: Institutional change in 
advanced political economies. In: Wolfgang Streeck/Kathleen Thelen (eds.), 
Beyond Continuity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-39. 
Szyszczak, Erika, 2006: Experimental governance: The open method of coordination. 
In: European Law Journal 12(4), 486-502. 
Tauch, Christian, 2004: Almost half-time in the Bologna Process - Where do we stand? 
In: European Journal of Education 39(3), 275-288. 
Teichler, Ulrich, 1998: The role of the European Union in the internationalization of 
higher education. In: Peter Scott (ed.) The globalization of higher education. 
Buckingham: The Society for Research into Higher Education & Open 
University Press, 88-99. 
Teichler, Ulrich, 2004: The changing debate on internationalisation of higher education. 
In: Higher Education 48(1), 5-26. 
Teichler, Ulrich, 2005: Hochschulsysteme und Hochschulpolitik. Quantitative und 
strukturelle Dynamiken, Differenzierungen und der Bologna-Prozess. 
Studienreihe Bildungs-und Wissenschaftsmanagement. Münster/New York: 
Waxmann. 
Teichler, Ulrich, 2006: Changing structures of the higher education systems: The 
increasing complexity of underlying forces. In: Higher Education Policy 19, 
447-461. 
Teixeira, Pedro Nuno, 2006: Markets in higher education: Can we still learn from 
economics' founding fathers?  CSHE Paper,(4): Center for Studies in Higher 
Education <http://repositories.cdlib.org/cshe/CSHE-4-06/>. 
Theisens, Henno, 2001: United Kingdom. In: Jeroen Huisman/Frans Kaiser (eds.), 
Fixed and fuzzy boundaries in higher education. A comparative study of (binary) 
structures in nine countries. The Hague: Advisory Council of Science and 
Technology Policy, 103-109. 
Thelen, Kathleen, 2003: How institutions evolve. Insights from comparative historical 
analysis. In: James Mahoney/Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds.), Comparative 
historical analysis in the social sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 208-240. 
Thomassen, Jacques/Hermann Schmitt, 2006: Democracy and legitimacy in the 
European Union. In: Tidsskrift for Samfunnsforskning 45(1), 377-410. 
Trondal, Jarle, 2002: The europeanisation of research and higher educational policies - 
some reflections.  European Integration online Papers, 6:  
<http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2002-012.pdf>. 
Trow, Martin A., 2000: Some consequences of the new information and communication 
technologies for higher education.  CSHE Paper,(5): Center for Studies in 
Higher Education <http://repositories.cdlib.org/cshe/CSHE5-00/>. 
Trubek, David M./Patrick Cottrell/Mark Nance, 2005: "Soft law", "Hard law", and 
European Integration: Towards a theory of hybridity.  Jean Monnet Working 
Paper, 02, New York: NYU School of Law 
<http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/index.html>. 
 185
Tuten, Tracey L., 1997: Electronic methods of collecting survey data: A review of "e-
research".  ZUMA-Arbeitsbericht,(9):  
<http://www.gesis.org/Publikationen/Berichte/ZUMA_Arbeitsberichte/97/97_09
.pdf>. 
UNESCO, 2006a: Global education digest 2006. Comparing education statistics around 
the world. Montreal: UNESCO Institute for Statistics 
<http://www.uis.unesco.org/TEMPLATE/pdf/ged/2006/GED2006.pdf>. 
UNESCO, 2006b: International standard classification of education. ISCED 1997. Re-
edition.  <http://www.uis.unesco.org/TEMPLATE/pdf/isced/ISCED_A.pdf>. 
Van der Wende, Marijk, 2003: Globalisation and access to higher education. In: Journal 
of Studies in International Education 7(2), 193-206. 
Vijlder, Frans J. de, 2001: Globalisation of higher education. What roles for nation 
states? In: European Journal of Education Law and Policy 5(1-2), 159-162. 
Vlk, Aleš, 2006: Higher education and GATS. Regulatory consequences and 
stakeholders' responses. Enschede: CHEPS 
<http://www.utwente.nl/cheps/documenten/thesisvlk.pdf>. 
Wächter, Bernd, 2004: The Bologna Process: developments and prospects. In: 
European Journal of Education 39(3), 265-273. 
Walkenhorst, Heiko, 2005: The changing role of EU education policy - a critical 
assessment. Paper presented at: EUSA Ninth Biennial International Conference, 
Austin. 
Wallace, Helen, 2005a: An institutional anatomy and five policy modes. In: Helen 
Wallace/William Wallace/Mark A. Pollack (eds.), Policy-making in the 
European Union. Fifth edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Wallace, Helen/William Wallace/Mark A. Pollack (eds.), 2005: Policy-making in the 
European Union. Fifth edition. In. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Wallace, William, 2005b: Post-sovereign governance: The EU as a partial polity. In: 
Helen Wallace/William Wallace/Mark A. Pollack (eds.), Policy-making in the 
European Union. Fifth Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Waltz, Kenneth N., 1979: Theory of international politics. New York: Random House. 
Welsh, Helga A., 2004: Higher education in Germany: reform in incremental steps. In: 
European Journal of Education 39(3), 359-375. 
Wessels, Wolfgang, 1997: An ever closer fusion? A dynamic macropolitical view on 
integration processes. In: Journal of Common Market Studies 35(2), 267-299. 
Wessels, Wolfgang/Ingo Linsenmann, 2002: Die offene(n) Methode(n) der 
Koordinierung (OMC). Beitrag zur Sitzung des Expertenrates Konvent. 
Staatskanzlei des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen <http://www.uni-koeln.de/wiso-
fak/powi/wessels/DE/PUBLIKATIONEN/texte/koordinierung.pdf>. 
Weymann, Ansgar/Kerstin Martens, 2005: Bildungspolitik durch internationale 
Organisationen. Entwicklung, Strategien und Bedeutung der OECD. In: 
Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie 30(4), 68-86. 
White Paper, 2003: The future of higher education. Department for education and skills 
<http://www.dfes.gov.uk/hegateway/strategy/hestrategy/pdfs/DfES-
HigherEducation.pdf>. 
Williams, Gareth, 1999: State finance of higher education: An overview of theoretical 
and empirical issues. In: Mary Henkel/Brenda Little (eds.), Changing 
relationships between higher education and the state. London: Jessica Kingsley, 
142-161. 
Witte, Johanna Katharina, 2006: Change of degrees and degrees of change. Comparing 
adaptions of European higher education systems in the context of the Bologna 
 186
process. Enschede: CHEPS/University Twente 
<http://www.che.de/downloads/C6JW144_final.pdf>. 
Wolf, Klaus Dieter, 1989: Das antarktische Regime für die Nutzung mineralischer 
Rohstoffe. Die Struktur von internationalen Regimen als Problem der 
Regimeanalyse. In: Beate Kohler-Koch (ed.) Regime in den internationalen 
Beziehungen. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 151-178. 
Wolf, Klaus Dieter, 1999: The new raison d'état as a problem for democracy in world 
society. In: European Journal of International Relations 5(3), 333-363. 
Wolf, Klaus Dieter, 2000: Die Neue Staatsräson - Zwischenstaatliche Kooperation als 
Demokratieproblem in der Weltgesellschaft. Plädoyer für eine geordnete 
Entstaatlichung des Regierens jenseits des Staates. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
Wolf, Klaus Dieter, 2007: Private actors and the legitimacy of governance beyond the 
state. Conceptional outlines and empirical explorations. In: Arthur Benz/Yannis 
Papadopoulos (eds.), Governance and democracy. Comparing national 
European and international experiences. London, New York: Routledge, 200-
227. 
World Bank, 2002: Constructing knowledge societies: New challenges for tertiary 
education. Washington, DC: World Bank 
<http://www1.worldbank.org/education/pdf/Tertiary%20Education%20Paper%2
04-10.pdf>. 
Young, Oran R., 1991: Political leadership and regime formation: On the development 
of institutions in international society. In: International Organization 45(3), 281-
308. 
Young, Oran R., 1994: International Governance. Protecting the environment in a 
stateless society. Cornell Studies in Political Economy. Ithaca/London: Cornell 
University Press. 
Young, Oran R., 1999: Comment on Andrew Moravcsik, "A new statecraft? 
Supranational entrepreneurs and international cooperation". In: International 
Organization 53(4), 805-809. 
Yun, Gi Woong/Craig W. Trumbo, 2000: Comparative response to a survey executed 
by post, e-mail, and web form. In: Journal of Computer-Mediated 
Communication 6(1) <http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol6/issue1/yun.html>. 
Zangl, Bernhard, 1999: Interessen auf zwei Ebenen. Internationale Regime in der 
Agrarhandels-, Währungs- und Walfangpolitik. Baden-Baden: Nomos. 
Zgaga, Pavel, 2003: Bologna Process between Prague and Berlin. Report to the 
ministers of education of the signatory countries. Berlin: Follow-Up Group of 
the Bologna process <http://www.bologna-bergen2005.no/Docs/00-
Main_doc/0309ZGAGA.PDF>. 
Zgaga, Pavel, 2005: Current trends in higher education in Europe. Paper presented at: 
The World Bank. Second ECA Education Conference (2-4 October), Dubrovnik 
<http://mt.educarchile.cl/mt/jjbrunner/archives/TrendsDEF.pdf>. 
Zgaga, Pavel, 2006: Looking out: The Bologna process in a global setting. On the 
“external dimension” of the Bologna process. Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of 
Education and Research 
<http://www.bolognaoslo.com/expose/sites/bolognaoslo/default.asp?s=1&id=51
>. 
Zürn, Michael, 1992: Interessen und Institutionen in der internationalen Politik. 
Grundlegung und Anwendung des situationsstrukturellen Ansatzes. Opladen: 
Leske+Budrich. 
 187
Zürn, Michael, 1996: Über den Staat und die Demokratie im europäischen 
Mehrebenensystem. In: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 37(1), 27-55. 
Zürn, Michael, 1998: Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaates. Edition Zweite Moderne. 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
Zürn, Michael, 2000: Democratic governance beyond the nation-state. In: Michael 
Thomas Greven/Louis W. Pauly (eds.), Democracy beyond the state? The 
European dilemma and the emerging global order. Lanham, Boulder, New 
York, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 91-114. 
 
 
16.1 Newspapers and magazines 
 
Der Standard 
 
Die Presse 
 
Die Welt 
 
Süddeutsche Zeitung 
 
The Guardian 
 
The Times Higher Education Supplement 

Wien, im März 2008 
 
Lebenslauf 
 
Name: Florian Feldbauer 
Geburtsdatum/-ort: 4. Dezember 1980, Wels 
Staatsbürgerschaft: Österreich 
 
Ausbildung: 
 
Oktober 2004-September 2007: Scholar in der Abteilung Politikwissenschaft, 
Institut für Höhere Studien, Wien 
10. Dezember 2004: Studienabschluss 
Oktober 2000-Dezember 2004: Studium der Politikwissenschaft Universität Wien 
 Diplomarbeit: „„Europa“ in der schulischen 
politischen Bildung“ 
28. Juni 1999 Matura 
September 1991-Juni 1999: Bundesrealgymnasium Wels 
